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Abstract 
This thesis examines indigenous movements and political organising in the 
Amazonian region in Ecuador. Specifically, it considers how indigenous 
movements have been created over the last decades to challenge land reforms and 
colonisation programs, neoliberal policies and oil development through both 
formal and informal political processes. The theoretical framework of the thesis 
combines the concerns of political ecology and new social movement analysis in 
order to investigate the ways in which notions of cultural identity, territory and 
place, and control over access become central to indigenous politics and struggles. 
The empirical case study is of the Shuar movement of the province of Morona 
Santiago and relies on qualitative methodologies with a particular focus on 
ethnographic investigation, participant observation, documentary analysis and in- 
depth interviews. 
Following the introduction (Chapter 1), the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), 
and methodology (Chapter 3), the thesis turns to the Shuar case study itself. 
Specifically, Chapter 4 presents an overview of indigenous struggles and oil 
politics in Ecuador that sets the scene for the empirical analysis of Chapters 5,6, 
and 7. Thus, in Chapter 5 the aim is to examine the way in which the Shuar 
struggle has been partly about the articulation of Shuar cultural identity and its 
deployment in political battles with both the Ecuadorian State and transnational 
oil companies. In contrast, Chapter 6 considers how that struggle has itself come 
to be defined in terms of particular geographical notions of Shuar territoriality and 
sense of place. Here, the effort by the Shuar movement to advance indigenous 
interests through the interweaving of ancestral and ecological claims is explored. 
Then, in Chapter 7 the ways in which the Shuar struggle involves a complex 
politics of land and resource access is investigated. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises 
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Campo Countryside, field 
Centro Centre/s 
Chakra Agricultural land 
Chicha A traditional fermented drink made of juka 
Colono Refers to any person who lives in an IERAC designated 
individual parcel and has come from somewhere else (highlands, 




Gringo Westerners (first used for Americans) 
Indigena Indigenous 
Indigenismo Classification of Indigenous Peoples 
Indio Indian 
Jivaro Terminology used for the Shuar by the missionaries and the 
Spanish 
Juca Cassava 
Kamote Sweet Potato 
La compahia The company. All multinational corporations and the various 
service industries they contract, regardless of site of origin are 








Naranjilla Citrus fruit 
Oriente Here refers to the Amazonian region of Ecuador 
Palmito A type of palm tree 







Tierras Baltidas Fallow lands 
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Words used by the Shuar 
Arutam The protecting god of the forest 
Etsa The sun, a cultural hero 
Huayusa A tea that the Shuar drink in the mornings 
If Nunke Our territory 
Kashi Guanta (a small animal that looks like a Guinea Pig) 
Mundo Shuar Publications about Shuar culture, customs, myths, gender 
relations, ethnohistory 
Nantu The moon 
Nunkui The earth spirit 
Tsantsa Shrunken heads 
Tsunki The water spirit/ mistress of shamanism 
UW1 Chonta 
Uwishint Shuar shaman 
Acronyms 
AIEPRA Asociacion de Indigenas Evangelicos de Pastaza, Region 
AmazOnica 
ARCO Atlantic Richfield Company 
ARUTAM A guerrilla-styled organisation of ex-militaries 
CDES Centro de Derechos Economicos y Sociales 
CONAIE ConfederaciOn de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador 
CONDEMIPE Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos 
Ecuadorianas 
CONFENAIIE ConfederaciOn de Nacionalidades de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana 
CTI Circurnscripcion Territorial Indigena (Indigenous Territorial 
Circumscription) 
ECORAE Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo de la Region AmazOnica 
Ecuatoriana 
EIA Estudio de Impacto Ambiental 
FICSHA FederaciOn Interprovincial de Centros Shuar-Achuar 
FICSH FederaciOn Interprovincial de Centros Shuar del Ecuador 
FINAE FederaciOn Interprovincial de la Nacionalidad Achuar del 
Ecuador 
FIPSE FederaciOn Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador 
IERAC Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agrario y Colonizacion 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INDA Instituto Nacional de Desaffollo Agrario 
INEFAN Instituto Ecuatoriano Forestal de Areas Naturales y Vida Silvestre 
Isis The Institute for Science and Interdisciplinary Studies 
MEM Ministry of Energy and Mining 
NGO Non-governmental. organisation 
OCP Oleuducto de Crudos Pesados 
OPI1p OrganizaciOn de Pueblos Indigenas del Pastaza 
OSHE OrganizaciOn Shuar del Ecuador 
PSUR Componente de Recursos Naturales del Programa de 
Sostenibilidad y Union Regional 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This thesis examines political organising by indigenous movements in the Amazon 
region in Ecuador. It considers how indigenous movements of the Shuar people have 
emerged there in the last decades in response to exterrially-led land reforms and 
colonisation, neoliberal policies, oil development, as well as agricultural and rural 
development programs. It considers the ways in which these movements have engaged 
in both formal and informal political processes. Exploring the complex and multi- 
faceted struggles of indigenous movements sheds light on the social and political 
possibilities embodied by them as well as the broader impact of indigenous struggles in 
the contemporary era. 
This empirical focus is situated theoretically with reference to work on new social 
movements, indigenous politics, cultural identity, territory and resource conflicts 
(Robbins 2004; Neumann 2005). In particular, a political ecology perspective has 
proved invaluable insofar as it helps to guard against overgeneralizations about 
indigenous struggles and, as we will see with the case study of the Shuar movement, 
especially vis-a-vis the ambiguous relationship between indigenous organisations and 
indigenous communities. The thesis thus builds upon the work of Bebbington (2001) 
and others critical of the persistent myth of the 'noble savage' in order to emphasise the 
complexity and ambiguity of an indigenous politics driven by differentiated interests 
and strategies. The thesis notably charts the relation between oil politics and indigenous 
movements by examining how forms of identity construction, territoriality, resource 
control and governance are elaborated as a reaction to neoliberal policies and oil-based 
development in order to understand the dynamics of struggles in indigenous areas. 
The investigation of indigenous movements looms large in political ecology. But 
'indigenous movement' turns out to be a sort of key word whose meanings is always 
unstable and contested and wrapped up in complex ways with social and environmental 
problems (Seracombe and Sellato 2005; Watts 2004). Indigenous movements are 
typically invoked as a single unity, as an undifferentiated entity, which speak with a 
single voice to the state, transnational corporations, non-govemmental organisations 
(NGOs) or other actors. Indigenous movements are of course nothing of the sort. 
Indeed, indigenous actors within a movement express quiet different sorts of social 
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relations and thus have to be understood in terms of inequality--not everyone 
participates or benefits equally in the construction and reproduction of the movement, 
let alone the claims made in the name of indigenous people. As social projects get 
under way and begin to succeed, the prospect of internal dissent within these 
movements is an ever-present threat--especi ally in a context in which powerful 
opponents seek to subvert their activities. The complex processes arising from this 
recognition of indigenous heterogeneity are discussed in Chapters 5 to 7. Here, it is 
important to understand generally that these internal differences have become 
manifested in new struggles within and between indigenous organisations and 
communities. As such, the thesis takes a critical stance on indigenous politics in 
general, and the relationship between indigenous political organisations and 
communities in particular. 
Further, the assumption of much of the literature is that grassroots actors, such as 
indigenous organisations, will carry forward 'alternative' agendas (Bebbington and 
Bebbington 2001). Again, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, indigenous 
commitment to 'traditional' agro-ecological techniques often asserted to exist by social 
scientists and development activists is in fact often missing from the practices of some 
indigenous organisations, who focus on reforming dominant models of development 
while keeping hold of principles of local control, democratisation, and community- 
based 'sustainable' development. Thus, intellectual concepts and indigenous practice 
may differ in some respect even as they may converge over wider political objectives. 
These preliminary reflections illustrate how analyses of indigenous movements can 
benefit from a more critical look at indigenous strategies as well as the factors 
underlying them. These strategies are hence not mere 'adaptations to the environment' 
as per early variants of cultural ecology (Bryant and Bailey 1997). They are also 
influenced by cultural and political logics and socio-economic exigencies. Furthermore, 
they may take on a form that may seem counter-intuitive-the incorporation of modem 
technology and administration methods as a part of cultural survival for instance. 
Looking more carefully at why such 'anomalous' behaviour happens addresses 
important questions in political ecology about the 'real world' conditions under which 
knowledge and practices become part of indigenous struggles in the modem era 
(Neuman 2005). 
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This introductory chapter thus begins with a brief overview of political ecology and 
indigenous movements. Here, the concern is to note how Indigenous political 
organising- whether it is individualized resistance, social movements or community 
politics- is related to questions of access and control of natural resources and land. I 
then turn to the political and economic context in which (alternative) development 
needs to be situated in Latin America. Here, of specific concern is the intersection 
between indigenous organisations and the state, and how indigenous identity and 
culture are portrayed politically. This initial set of reflections will be elaborated in 
setting out the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 even as it provides an appropriate 
basis for the case study at the heart of this thesis. Based on extensive fieldwork 
conducted between June 2002 and July 2004, that case study considers how the Shuar 
people in the Ecuadorian Amazon (the Oriente) emerged as viable political actors. The 
main focus in doing so is on a fairly short but nonetheless vital period stretching from 
the late 1990s to the early 2000s and this effort constitutes the first in-depth study of the 
Shuar struggle in southern Ecuador. The political awakening that occurred at this time 
comprised local political organising and development strategies, embraced ethnic and 
territorial claims as well as associated local resource control through sustained political 
engagement. These strategies have become increasingly complex and multifaceted over 
time, yet an underlying vision, exists based on opposition by most Shuar people to oil- 
based development and neoliberal policies that are seen to marginalise local people, 
politically, economically and culturally. 
1.1 Political Organising by Indigenous Movements 
A central theme in political ecology since its inception has been the political and 
ecological oppression of indigenous people by more powerful actors such as states and 
businesses. The ability of indigenous people to resist the predations of the powerful is 
also emphasised in the work of political ecologists. Indigenous people rarely accept an 
oppressive fate passively (although 'adaptation' does occur), but strike out at 
oppressors in both covert and overt ways. Such resistance is also not new as the 
discussion of indigenous resistance in the colonial era demonstrates (Doolittle 2005; 
Guha 1989; Kathinthamby-Wells 2005; Neumann 1992; Peluso 1992; Bryant 1997a). 
1 The Ecuadorian Amazon is commonly known as the Oriente. Here this concept will be used when 
referring specifically to Ecuadorian Amazonian territory. 
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However, the recent spread of democratic political regimes in the Third World has 
arguably reduced the likelihood that states will respond in an especially coercive 
manner. An intriguing development in terms of the topography of a politicised 
environment since the 1980s has thus been the emergence of indigenous organisations 
as a political force to be reckoned with in many parts of the Third World. Ecuador 
affords an interesting example to explore these important shifts, both because of the 
organisational strength of the country's indigenous movements (an important regional 
referent since the 1990s) and because of the movement's ability to challenge powerful 
political, economic and cultural notions and practices. 
Many indigenous groups have sought to fight the oppression of powerful actors through 
what James Scott (1985) calls 'everyday resistance'. Everyday resistance is widely 
resorted to by grassroots actors (indigenous people, poor farmers, shifting cultivators 
and the like) when open confrontation with powerful actors carries the real prospect of 
severe retribution. Scott (1985) highlights in the agrarian context how everyday forms 
of resistance are embedded in daily life rather than manifested in revolutionary events. 
He found that in a Malaysian village dominated by state officials and landlords, there 
developed covert forms of resistance such as foot dragging, false compliance, poaching 
and anonymous threats. In this context, the 'weak' were motivated by a sense of social 
in-justice and the need for survival in a context where power relations constrained open 
forms of resistance. 
Consideration of the strategy of everyday resistance is potentially useful in overturning 
the myth of suppressed people as 'powerless' insofar as it shows cases of the micro- 
powers' that the poor can use to erode the foundations of established social and 
political relations. In particular, it forces us to question the view of social compliance 
by the weak as positive affirmation and to search for other behaviour, such as 
'unremarkable' daily resistance. Scott (1990) understood such resistance as a daily 
expression of words, multiple meanings and complex actions. In the context of 
exploring indigenous struggles against the oil industry in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 
Scott's work offers potentially helpful insights by some Shuar acting at individual level. 
Yet, as our case study will also illustrate, such micro strategies have clear limits in 
resisting oppression. The limitations of everyday resistance 
become clearer when the 
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technique is contrasted with formally organised indigenous movements. Whereas 
indigenous movements are overt and collective, everyday resistance is covert and often 
individual; while movements often directly challenge political and economic norms, 
everyday resistance does so only indirectly (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Neumann 2005; 
Robbins 2004). It is precisely the anonymity of everyday resistance that is its greatest 
strength and, paradoxically, yet also its gravest weakness. Everyday resistance may 
ultimately undermine a detested political or economic order, but will only do so in the 
long-term, if ever. As a result, the 'weapons of the weak' should not be overly 
romanticised in that they are "unlikely to do more than marginally affect the various 
forms of exploitation that peasants confront" (Scott 1985: 29-30). Thus, indigenous 
movements are often seen to pose a more direct challenge to the prevailing economic 
and political order (Watts 1998; Bryant 2000). 
Indigenous movements are not a new phenomena. Indeed, in our case study there is 
some evidence of organising as far back as the 1960s. However, it is only since the 
1980s they have become a central means by which indigenous people have sought for 
social justice and local control of natural resources and land. This surge in activity can 
be explained partly in terms of intensified social and environmental problems facing 
indigenous people (and other grassroots actors for that matter) and the growing ability 
of these movements to openly address local social and environmental problems without 
prior state support (Cecena 2004; Gibson et al. 2000; Ghai and Vivian 1992). Such 
movements develop as a collective reaction to planned or existing activities that 
Jeopardise the livelihoods of indigenous people, even as connections to national and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often vital to their success. 
Many indigenous organisations have added weight to this challenge insofar as they seek 
to by-pass the state altogether through local autonomy and governance (Bebbington 
2004). Thus, these organisations seek to integrate environmental and development 
concerns in such a way as to promote long-term indigenous resource management. 
Ideas of 'appropriate' resource management are often embedded into their criticisms of 
development projects of powerful actors that they oppose. 
Thus, the growth of indigenous movements can be seen to reflect a shift in wider state 
society relations and the growing power and assertiveness of 'civil society' and 'social 
movements vis-a-vis the state in many Third World countries since the late 1980s 
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(Peet and Watts 2004). That increasing role, in turn, is linked to the declining ability 
and/or willingness of the state to provide for public social and environmental well- 
being. Chapter 2 highlights literature that underscores how the state has failed for 
various reasons to live up to its self-proclaimed role as both as a developer and steward 
of the environment. Indeed, there is the perception that states have even contributed to- 
rather than mitigated- poverty and environmental degradation, thereby encouraging 
diverse groups in civil society to become assertive over social justice issues (Simmons 
2002). Thus, the growth of indigenous movements largely unregulated by, and distinct 
from, the state poses wider questions about the shifting relationship between civil 
society and the state over the environment (Escobar 1995; Ghai 1992; Bebbington 
2004). 
The emergence of indigenous movements also relates to what Foucault (1980) 
describes as 'reverse discourses'--the power to oppose and even change some of the 
structures of domination and governance (this will be discussed in Chapter 2). 
Zimmerman (2001: 18) examines the question of governability in this regard as the 
failure of the state "to totalise all social relations constituting the nation". In this 
situation, "the state [which is] required to maintain and extend given international and 
local socio-economic power relations has to exert such pressure over one or more social 
sectors or social configurations" (Zimmerman 2001: 18). By attempting to control 
multiple social contradictions, however the state may create the conditions for its own 
opposition and resistance to a given construction of hegemonic social relations. The 
emergence of this challenge relates to 'points of resistance' within the network of 
power (Foucault 1980). As the Shuar case considered in this thesis attests, indigenous 
movements can challenge and even redraw the boundaries of the political as long- 
standing notions of appropriate political conduct by state agencies or political parties 
are undermined or weakened. The role of indigenous movements has also been to 
reveal the political essence in the everyday lives of indigenous people and hence the 
need for political responses (Slater 1994b). 
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The political ecology perspective, as selectively discussed here, is important for this 
thesis in order to explain the indigenous movements that have emerged In Ecuador. 2 
However, the emergence of indigenous organisations, the politicisation of indigenous 
identity, and demands for indigenous rights to territory and resource access in Ecuador 
challenges historical norms and scholarly conclusions about the politication of 
indigenous movements in Latin America. Indeed, many scholars of indigenous people 
have still not reflected adequately upon the complex and multi-faceted nature of such 
struggles and 'modem' forms of doing indigenous politics (Bebbington and Bebbington 
2001). In contrast, this thesis suggests that indigenous organisations often focus on 
participating in mainstream political discourses and development projects even while 
asserting principles of local control, autonomous governance, 'traditional' production 
systems, and community-based sustainable development (Bebbington 2001). Thus, it is 
important to carefully analysis these processes to understand the conditions under 
which indigenous practices and knowledge become part of a wider network of political 
organising. By organising politically, people may gain greater control and access to 
resources and land, form new relations, and acquire new identities that in turn enable 
new freedoms and actions. 
Further, where official policies promote local participation in land and resource 
management, they may be well received by local communities. Importantly, these 
benefits are not (at least entirely) about money. This has been found, for instance where 
local people acquire access to 'culturally meaningful' benefits (Colchester 1992; 
Lawrence 2002). One such possible benefit is the opportunity to negotiate on their own 
terms and to meet their own needs, whether they are cultural, material or spiritual. With 
such 'negotiated' claims there is typically an increasing demand by local communities 
to influence decisions regarding local access to and management of resources and land. 
In many cases, indigenous people articulate the need to 4protect' resources and 
land in a 
stance that echoes some of the views of conservation-minded scientists. 
Yet, these self- 
imposed restrictions may actually be designed pragmatically to assist them 
in securing 
formal access to land and resources in the expectation that they will still 
be able to use 
local resources to improve their socio-economic situation 
(Neumann 2005). Indeed, it 
can bring local benefits across a range of social, political and environmental relations. 
2 Even in the past few years, there has been a boom in publications dealing with social movements and/or 
political ecology in Ecuador (for example, Bebbington 
2004; Perreault 2003a, b; Radcliffe 2001 a, b; 
Sawyer 1997,2004; Selverston-Scher 2001; Yashar 1998). 
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Much of this can be seen by the close examination of multiple perspectives on claims to 
land and resources based on different discursive concerns and relations (Hajer 1995; 
Thompson and Rayner 1998). Thus, it is important to understand possible changes in 
social and political relations of perceived benefit to local communities resulting from 
those multiple perspectives and stances taken in indigenous struggles. 
A number of implications stem from political ecology analysis of indigenous 
movements and which are central to this thesis. Chapter 2 offers a more detailed 
assessment but here key issues are noted. First, forms of access to resources and land 
are closely linked to the identity question. Second, identity is often articulated in the 
name of 'tradition' and 'culture'; however these are not stable but rather interpreted and 
contested by particular constituencies in favour of particular interests. Third, identity 
and culture can be used strategically as a way to acquire political and financial support 
in order to further access and control various forms of property. Fourth, to the extent 
that indigenous movements can be understood as complex 'fields of powers' they are 
accordingly differentiated socially, politically and economically. Fifth, indigenous 
communities are rarely isolated, which means that the fields of power are typically non- 
local in key ways (for example, local communities in the pay of the state or oil 
companies or indigenous organisations working together with national and international 
NGOs). And, not the least, indigenous movements have to be rendered politically and 
understood as consisting of multiple and contrasting interests and alliances (Li 2004). 
This can be termed 'stakeholders' --a curiously weak term--but often what is at stake is 
the identification of different forms of political power and authority. This discussion, in 
turn, appropriately frames the empirical concerns of this thesis that are taken up in 
chapters 4-7. As such, the emergence of indigenous movements and political organising 
that proclaims and promotes indigenous identity and rights constitutes a phenomena 
that merits explanation in its own right--let alone as a process that increasingly shapes 
wider social and political processes. 
1.2 Culture, Identity and Politics 
To understand the political dynamics of indigenous movements is to appreciate how 
they are related to the interaction of cultural identity politics. This thesis therefore 
explores the different ways in which indigenous people have mobilised around 
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indigenous culture and identity in order to challenge the prevailing political order. The 
indigenous movements that are considered here are those that explicitly construct a 
political strategy for the defence of culture and identity linked to particular places and 
territories. 
This concern of the thesis reflects a wider historical trend. In the 1980s a new form of 
identity politics emerged in Latin America, most notably among indigenous people. 
This politics rejected previous national and populist projects as well as traditional leftist 
articulations of identity based on class that had pigeonholed rural indigenous people as 
campesinos (peasants), and that had left class-conscious outside leaders as the 
mediators of their voice and vision (Selverston-Scher 1994). In contrast, the new 
politics of mobilisation is based on the agency of indigenous people themselves in 
which ethnic differences are seen to be central to identity as well as the recognition and 
re-articulation of what Mignolo (2000b) refers to as colonial difference, colonial 
legacies, and ethnic struggle. 3 In Latin America, indigenous people have thus sought to 
transform social and political structures of the past, mostly associated with a 
subordinated segregation characteristic of colonial times, and policies of indigenismo 
by politically strengthening collective indigenous identities (both national and 
transnational) (Assies et al. 2001). The concept of indigeneity has proved critical here. 
This concept describes a political discourse of indigenous citizenship as a post-colonial 
response to historical subjugation of indigenous people, as well as to their displacement 
from an imaginary of the nation-state in which they live (Quijano 2000; see also 
Chapter 5). 
The challenge faced by indigenous movements in Latin America is to respond in a 
concrete way to a long history of exclusion and marginalisation linked to oppressive 
political and economic conditions in a way that simultaneously strengthens cultural 
identity and political opportunities. In fact, the strategic politicisation of identity and 
culture by indigenous movements takes on new significance in the current climate of 
globalisation. At a time of the alleged crisis and erosion of the nation-state and of 
neoliberal projects that transform capitalism, indigenous strategies are also symbolic 
and cultural as well as economic (Guardiola-Rivera 2000). This significance resides, in 
3 For an important and critical discussion of the category of 'class' and the current trend to make it more 
one link in a chain of identities associated with the new social movements, see 
Laclau (2000). 
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part, in the articulation of an emergent and highly reflective and self-consci IOUs 
subjectivity within the movements and articulated by their leaders. The broad aim has 
been the incorporation of ethnic concerns within the existing nation-state structure. At 
the same time, however, the goal is to bring into question the very concepts, constructs 
and institutions of the state, such as citizenship, democracy, and nation (Doolittle 2005: 
Guardiola-Rivera 2002; Saldaana-Portillo 2003). 
In the context of this study, it is indeed not surprising that the Ecuadorian state has 
sought to control indigenous movements. However, the latter have begun to exercise a 
new form of politics and agency within a cultural framework, thereby attempting to 
enter the sphere of governance on their own terms as we shall see. The mobilisations of 
the late 1990s, accompanied with demands for legal recognition of territorial rights and 
a cplurinational' state, forced the state not only to take into account the indigenous 
movements and to award collective land titles, but also to seek ways in which to 
incorporate indigenous opposition into the state apparatus itself (Sawyer 2004). 
Connected as they are to a larger matrix of Ecuadorian, Latin American, and indeed 
global indigenous and environmental organising, these struggles are nevertheless 
situated within and build upon an indigenous politics in Ecuador that seeks to transform 
indigenous people's place in the nation (Howitt 2001). 
Some scholars have thus turned their attention to the notion of cultural politics, or the 
process enacted when sets of social actors, shaped by and embodying different cultural 
meanings and practices, come into conflict with each other. Yet, Escobar (1998: 64) 
argues that this definition is inadequate in that it "assumes that meanings and practices 
can be the source of processes that must be accepted as political. This is rarely seen as 
such because of entrenched definitions of the political". This is particularly the case 
with those practices that are theorised as marginal, alternative and emergent in relation 
to dominant cultural order. Culture is political because meanings are processes that 
explicitly or implicitly seek to redefine social and political power (Alvarez et al. 1998; 
Dagnino 1998). Thus, when indigenous movements deploy alternative conceptions of 
identity, development, democracy and citizenship that unsettle dominant cultural 
meanings, they enact cultural politics. 
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Cultural politics is implicated when examining the politics of indigenous movements 
because social movement research involves situations in which the interrelations 
between everyday life, political practice and social relations need to be effectively 
integrated (Escobar 1998; Slater 1998). When people practice their everyday lives, they 
are thereby reproducing or creating culture. At the same time, there is here a collective 
act of creation- a collective signification- that is cultural and it is out of this process that 
people actually define and elaborate their struggles (Alvarez et al. 1998). The challenge 
is thus simultaneously cultural, political, symbolic and material (Escobar 2001). 
Indigenous movements may enact cultural struggles over meaning. At the same time, 
however, these meanings, as well as what the fight is about, are not always clear or 
universally agreed upon. 4 
Further, Moore et al. (2003: 2) suggest that cultural politics is an approach that treats 
culture itself as a site for political struggle, "an analytic emphasising power, processes 
and practice". Cultural practices are thus politically resonant- they forge communities, 
reproduce inequalities, and acquit exclusions. Yet, they also provide the means by 
which those very effects are challenged. Cultural politics insists that such struggles are 
simultaneously material and symbolic (Moore et al. 2003). Thus, cultural politics is an 
attempt to make visible strategies originating in cultural practices, and in particular the 
ways in which local people, far from being passive recipients of transnational 
conditions, actively shape the process of identity construction (Alvarez et al. 1998). 
Work by Stuart Hall (1990) notably illustrates the importance of cultural politics when 
he examines the processes of collective identity construction by Caribbean and Afro- 
British identities. For Hall, ethnic identity construction is on the one hand rooted in 
shared cultural practices, a collective self of sorts. This conception of identity has 
played an important role in anti-colonial struggles and involves the imaginary recovery 
of culture that leads to adherence to the experience of oppression. On the other hand, 
identity is seen in terms of contingent differences created by history. This aspect of 
identity construction emphasises becoming rather than being, positioning rather than 
essence, and discontinuity as well as continuity at the cultural 
level. Thus, identity is 
seen in both ways, as anchored in 'traditional' practices and 
forms of knowledge, but as 
4 This is also evident in the Shuar case study presented in this thesis. In Chapter 5, the aim is to examine 
the ways in which the Shuar federations have responded to these challenges in order to secure resources, 
territorial and political rights, and how the construction of cultural identity relates to this process. 
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always a changing project of cultural and political construction. This will also be seen 
in the Shuar case study featured in this thesis. Here we will see how different forins of 
culturally-based resistance have also been used with one such form being that of 
political mobilisation organised around the calculated assertion of cultural identity. 
Indeed, an indigenous group's self-identification as indigenous is neither natural nor 
inevitable, nor is it simply invented, adopted or imposed (Li 2004). It is, rather, 
articulated and used in a way that draws upon culturally-based local practices, 
landscapes, and meanings, and emerges through particular patterns of engagement and 
struggle. The conjunctures at which the indigenous come to identify themselves as 
such, realigning thereby the ways they connect to the nation, the state, transnational 
corporations and often civil society groups, are contingent products of agency as well 
as cultural and political work of articulation. 5 Thus, the politics surrounding indigenous 
identity (often referred to as indigeneity), and its consequences for rights, resources and 
the formation of alliances, highlights the urgent need for new ways to conceptualise 
identity that are theoretically more adequate to the diversity of conditions and struggles 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon, as well as being alert to the risks and opportunities posed 
by particular discourses propounded by external actors. 
Indeed, in our case study, there is evidence of these cultural and political challenges. 
These complexities were also readily apparent in the early years of the national 
umbrella organisation for the Ecuadorian indigenous people, the ConfederaciOn de las 
Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). In June 1990, CONAIE mobilised 
indigenous people against official apathy towards their needs, demanding state support 
for and recognition of indigenous cultural difference (Macas 1991; Bebbington 2004). 
This act of protest asserted the values of 'traditional' indigenous identity, yet at the 
same time made demands for a full incorporation of indigenous people into Ecuador's 
development process as their right as national citizens. It thus supported the 
continuation and recovery of cultural traditions and demanded access to the means of 
rural modernisation via the technologies and institutions of the national centre. During 
5 Articulation is a key word within political ecology since it recognises the structured character of 
different social groups, production systems and ideologies, but highlights the ways in which these are 
brought together, changed, and articulated at particular conjunctures (see Li 2004). Conjuncture is 
another key word: it challenges us to consider the ways geographies and the micro-politics of 
livelihood 
struggles intersect with constructions of landscape, 
livelihood and identity generated across multiple 
scales (see Moore 1998). 
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this period CONAIIE was transformed from a marginal social movement into a national 
political actor by using a variety of strategies to achieve substantive policy gains and a 
dramatic increase in political representation, thereby becoming one of the region's most 
successful social movements (Castells 2004). With few material resources, CONAEE 
developed an alternative model of national identity and economic development and 
broke up the elite monopoly on political representation (Selverston-Scher 2001 ). 6 
These empirical phenomena demand analysis and explanation and complicate greatly 
the notion of indigenous movements as being only acts of resistance or as only the 
defence of 'traditional' culture. A whole range of complex articulations and identities 
are clearly at stake and merit further attention in political ecology analyses, as this 
thesis suggests. A difficult question here is to decide what it means to be 'indigenous' 
(a highly contested category and one might as well add 'tribe' or 'ethnicity' )7 in the 
context of new relationships with the state, transnational corporations, non- 
governmental organisations, and markets. How does a notion of 'indigenous' come to 
resonate in a particular place and time? How does it relate to political struggles and 
how might it help to reconfigure alliances? Who is privileged and who is left out 
through such labelling? These are important questions to any rigorous understanding of 
indigenous politics and hence are explored in detail in this thesis. 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to extend arguments in political ecology by examining the 
hybrid and complex relations between the state, oil-based development, indigenous 
movements, cultural identity, territoriality, resource and property conflicts and some 
social forms of contention in particular resource settings. Social conflict over physical 
things like land and petroleum has been about much more than the materiality of their 
use. 8 Struggle over the control of land and oil operations in Ecuador has been as much 
about challenging neoliberalism as it has been about the material use and extraction of 
6 Selverston-Scher's work falls within the social movement approach. Like most scholars in the late 
1990s, she uses both 'strategy' and 'identity' approaches within this literature (see also Foweraker 1995), 
but her main focus is on the use of collective identity as a strategic resource. 
7 For example, the UN, the ELO and the World Bank have differing approaches to the definition of 
indigenous people. The complexity of the legal debate raised around the category is reflected in the vast 
panoply of national, international and inter-state institutional mechanisms deployed and the on-going 
debate over non-dominance, special connections to land/territory and continuity based on historical 
priority (Castree 2004; Peet and Watts 2004). 
8 For insightful scholarship on the simultaneity of material and symbolic struggles with reference to oil, 
see Coronil (1997), Karl (1997), and Watts (1997,2001). In other contexts, see 
Berry (1993); Moore 
(1996a), 1996b, 1998), Peluso and Watts (2001), and Schroeder (1999). 
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natural resources. The elaboration of such analysis is a valid and important task, not the 
least because in doing so, it suggests that the politics of indigenous movements need to 
be taken seriously in all of its complexity and not simply as a 'reaction' by 'traditional' 
actors. 
1.3 Thesis Focus 
The discussion in this chapter has sought to set out the key concerns of this thesis, 
noting possible contributions to be derived from this study of indigenous oil-related 
struggle in Ecuador's Amazonia. It remains here to set out the structure of the thesis. 
Thus, the next chapter will establish the theoretical framework elaborating points made 
in the overview presented above by exploring selectively key research in political 
ecology and new social movements studies. That framework is understood in terms of a 
three-fold structure- -namely cultural-identity politics, territory and place, and resource 
access. In turn, this theoretical framework enables an empirical exploration of the 
extent to which these elements provide political opportunities for indigenous people to 
assert identity claims, indigenous territoriality and place-based claims, and access to 
and control of resources and land. By exploring these potential opportunities through a 
case study of Shuar struggles notably linked to oil development, an assessment of the 
possible analytical relevance of indigenous identity constructions, notions of 
territoriality, and ideas about resource struggles can be made. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in the thesis--specifically, an ethnographic 
approach with participatory research methods. The discussion here also illustrates the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methodological approach followed in the light of 
actual field experience. By providing a background to Shuar struggles and political 
organising against oil-based development, Chapter 4 examines the historical context in 
which oil development and land reforms took place there. It also describes the current 
political and economic climate in Ecuador, which has had a major effect upon the Shuar 
people and their battles. 
Having presented essential background to the Ecuadorian case, it is then possible to 
undertake detailed empirical investigation in 
keeping with the framework set out in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 5 thus explores the reciprocal links and tensions between politics 
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and culture in the construction of Shuar identity in an age of proposed oil development, 
and how the Shuar federations have been quite successful in some respects in forging a 
modem and even powerful movement strategically steeped in the assertion of Shuar 
culture. And yet, cultural ly-based strategies do not exhaust the array of ways in which 
Shuar federations interact with local communities as well as with powerful outsiders in 
their quest to assert Shuar autonomy. 
The focus in Chapter 6 is thus on understanding the geographical building blocks of the 
Shuar struggle-- specifically territory and place. Control over territory is the key 
political motivating force of Shuar mobilisation and processes of territorial control and 
associated land-based conflicts are central to Shuar strategies of resistance as a reaction 
to oil development. Local claims to land are partly related to local place-based 
relations. These place-based relations are also important in constituting a local sense of 
place. As such, place is assessed here to understand how territorial initiatives are 
devised in light of the senses of place articulated by different Shuar groups in the 
region. 
At the heart of this intensifying multi-scale struggle is the attempt by state-backed oil 
developers to dispossess Shuar communities of their lands and resources-- in effect to 
undermine their way of life by severing essential links to the biophysical environment. 
In Chapter 7, then, the focus is on how Shuar struggles for local resource control and 
authority has been designed to combat successive waves of outsider-imposed 
'development'. Here, the crucial aspect of access, and how the Shuar struggle needs to 
be understood as being contested on this vital ingredient of indigenous life, is the focus 
of attention. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis 
before concluding with an assessment of the broader implications of the study. Here, 
the elements of a future research agenda are briefly and selectively discussed. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
The previous chapter introduced the idea that there are various notions of resistance and 
struggle in the scholarly literature with reference to indigenous people while 
establishing that the basic approach of this thesis is derived from the political ecology 
and social movement literatures. Here the main conceptual themes of the study are 
explored in greater depth as the theoretical framework is elaborated. In doing so, the 
discussion is related to Latin America in order to ensure that the theoretical relevance to 
the region of study is maintained. Overall, then, the aim of this chapter is to develop a 
nuanced and region-specific theoretical framework for the subsequent Ecuadorian 
investigation. 
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. The first section explains the increasing political 
salience of social movements in Latin America by analysing the consequences of 
changing state-society relations which served as a catalyst for the emergence of 
indigenous movements throughout the region. Here, a political ecology approach linked 
to social movement theory is adopted. Thereafter, the chapter uses relevant literature to 
establish the threefold theoretical structure of the thesis, namely 1) the relationship 
between cultural politics and ethnic identity questions; 2) territory and place; and 3) 
access to and control of natural and material resources that are emerging from the 
struggles of 'new' indigenous movements. 
2.1 The Political Ecology of Social Movements 
The growth of environmental and social problems worldwide has been associated with 
the emergence of social movements in political-ecological conflicts. Although few parts 
of the world have been untouched by this process, it is largely in the Third World that 
the political impact of movements has been the greatest. Accordingly, the influence of 
this type of actor on the changing topography of the politicised environment in the 
Third World is coming under increasing scrutiny by policy-makers and scholars alike. 
This section thus explores the growing significance of social movements--what are the 
spaces within which these movements develop, and how do they articulate with other 
organisations even as they often seek to resist the predations of states and businesses? 
The relationship between social movements and states is considered as part of a broader 
evaluation of whether the advent of social movements signifies a new politics of the 
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environment in the Third World. This discussion, in turn, approPriately frames the 
empirical concerns of this thesis that are taken up in detail in Chapters 4-7. 
A large literature now exists in political ecology and allied fields on the 
interconnections of the 'new' social movements, civil society, empowerment and 
democratisation (for example, Alvarez et al. 1998; Bebbington and Batterby 2001; 
Bryant and Bailey 1997; Escobar 2001; Forsyth 2002; Neumann 2005; Peet and Watts, 
1996,2004; Robbins 2004; Rocheleau et al. 1996; Stott and Sullivan 2000; Yashar 
2005; Zimmerer et al. 2003). In particular, these studies underscore the important 
contribution of social movements to political and cultural transformation, notably in 
terms of democratisation and expanded political opportunities (see also Foweraker 
1985; Slater 1994a, b). Social movements were thought to give expression to new 
interests, to practice new ways of doing politics and even to create a new possibility of 
empowering the poor. In their continuous struggles against hegemonic projects of 
nation building, development, and 'security', social movements are seen to mobilise on 
the ground people with very different sets of meanings and interests from elites (Jasper 
1997). Generally speaking, social movements (defined below) are thus seen to be 
engaged in "political struggles over access to the mechanisms of power but also cultural 
struggle in the search for different identities" (Jelin 1990: 206). 
In exploring the emergence of social movements (especially so-called 'new social 
movements') as a significant focus of attention in contemporary scholarship, three main 
factors can be mentioned. First, the term 'new social movements' has been used to 
describe the kind of social activism that emerged in Europe and North America during 
the 1960s and which was closely associated with new identity-based politics, such as 
women's rights, gay rights and peace campaigns. They were called 'new' because they 
were seen to differ from old social movements based on material interests often 
represented by different economic classes (Dussel 2000; Morris and Mueller 1992). 
Many scholars have argued that new social movements are both the symptoms of, and 
solutions to, the contradictions inherent in modem bureaucratic society and emerge 
because of tensions between the regulation of society by the state and the emerging 
autonomy and diversity of identities experienced in post-industrial societies (Habennas 
1981; Jasper 1997; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981). 
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Second, there has been a growing post-structural interest in questions of agency and 
subjectivity (Bryant 1992; Slater 1994b). This started with the reallsation that the 
dominant frameworks of the past- especially neo-Marxist theories that had long 
underpinned social movement theorising- were at an impasse (Booth 1994). In the wake 
of mounting dissatisfaction with 'traditional' Marxist class analysis, the issue of the 
constitution of social actors and their potential relation to collective action and political 
change became increasingly central (Lander 2000; Palmero 2001). The 'old' is thus 
characterised by analysis in terms of 'modernisation' and 'dependency' theories, by 
definitions of politics that were anchored in 'traditional' actors who struggled for the 
control of the state (particularly the working class and revolutionary front) and by a 
view that society consisted of structures and class relations that only large-scale 
development schemes or upheavals could alter (Alvarez et al. 1992,1998; Calderon 
1992; Cohen 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992; Davis et al. 2005; Slater 1985). In contrast, 
6 new' theories see contemporary social movements as bringing about a substantial 
transformation in the very nature of political practice and state-society relations. New 
analyses focus instead on the complexities of social life- including their political, 
social, cultural, spatial and temporal aspects--and how such complexities negate 
4simplistic' explanation. 
Third, controversy surrounding the potential political relevance of social movements, 
and how these movements challenge conventional notions of democracy, has tended to 
flow into and reinforce discussions of the shifting nature of state-society relations 
(Alvarez et al. 1992; Jasper 1997; Whittier et al. 2002). Indeed, since the 1980s Latin 
America has witnessed the appearance of new understandings of social change and 
resistance that have marked a significant break with past forms of analysis and practice. 
These new forms of awareness have been matched by equally significant changes in 
popular practices and collective action. Attention then has focused on understanding the 
complex processes that account for momentous social, political, and economic changes 
that are taking place in Latin America today (Bebbington 2004). 
Clearly much depends here on what the researcher means by a 'social movement'. 
Touraine's (1988) analysis of collective action is well known and useful in this regard. 
He argues that society is a result of a complex set of actions that society performs upon 
itself involving actors who may have conflictual interests but who nonetheless share 
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certain cultural orientations. Social movements are therefore not 'dramatic events' but 
rather "the work society performs upon itself' (Touraine 1981: 29). The goal of such 
work is to control historicity which is defined as "the set of cultural models that rule 
social practices" (Touraine 1988: 8) and is embodied in knowledge, economic and 
ethical models. 
According to Touraine (1988: 68), the distinctive qualities of social movements are 
clear. Thus, it is "an action, both culturally oriented and socially conflicted, of a class 
defined by its position of domination or dependency in the mode of appropriation of 
historicity, of the cultural models of investment, knowledge and morality towards 
which the social movement itself is oriented". In this view, most forms of collective 
mobilisation in Latin America are not therefore social movements proper but rather 
struggles for control of the process of historical change through political participation. 
This definition of social movements helps us to understand how indigenous movements 
have emerged as a viable political force in Ecuador, notably by participating in the 
political system. 
However, as Melucci (1988a) pointed out, Touraine does not explain the process by 
which actors build a collective identity through interactions, negotiations and 
relationships with the environment, but rather treats this aspect as an already 
accomplished fact. Melucci argues that, rather than assuming the existence of a 
relatively unified collective actor, actors construct common actions and identity via a 
process (and not as a fact or event). As he pointed out, concepts proposed by resource 
mobilisation theory (such as structure and opportunity) are not really 'objective' 
realities since they "imply the capacity of the actors to perceive, evaluate and determine 
the possibilities and limits afforded by the environment" (Melucci 1988a: 342). Thus, 
the question of identity construction is crucial: "Collective identity is an interactive and 
shared definition produced by several individuals and concerned with the orientation of 
action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which action takes place" 
(Meluccil988a: 342). Melucci also pointed out the crucial network of relationships that 
underlie collective action. Contemporary action "assumes the form of networks 
submerged in everyday life" (Melucci 1988b: 248). Social movements in this way 
1 Resource mobilization theory explores simultaneously the institutional, structural and cultural -symbolic 
resources of social movements (Jenkins 1983; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald 1996; Tarrow 1994). 
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cannot be understood independently from the 'submerged' social and cultural 
background from which they emerge (Escobar 1995). 
A sense of the key role performed by the process of articulation in such identity 
construction is adhered by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). For these authors, social change, 
the nature of political spaces, and historical transformations are fundamentally 
discursive, endowed with and apprehended through meaning which can never be fixed 
but rather is constantly contested. This has consequences for understanding the making 
of collective identities. Actors construct collective identity through the interaction, 
negotiation and opposition of different perceptions and such construction depends 
notably on how they define those situations susceptible to common action. Because all 
these perspectives are ripe with meaning, actors must inevitably build collective 
identities through an articulation of meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). These 
articulations may result in the formation of collective identity and collective 
mobilisations which take place in different forms at the 'centre' and at the 'periphery' 
of the capitalist economy. This process can be linked to democratic struggles but only 
"in societies in which democratic revolution has crossed a certain threshold" (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985: 166)--in other words, it is suggested, in 'developed' countries. 
Further., the ability to devise a political strategy is predicated on certain preconditions 
called 'political opportunity structures'. Tarrow (1994: 85) suggests these are 
"consistent- but not necessarily formal or permanent- dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action" (see also 
Kitschelt 1986; McAdam et al. 1996). The concern in this thesis is specifically about 
shifts in resources external to indigenous organisations that affect their prospects, such 
as new allies, political alignments, and divisions within and between communities and 
leaders, as well as wider access to national decision-making structures. While political 
opportunity structures condition institutional prospects, these structures are themselves 
not rigid. As Jasper (1997: 36) notes: "the term structure misleadingly 
implies relatively 
fixed entities, so that attention is often diverted away from open-ended strategic 
interplay". It is important to note that while political opportunity structures rarely 
determine the details of indigenous strategies they certainly condition the networks 
through which they operate (Bryant 2005). In the case of organisations that 
involve 
state-transnational-community linkages, 
it is influence and prestige, coupled with 
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authority and money, which frame the forms of governance as well as who participates 
and benefits from particular forms. The attraction here, as political ecologists highlight, 
is that it addresses the means by which differentiated social actors gain access to and 
control over resources through institutionalised practices and political strategies 
(Brosius et al. 1998; Diani et al. 2003; Leach et. al. 1997; Li 2004; Robbins 2004). 
Much discussion in political ecology has pointed to the positive role played by social 
movements- or a vibrant civil society in general- in forming a more ecologically aware 
or more socially just form of development (Forsyth 2002; Neumann 2005; Paulson and 
Gexon 2005; Peet and Watts 2004). Some in political ecology are optimistic about the 
ability of new social movements to reframe policy and associated discourses in favour 
of marginalised groups. The social activism that emerged from the issues discussed 
above was placed squarely on the agenda by local people themselves, including 
indigenous movements. Exploring the demands for participation, autonomy and 
democratisation around the world (such as the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, or the 
Miskito of Honduras or Nicaragua) and analysing the livelihood conditions, moral 
economies and political exigencies of regional life that propel them, forms the core of 
social movement research in political ecology (Cecena 2004; Robbins 2004; Rochlin 
2003). 
Changes in environmental management regimes and conditions have created 
opportunities or imperatives for local groups to represent themselves politically. Such 
moves often represent new forms of political action since their ecological strands 
connect disparate groups across class, ethnicity and gender. In this way, local social and 
environmental conditions and interactions have delimited, modified and blunted 
otherwise seemingly omnipotent global political and economic forces. In this sense, 
therefore, social movements draw together disparate communities and interests into 
collective awareness, and help thereafter to facilitate collective action. Here, 
communities assert their identity notably through the way they make a living. Drawing 
on a paradigm case of the struggle for rights of indigenous people in Jharkhand, India, 
Parajuli (1998) has described this as a form of 'ecological ethnicity'. 
Yet, Forsyth (2002) argues that these approaches- such as those involving notions of 
ecological rationality, advocacy coalitions or 'liberation ecologies' (for example, 
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Martinez-Alier 2001; Peet and Watts 2004)- do not pay sufficient attention to the co- 
production of activism and the multi-faceted knowledge that is used to add legitimacy 
to campaigns. As a consequence, new social movements may simply replicate and 
reinforce pre-existing structures of environmental knowledge rather than reframe them 
in a way more favourable to marginalised groups. Here too, therefore, there is a need to 
understand the complex and multi-faceted nature of social movements. This thesis thus 
maintains a critical stance on the possible impacts of social movements in achieving 
social justice by examining one such movement with an eye to illustrating the multi- 
faceted and highly complex nature of indigenous political organising. 
A theoretical perspective that draws on both social movement literature and political 
ecology, as selectively discussed here, is therefore important for this thesis in order to 
explain how indigenous movements have emerged and operate in Ecuador. The 
emergence of indigenous organisations, the politicisation of indigenous identity, and 
demands for indigenous rights over the past two decades in particular have challenged 
historical norms and scholarly conclusions about the politicisation of indigenous 
movements in Latin America (Bebbington 2004; Eckstein et al. 2001; Van Cott 1999; 
Warren et al. 2003; Yashar 2005). Indeed, historical records suggest that in much of the 
twentieth century indigenous people rarely sustained social movements that demanded 
indigenous rights and emphasised indigenous identity. On the contrary, rural organising 
within and between indigenous groups has traditionally been related to peasant unions, 
political parties, churches and revolutionaries. These movements have tended to 
mobillse indigenous people to forge class, religious and/or revolutionary identities that 
ignored indigenous identities. Accordingly, scholars have generally underscored the 
weak politicisation of ethnic identity in Latin America which had comparatively little 
explicit impact on political organising (see for example, Horowitz 1985). 
However, the increasingly political nature of indigenous movements recently has 
attracted particular attention from new social movement theorists precisely because of 
the interesting contribution of culture, identity and politics at stake in these struggles. 
By the mid-1990s, work on Latin American movements had moved beyond the class- 
based peasant studies of prior decades to embrace 'new' social movements that 
appreciated the ethnic and cultural dimensions of indigenous resistance. Scholars thus 
probed how the construction of meaning and identity shaped indigenous political 
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action. They also studied indigenous political struggles as a means toward 
understanding wider change, notably the quality of democracy in Latin America (see 
Appelbaum 2003; Appelbaum et al. 2003; Andolina 1999; Collins 2000, De la Cadena 
2000; Garfield 2001; Rubin 1998; SaIdaana-Portillo 2003; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 
1998,1999). More and more, the arena of the nation-state and the relationship between 
indigenous people and nation-states has become the centre of analytic as well as 
2 political activity for social scientists . 
Much analysis of indigenous movements has tended to emphasise either the class of 
rural movements (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001) or the identity politics involved in their 
mobilisation (Esteva 1999; Alvarez et al. 1998). Barta and Otero (2005) argue 
meanwhile that in most social movements, but particularly so in the case of indigenous 
struggles, material (resources and land) and identity (culture) demands are inseparable. 
Indeed, indigenous identity and culture are anchoring points for the struggle for 
resources and land. Indigenous ethnicities have long been reproduced in a subordinate 
interaction with political and economic elites, and such reproduction has depended 
primarily on the regulation of access to land and resources (Otero 2004). Thus, 
indigenous movements are in no simple sense 'environmental' since they typically 
combine human rights, identity/culture and questions of social justice (Escobar 1995). 
Slater (1985), for example, has viewed them as types of protest against traditional 
mestizo politics, in particular against the excessive concentration of decision-making 
power in national and regional capitals as well as the incapacity of the state to deliver 
needed services to indigenous people living in peripheral areas. In this sense they can 
be seen to be a consequence of the legitimacy problems of the state itself. As 
Bebbington (2004) points out, movements are also cultural insofar as they are 
expressions of long-dominated and marginalised identities-- identities that are at the 
same time reformulated through the activity of the movement (see also Perreault 
2003b). For example, in Ecuador the recovery and projection of the idea of being 
indigenous has been a form of resisting forms of mestizo domination and of regaining a 
space for the values of being indigenous (Bebbington 1991; Yashar 1998; see Chapter 5 
below). 
2 As Field (1994) observed, anthropologists had also become increasingly focused on indigenous 
resistance to the nation-state by the early 1990s. Political resistance, in fact, had become "the primary 
characteristic of [Indian] ethnicity" in their eyes (Field 1994: 239). 
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As such, the emergence of 'new' indigenous movements and political organising 
constitutes a phenomenon that merits explanation in its own right even though 
acknowledging its possible wider impacts. To flesh out the theoretical setting of the 
thesis, this chapter will now consider in turn the three specific elements that in 
aggregate constitute the framework of this thesis--namely, culture-identity politics, 
territory and place, as well as resource access. First of all', indigenous movements will 
be examined in-depth in order to highlight how culture and identity have become 
embedded in their strategies. 
2.2 Cultural Politics and Ethnic Identity 
The cultural politics of indigenous struggle is closely related to a specific history of 
state policies and practices. State reforms have combined with political liberalisation 
and existing power networks to prompt the emergence of Latin America's new social 
movements. Indeed, Tilley (1988) has argued generally, many states have implemented 
reforms that have initiated an incomplete process of democratisation; while 
democratisation has expanded political opportunities for civil society, weak state 
institutions have nonetheless often restricted political access, participation and local 
autonomy for historically marginalised groups. Excluded from political cultures as well 
as local governance structures, indigenous people have thus mobilised around their 
indigenous identity in order to challenge the prevailing political order. 
There is a long history of exclusion from national politics and culture based on the 
legacy of Spanish colonialism and/or subsequent forms of European and American neo- 
colonial influence (Dean et al. 2003; Hansen and Stepputet 2001; Mignolo 2000b). 
Regardless of how indigenous people perceived themselves, colonial states and their 
functionaries insisted that the only relevant means of identifying indigenous people was 
through national schema that were fundamentally alien to them. Thus, they were placed 
at the bottom of the economic, political, and cultural ladder under the supervision of 
blancos (white) and mestizos (mixed-race), who defined their own identities in terms of 
being superior to them. In short, indigenous people were denied citizenship (Beck and 
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Mijeski 2000; Silverblatt 1995). 3 This process of national identity formation was 
designed in part to ensure forced assimilation into national culture of indigenous people 
thereby denying them recognition of their own identity and by extension, the possibility 
4 of a separate national identity (Hale 1994) . 
During the second half of the twentieth century, Latin American states aimed to 
'modernise' and 'develop' their countries. This aim intensified political tensions by 
claiming that the fundamental obstacle to modernisation was the 'backwardness' of 
indigenous and other non-white citizens (Quijano 2000). Thus, state ideologies sought 
to end resistance among indigenous people through their assimilation to dominant 
Western culture and mestizo populist ideology (Nfignolo 2000a). The Indian was 
henceforth called campesino even as 'traditional' indigenous culture was condemned. 
Confronted with diverse ethnic populations, most Latin American states promoted 
assimilation, while maintaining labour markets segmented along ethnic lines (Acosta 
2001; Sissons 2005). The solution contained in 'development' and 'modernisation' 
programmes therefore was to gradually erase all that was indigenous and non-white. 
Latin American states' discourses thereby coincided in their attempts to use Indian, or 
the imagined Indian, as traditional object against which to construct modernist 
'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) which informed state policies and associated 
nationalism. 
For example, ethnic politics in post-colonial Ecuador has been strongly determined by 
the promotion of ethnic assimilation and the inclusion of indigenous people in the 
construction of a unitary and homogenous state (Vickers 1992). Where national citizens 
did not exist, they would forge them through centrally-encouraged identity formation. 
As Chapters 4 and 6 investigate, this was largely done by land reforms that 'removed' 
indigenous people from exploitative forms of labour control, occasionally distributed 
land and credit, and incorporated them into the national project through peasant 
associations. As a result, state and union organisations imposed a class identity on 
indigenous people as the price of political incorporation and access to resources 
3 Indigena and mestizo are social categories and they are based as much on external distinction, formed 
within specific socio-political context, as on self-definition. The glorification of mestizo 
identity as the 
4substance of the nation' was an essential part of the ideology of the state and one that appealed to 
powerful middle and upper income groups (Str6bele-Gregor 1996). 
4 National identity was also based on faith through the help of missionary foundations who subjected 
indigenous populations to a regime of legal guardianship and a racist ideology that supported elite claims 
to national ethnic superiority (Perrechon 2003). 
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(Guardiola-Rivera 2002). The registration of peasant communities and the growth of 
peasant federations, in particular, fostered the fiction that the state had turned 
indigenous people into peasants and stripped indigenous ethnicity of its identity 
(Perreault 2001). As Guardiola-Rivera (2002) notes, national politicians and 
constitutions have either assumed ethnic homogeneity of the nation's populace or 
disregarded ethnic diversity as a legitimate form of political identity. 
The development process was a key part of this nationalist project in Latin America. 
Thus, Garfield (2001) notes how Brazilian officials presented Brazilian nationality as 
an already finalised entity that was threatened by feudal modes of production and ethnic 
separatism. In fact, the very emergence of the nation-state and national identity was 
contingent on the reproduction of capitalist social relations and the elimination of 
cultural differences (Chatterjee 1993). Development was said to be based on the 
premise of collective will, transcending regional and particular interests and benefiting 
all members of the nation, in the 'national interest' of the country. As Hobsbawn 
(1990: 10) asserts "Nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way 
around". The recasting of the 'nation' from a formless social mass to the idea of the 
state as a consolidated and unified entity represented one of the long-term successes of 
state officials however much it has recently begun to be challenged (Garfield 2001; 
Kearny and Varese 1995). 
State planners paid particular attention to indigenous people. Enjoining them to 
surrender territorial control and political autonomy in the 'national interest', state 
planners asserted their exclusive 'know-how' and capacity to engender 'better Indians 5 
(farmers, rural labourers, market consumers, and patriotic citizens) as adequate 
justification for their actions. As a part of this process, elites employed biologically and 
culturally deterministic notions of indigenismo to legitimise power and neutralise 
opposition. Thus, past state policies sought to assimilate indigenous people into 
national mainstrearns but in a way that created structural conditions that entrenched 
their marginalisation and oppression. Because contemporary power relations are rooted 
in these historical processes, the status of indigenous people has always invoked larger 
5 This was a common terminology used by state officials in Ecuador. 
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questions about the organisation and power of the state (Appelbaum et al. 2003; Van 
Cott 2003 ). 
Historical inequality was exacerbated in the 1980s when international lenders required 
Latin American governments to slash social welfare programs and public employment 
to avert fiscal catastrophe and debt default. The shift to neoliberal policies thus 
followed and informed the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that have drastically 
cut back on social services and goods that were designed to secure a basic social 
standard of living for all, notably including indigenous people (Yashar 1999). As 
Chapter 4 relates, the Ecuadorian state privatised land and resources, designed new 
development projects to intensify export production, eliminated trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies, and reduced social service and environmental programs--all as 
part of the structural adjustment programs and all of which had adverse effects on 
indigenous people in the country. 
However, as this thesis amply documents, indigenous people have started to challenge 
state-designed development projects and neoliberal policies thereby calling into 
question the indigenismo policies-- exposing them as constituting a prolonged act of 
discrimination. In the process, they have brought into question the very concepts, 
constructs and institutions of the state (Brysk 1996; Alvarez et al. 1992; Melucci 1989). 
Using a variety of theoretical approaches, the literature explain how indigenous people 
in Latin America struggle for the survival of their historically rooted yet constantly 
changing cultures; for title to and control over traditionally-held territories; for the right 
to define themselves individually and collectively in relation to other groups in society; 
for the right to control representations of the Indian that are offered by non-indigenous 
intellectuals, the state or others; for access to economic resources to maintain their 
preferred methods of economic production; for the right to participate in public 
decision-making as individual citizens and as collectively recognised 'people' or 
'nations'; and for the right to be indigenous and a full and equal citizen of the Latin 
American nation-state within which they reside (for example, see Berry 2000; Assies 
6 The forthcoming book by De Oliveria et al. (2006) examines the experiences and perceptions of 
indigenous people in the context of the national states and political systems that 
have been externally 
imposed and implemented upon them, and it discusses indigenous territories, concepts of political 
autonomy and sovereignty that have been used to describe and construe indigenous political projects. 
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and Hoekerna 2001; Carvalho 2000; Grandin 2000; S el verston -Scher 1994; Stonich 
2001; Ticona 2000; Van Cott 1994,2000; Van der Haar 1998). 
In the process, indigenous people and their struggle to maintain their cultures and 
identities have become a central concern of scholars. For example, de la Cadena (2000) 
examines changing forms of identity construction among indigenous people of the 
Peruvian highlands and considers how the development of Indian, mestizo and peasant 
identities help to explain why contemporary Peruvian indigenous movement 
organisations have been slower to form and are organisationally weaker than in other 
regional countries. Similarly, Garfield (2001) shows how Brazil's Xavante people 
adapted to the physical intrusion of the state and non-indigenous settlers and how they 
mobilised their identity politically to contest the nation- and state-building projects of 
the modem Brazilian state: "The violent and convoluted process whereby the Xavante, 
stripped of autonomy, learned and articulated that their ethnicity was a political marker 
that restricted or accorded them rights as indigenous people and Brazilian citizens" 
(Garfield 2001: 16) Thus, as state contact intensified in the twentieth century, the 
Xavante 'selectively adapted' by politicising their culture, identity and traditions and 
indigenous leaders consciously mixed images of the Indian with the national 'myth' of 
racial democracy and patriotic rhetoric in order to simultaneously demand rights as 
Brazilian citizens and as indigenous people. 
Like Garfield (2001) and de la Cadena (2000), Brysk (2000) shows how indigenous 
people construct and manipulate their 'traditional' identities, and blend these with 
carefully selected contemporary technologies and ideologies, as they adapt to processes 
of modernisation and globalisation, constructing identities that are simultaneously 
local, 
7 
national and international in the process. Ecuador affords an interesting example to 
explore these points, both because of the organisational strength of the indigenous 
movement as well as the movement's ability to (re) articulate political 
identities, 
thereby challenging and even transforming both their own cultural politics and that of 
wider political culture. Compared to the Bolivian case, 
for instance, Ecuador's 
7 Similarly, Warren (1998) examines pan-Mayan activism in Guatemala and how these activists form a 
small, mainly urban group of Maya intellectuals, who are reaching out 
to Guatemala's largely rural 
population to mobilise national political movements around a revitalised 
definition of indigenous 
identity. 
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indigenous movement has demonstrated both greater political coherence and national 
influence (see Stonich et al. 2001; Selverston-Scher 2001). 
Other research has highlighted the important if ambiguous role of international 
networks in recent indigenous political mobilisations (DeMars 2004; Keck and Sikkink 
1998). Contact with international allies knowledgeable about international human fights 
law and constitutional reforms in other regions assisted indigenous movements in many 
Latin America countries in the struggle to alter the institutional environment of 
indigenous-state relations. Many successfully presented proposals to formally redefine 
national identity as articulated in the national political constitution. Most Latin 
American countries in the 1990s indeed adopted constitutional language recognising 
the ethnic and cultural diversity of the nation--an important symbolic goal. More 
substantive institutional reforms were also made, such as recognition of the public 
authority of customary law, protection of collective indigenous land rights, and the 
right to bilingual education, which provides a structural framework for other indigenous 
demands--notably the right to self-determination (see Korovkin 2000; Van Cott 2000). 
Institutional approaches to indigenous struggle examine in particular the meaning and 
impact of these new developments (see Assies et al. 2001; Gonzalez Casanova and 
Roitman Rosenmann 1996; Van Cott 2000). 8 Scholars demonstrate how multicultural 
reforms resulted not solely from effective mobilisation of indigenous movements but, 
above all, from confrontations among diverse social and political actors. For example, 
Assies et al. (2001) examine reforms in Bolivia and Colombia, where significant 
changes in indigenous (and sometimes black) constitutional rights were attempted in 
the 1990s as well as other state reforms that aimed to recognise ethnic diversity. 
Recognising legal pluralism in Colombia satisfied indigenous demands for legal 
autonomy while reducing the backlog of cases in the national 
judicial system and 
extending the rule of public law to rural areas (see also Escobar 
2001), and municipal 
decentralisation in Bolivia facilitated the greater (albeit still limited) participation of 
indigenous community authorities in public decision-making. 
8 In particular, indigenous organisations have 
lobbied Latin American states to ratify the Labor 




Such multicultural reforms imply a critique of dominant nation- and state-building 
models and elite notions of democracy and citizenship (Painter and Philo 1995). As 
Yashar (1999) argues, the failure of Latin American democracies to deliver on the 
promise of citizenship in the 1980s led to the more politically assertive presentation by 
indigenous movements of rights claims in the 1990s. To varying degrees, the reforms 
address both indigenous demands for recognition of difference as well as popular 
demands for democratic reform. 
Some scholars argue that no inherent contradiction exist between indigenous claims to 
national citizenship and their aspiration to maintain their own separate identity (Leon 
1994; Deregori 1998). Van Cott (2000) suggests to the contrary, that the contribution of 
indigenous struggles to Latin American democratisation lies in infusing the political 
culture with values of participation, inclusion and tolerance (see also Seracombe and 
Sellato 2005). Rather than destabilising the state, conceding spheres of autonomy to 
people that constitute it "is a strategy for strengthening the state itself, by increasing its 
capacity to dispense justice and property rights" (Van Cott 2000: 278). Indeed, 
Bebbington (2001) argues that rural societies often choose 'modem' production 
methods as part of their own vision of cultural survival and mediated 'modemisation'. 
He suggests that a viable indigenous development, which at the same time respects and 
strengthens ethnic identity, can be based on a modernisation strategy hence building 
economically viable livelihood strategies. In effect, 'self-determination' is often defined 
in terms of greater control of local decision-making and more effective participation in 
national representative structures and economic processes. 
Scholars increasingly emphasise the novel, unexpected and even contradictory nature of 
indigenous mobilisation through local level cultural practices. Consider, for example, 
the work by Brosius (1997) in Indonesia, who conducted comparative community work 
in two seemingly similar indigenous communities and found that 1) the type of 
resistance varied dramatically between the two communities, and 2) that these 
differences turned on a combination of contingent but nonetheless important events. 
Brosius thus found that radical differences in reaction to logging companies in the two 
communities reflected their differing histories with respect to colonialism, social 
structure, relative autonomy, and links to transnational forces (and environmental 
NGOs in particular). The point is that some communities do not resist (when outsiders 
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expect them to) and may not even have any innate interest in externally-cheri shed local 
knowledge. Similarly, Zerner (1999) shows how local 'traditions' can be discovered 
(sometimes at the behest of outsiders) and are then put into service under the new 
political circumstances in which villagers find themselves. Indeed, this thesis will 
indicate how some Shuar communities may adopt essentialist 'local traditions' pedalled 
by foreign activists in order to further local struggles through enhanced natural and 
global networks (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Thus, instead of viewing indigenous movements as simply defenders of frozen 
'traditions', the way that they actively use culture and identity alerts us to the 
contemporary and politicised character of these movements and the ways in which their 
discourses and claims are forged and shaped through interactions with allies and other 
actors. Indeed, indigenous mobilisation can be viewed as involving the process of 
identity (re)formation through interaction between ascription and identification. This 
opens a window to examine the cultural interactions between strategy and identity and 
the social and political processes thereby involved. 
2.3 Territory and Place 
The discussion so far has pinpointed the important relationship between cultural 
politics, state-building and the spread of capitalism and neoliberal policies with 
particular reference to Latin America. Implied in this discussion has been the idea of 
state-based versus indigenous territoriality. Indeed, state-designed development projects 
have often been associated with a palpable threat to indigenous notions of territory. As 
such, we will now consider the issue of indigenous territoriality and place-based 
strategies, as well as associated issues surrounding the notion of a 'local sense of 
place', as the second element in the elaboration of a theoretical framework 
for this 
thesis. 
In conceptualising territory, the definition offered by Sack (1986) is the most useful 
for 
our purposes. Thus, territoriality is the "attempt by an individual or group to affect, 
influence, or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and asserting 
control over a geographic area" (Sacks 1986: 19). Territorialization 
is about excluding 
or including people within particular geographical 
boundaries, and about controlling 
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what people do there--notably, their access to natural resources within those 
boundaries. Much work in political geography understands territoriality as an attribute 
of the state (Bryant 2005). The literature examines the impact of interstate relations on 
territory and how it is understood, the social construction of identity through imagined 
communities (Anderson 1983), and the possible dissolution of identity and territory 
through globalisation (Walker 1990; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). This literature 
thinks about territory as a geographical unified phenomenon thus reflecting a state- 
centric view (Taylor 1994; Johnston 2001). Recent work challenges these assumptions 
leading to what Bryant (2005) terms 'soft territoriality', that is, a situation where 
territoriality is understood as a strategic and relational practice by a range of state and 
non-state actors operating at complex multi-scale levels (Swyngedouw 1997; Kelly 
2002). Thus, territories are constructed and contested "in people everyday lives" and 
are "spatial reflections of power" (Storey 2001: 6). This literature tends to view territory 
as a multi-actor geographical phenomenon--including, at the local community level 
(Martin 2003; Storey 2001). 
States have certainly played a central role in the territorialization of space. States seek 
to control a space in which they carry out their actions and throughout which they claim 
sovereignty and power (Agnew 1999; Brown and Purcell 2003; Doolittle 2005). Yet, 
the establishment of spatial outreach and the techniques of control that work through 
the territory are questions about how over time a state responds to the challenges of 
territorial integration and internal contests for power. Agnew (1994) argues that 
although the sovereignty of the territorial state has been organised historically at the 
national scale, the national-scale character of state sovereignty is not inherent. Rather, 
the state has been socially produced in a particular era by particular political interests. 
Joseph and Nugent (1994a: 19) examine the ways in which "practical and processual 
dimensions of state formation" are inherently spatial, based on geographical tools and 
knowledge and on imaginative geographies and images. Similarly, Radcliffe (2001b: 
121) examines the spatial "forms of rule and ruling" that have been accomplished 
in 
Ecuador. The Ecuadorian state (as with most states) has divided its territory into 
economic and political zones, rearranging people and resources within these zones, 
while creating regulations to control how land and resources can 
be used. Registered 
land titles and maps based on scientific surveys are key texts that provide standard and 
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official definitions of land and property rights for many states (Vandergeest and Peluso 
1995). 
In fact, mapmaking is an inherently political practice. Sawyer (2004) argues in this vein 
that maps are 'intellectual weapons' through which states gain power and control, and 
which they use in turn to legitimise their policies. Even though maps are portrayed as 
scientific 'truths' they are made within specific political contexts of power (Taylor 
1992). Indeed, as Dorling and Fairbaim (1997: 7) note, the mapmaker "is able to 
manipulate the appearance and the content of the map to a surprisingly large degree". 
When crafted by a government, the maps reflect the dominant social and political order 
and often deny the historically constructed senses of place and identity felt by local 
populations. As Scott (1998) points out, state maps simplify and misrepresent complex 
local practices, depicting only those aspects that interest state officials, such as cash 
crops, livestock, export-led mineral, oil and lumber production potentials (see Chapter 
6). Through classifications and selective representation, maps aid the provision of 
territorial understandings that often helps to establish and extend state power by the 
means of physical and discursive control over areas (Smith 1991; Hobsbawn 1990). In 
this regard, Foucault (1984: 252) notes that specific "spatial agreements are a technique 
of power and are fundamental in any exercise of power". Territoriality, thus, provides 
an excellent example of how 'modem governability' has penetrated and shaped human 
life in unprecedented ways, even though the practices and sites of governance are 
always fraught with internal complexities and contradictions (]Foucault 1991). 9 
For example, Rose (1999: 34) argues, "governmental thought territorializes itself in 
different ways. We can analyse the ways in which the idea of a territorially bounded, 
110 politically governed nation-state under sovereign authority took shape' . For Rose 
(1999: 32), 'governable spaces' are "modalities in which a real and material governable 
world is composed, terraformed, and populated". Governable spaces necessitate the 
territorialization of government thought and practice but are simultaneously produced 
at differing scales by the laws of political economy. These spaces become 
9 Government for Foucault (2000) referred to the 'conduct of conduct', a more or less calculated and 
rational set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule through a multiplicity of authorities and 
agencies in and outside the state and at a variety of spatial levels. Meanwhile, governability is a form of 
power exercised through institutions, analysis and reflections which result from complex power relations 
(Foucault 1991). 
10 Vandergeest and Peluso (1995: 385) refer to this as "internal territorialization" in establishing control 
over natural resources and the people who use them. 
41 
'territorialized' and modelled through a system of cognition and remodelled through 
government practice in a way that frames social thought and governance (Fergusson 
2005). 11 1 want to root these spaces and forms of power in the logic of oil development 
which is generative of different sorts of 'politics of scale' (Smith 1992). 
However, state territoriality is constantly a highly contested space, with indigenous 
groups generating different mappings and images of national space (Castree 2004; 
Moore 1996; Poole 1995; Radcliffe 2001b; Sharp et al. 2000). Another form of 
territoriality is emerging in Ecuador as mappings of state and citizens are moving out of 
the state's hands and increasingly into a space informed by indigenous and social 
movements. Alternative geographies have erupted in Ecuador during the past twenty 
years that contest the spatial ordering of the state. Relations of citizenship and space 
have been reworked through processes that illustrate the ways in which "emergent 
popular cultures and processes of state formation" interact (Joseph and Nugent 1994a: 
3). As the negotiation of terms of rule is increasingly subject to indigenous movement 
input, the rule of the state is thereby transformed. Challenging state-centred notions of a 
unified and homogenous space, practices of 'popular geographical identities' create 
new spaces through which to express notions of citizenship, community, and identity 
(Crovetto 2001; Radcliffe et al. 2002; Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). Popular 
geographies may attempt to subvert the map of state power by generating a new spatial 
order and mapping that emphasise novel affiliations to territory. 
Thus, it is important to understand how these 'popular geographical identities' may 
have created new spaces of governance and different sorts of politics. To clarify this 
matter, this section will now explore the extent to which indigenous territoriality can 
function as what Foucault (1986) termed 'heterotopias'. These are 'other places' where 
key local place-based relations are asserted in ways that both represent and challenge 
broader state-society relations. In doing so, we assess circumstances where indigenous 
territoriality may be associated with new opportunities for local people to claim rights 
to land and other resources. To get a better sense of the dynamics involved here, the 
discussion now focuses on three conceptual aspects that we shall see are central to the 
construction of indigenous territoriality: 1) place-based relations; 2) sense of place; and 
11 The map has been central to this process as it inscribes and marks objects but also as "a little machine 
for producing conviction in others" (Rose 1999: 37). 
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3) 'placing' culture. While analytically disaggregated, these are all inter-related in 
practice. 
The first conceptual aspect refers to the manner in which local claims to land are partly 
formed from a group's historical and place-based relations (Murray 2001; Agrawal 
2001). These local place relations are also important in constituting a local sense of 
place (see below). However, "there can be no single definition of place" (Thrift 
1999: 310) and to define place-based practices is a complex and multi-faceted process. 
As such, place is assessed here to understand how indigenous territoriality is 
incorporated as various senses of place. Massey and Jess (1995) point out in this regard 
that there are often rival claims to the meaning of places and therefore to the right to its 
legitimate use. Rose (1995) argues that there are four main ways to highlight place- 
based relations linked to access to resources and land (see also Elmhirst 2001; Massey 
1994). First, place is a result of meanings drawn from activities and knowledge derived 
from direct exposure to local biophysical characteristics. Second, place is a set of social 
survival relations with the biophysical resources available. Third, place is a 
manifestation of the uneven socio-cultural relations within a group and/or between 
groups, again in relation to natural resources. Finally, place is a set of spatial access 
relations related to the locality--where access also denotes availability of resources 
rather than just a right of use (see Agnew 1993). In aggregate, the four ways just noted 
stress the types of relationships associated with place, and hence are of central 
relevance to the concerns of this thesis. 
We also need to recognise how different groups express their various lived experiences 
within a specific geographical location through what is referred to as 'local sense of 
place'. This is the second conceptual aspect surrounding the concept of indigenous 
territoriality and refers to the ways in which "human experience and imagination 
appropriates the physical characteristics and qualities of geographical location" 
(Oslender 2004: 962). It is an outcome of interconnected social and environmental 
processes that are creating flexible and contingent relations with physical space. Local 
sense of place "emphasises the significance of a particular place for a group and is 
linked to a set of place-based relations" (Rose 1995: 88). Sense of place provides the 
flexibility to explain differences between multiple groups interacting within a defined 
territory. Thus, a sense of place is not bound by locality per se, as meanings are drawn 
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from dominant place-based relations or a combination of relations often generated at a 
distance from them. Indeed, meaning and relations incorporated in a sense of place may 
even be maintained when people transfer to different localities, like when people move 
from rural communities to towns. 12 
The relationship of a local community to a geographical location may reflect a 
relational 'sense of place', derived from living in biodiversity (Lawrence 2002). This 
process may highlight specific relations with biodiversity without using that term, for 
example how hunters may describe how and why they catch fewer animals than in the 
past (see Chapter 6). A local sense of place may even emphasise power relations when 
local users forced to render themselves invisible to other actors seek to maintain or 
6protect' local claims to land and resources. At first, such experience may seem similar 
to the discourses articulated by external actors, such as the international science 
community (see below). Yet, locally articulated protection is nonetheless likely to be 
different insofar as it reflects highly specific personal or communal identification with, 
and responsibility felt for, local resources. It then becomes necessary to be able to 
recognise how different 'local sense of places' may emerge from place-based relations 
to the biophysical environment (Oslender 2004). Indeed, attention to discursive 
articulation here underscores the role of nuance and flexibility in this aspect of 
indigenous territorial expression. Importantly, the prevalence of differences in 
expressing local senses of place may facilitate a process whereby agreements are 
negotiated between local groups, even as it allows these groups to adopt a common 
stance towards outsiders (such as NGOs) but for different reasons. Such negotiation 
over difference features at various stages of the empirical analysis of the thesis (for 
example, see Chapter 5). 
If sense of place is thus understood as a nexus of social, political and economic 
relations in constant interaction, then it becomes possible that more than one place can 
exist in the same location (Massey 1995). This is important in terms of 
biodiversity 
where the international science community has identified countries such as 
Ecuador as 
places of high biodiversity under threat from human 
development. This scientific sense 
12 From an anthropological perspective, it is argued that the emplacement of all cultural practices stem 
from the fact that culture is carried into places by bodies- bodies are 'encultured' thus enacting cultural 
practices (Ingold 1992). Cultural anthropologists have begun to 
draw on these theories to show the extent 
to which local people's engagement with the landscape is endowed with agency. 
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of place is interpreted as a discourse centred on the idea of 'hot spots' (Friends of the 
Earth 1994; Mittermeier et al. 2000; see also Chapter 6). Yet, indigenous people living 
in these areas may contest this sense of place. Their alternative may relate to the 
physical and spiritual health of the group living in the forest and not see the biodiversity 
as a degraded hot spot, but rather as a dynamic source of life (Escobar 1998). Mapped 
hot spots are thus a highly political way of spatially representing and defining human- 
biodiversity relationships. This is another example of the potential power of maps, and 
hence of mapmakers to condition social perceptions of place. Here, the mapmaker is the 
international scientific community, which emphasises those countries where the human 
threat to residual biodiversity is considered critical and such biodiversity is deemed 
vital to humanity as a whole. All maps thus "express an embedded social vision" 
(Harley 1996: 441) even as the process of map making can be seen to be "extremely and 
explicitly subjective" (Dorling and Fairbaim 1997: 39). This holds true whether 
comparing digitally produced maps (from Geographical Inforination Systems) assisted 
through a computer program or those drawn by local people with pen and paper (Bryant 
2000; Lawrence 2002; Peluso 1995). 
Changing the scale of place brings out the third conceptual element of indigenous 
territoriality, the (placing' of culture--or what can be described as a place-based cultural 
identity. Here, cultural political analysis (discussed in relation to ethnic identity above) 
may provide the means to understand how local groups discursively place culture and 
thereby assert their sense of place (for example, see Alvarez et al. 1998). This effort to 
strategically place culture can be seen to be, in turn, an application of power. As 
Chapter 6 will consider, the construction of an indigenous sense of place is strategically 
articulated through political discourse that creatively draws upon and mobilises lived 
experiences and reconstructs an identity politics in the defence of an indigenous place. 
This can be seen as a positive process. For Foucault "relations of power are largely 
positive in the sense that they also give identity/identities to individuals, which enables 
them to act in the world" (Darier 1999b: 223). 
Indeed, where local people strategically place culture, they too seek to place power, 
because "power is a strategic game" (Foucault 1988b: 18). All of which has important 
consequences for protected areas, which place claims through 
boundaries and limit 
access to resources through zones. In this way, protected areas are 
designed to be 'other 
4 5) 
places' or 'heterotopias', serving as "places of disturbance; their existence unsettles 
regular categorisations of our living space" (Heyd 1997: 61). Thus, protected areas are 
44 counter sites ... in which the real sites that can be found within culture are 
simultaneously represented, contested and inverted" (Quigley 1999: 201). It is how 
protected areas are 'constructed'- the techniques of power and practice that are 
deployed- that determine their function as heterotopias. Here, too, there may be 
opportunities for local people to assert claims, such as ancestral domain claims, in a 
wider political struggle on behalf of indigenous rights. 
In Ecuador, indigenous people have increasingly been making territorial demands 
through the articulation of ancestral domains claims. These claims typically specify 
locally-defined alternative arrangements that entail the mapping of long-standing local 
resource practices by indigenous people (Bryant 2000; Howard 1997; Howitt et al. 
1996; Peluso 1995). Here, a strong sense of place as historical process is evident, 
notably in the way that place is connected to ancestry. Indigenous people have thus 
established communally-held areas based on ancestral heritage where they have long 
been practising 'traditional' natural resource management. These places are to be 
considered communally owned and regulated via a set of customary laws and cultural 
practices (see Chapter 6). As has been noted in this context with reference to 
indigenous politics and environment in general, "historically, they have managed to 
protect their ancestral domains thereby protecting also biodiversity" (Bennegan and 
Lucas-Fernan 1996: 156). Thus, where indigenous people are able to help to determine 
how a protected area functions as an image of biodiversity in which people "locate 
themselves coherently in the scheme of things", there may be opportunities (Stock 
1993: 315). Thus, the analysis of cultural politics may provide a means to understand 
how local groups discursively negotiate and assert their sense of place in relation to 
such multi-actor endeavours. 
Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) discuss in this regard the issue of 'placing of 
biodiversity' as part of a wider process of internal state territorialization in Thailand 
(also the 'enclosure of the commons'). This process consist of three aspects: mapping 
of land boundaries; the allocation of land rights to private actors; and the 
designation of 
specific resource uses by both state and private actors according to territorial cn*tena 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). They point out that this process benefits the state as a 
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means of controlling and facilitating economic interest, hence this state-led process 
clashes with local property rights particularly where claims comprise overlapping 
rights. This example provides a means by which to view some of the consequences of 
4 placing biodiversity". However, not all areas are like those described in Thailand. 
Indeed, generally it is precisely the process of designating specific resource uses as a 
consequence of 'placed biodiversity' that may afford opportunities for local people (see 
Chapter 7). This is important to recognise if we are to understand how asserting a local 
sense of place may provide opportunities to bring about social change beneficial to 
indigenous people. 
Further, any given discursive outcome may also reflect an altered local sense of place 
as some local people acquire new social identities emerging from multi -stakeholder 
negotiations. As Escobar (1999a: 31) states, "hybridisation does not necessarily mean 
decline through the loss of identity", but rather may allow for identities to be formed 
... through the opening of new possibilities". This act of claiming new identities was for 
Foucault a practice of liberation, a "tactical reversal to that imposed" (Darier 1999b: 
229). Therefore, an assertion of a local sense of place may also allow local people to 
form new identities and enable them to act differently then in the past and in ways 
designed to better capture new political, economic and cultural opportunities. For 
example, Wilson (1999) suggests that the cultivation of a common 'place-based 
identity' or 'sense of place' provides common ground or shared set of environmental, 
social and cultural values that may allow a 'political community' to be (re)discovered. 
Such a 'rediscovered' political community may also be fertile ground for resistance to 
perceived oppression, a point considered at various stages of this thesis. Escobar 
(1999a) considers this possibility in the context of Colombian rainforest struggles 
where a combination of strategies is used to respond to perceived economic 
depredations. His example of a hybrid discourse between local communities and allied 
scientists that is targeted against possible 'development' interests highlights how 
discursive 'hybridisation' can have practical material consequences as an 'alternative' 
space is created. Similarly, Klooster (2000) examines how local struggles in Mexico 
over common resources were motivated by historical place-based relations resulting 
from social injustice and degradation of the environment perpetrated by states and 
transnational corporations. By directly confronting the imbalances of micro-powers 
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within the communities "the discursive struggle challenges the distribution of power" 
(Klooster 2000: 15) in a manner not unlike that found by Escobar in Colombia. 
This discussion provides insights into the particular dynamics of social relations within 
a 'field of power' that seeks to explain how asserting place-base relations may result in 
social change. Thus, small shifts in micro-powers may occur enabling 'larger' relational 
shifts to occur as hybrid discourses frame 'other places' conducive of new local 
opportunities, such as the articulation of an indigenous territoriality. 
The practical implications surrounding the articulation of an indigenous territoriality, 
based on the three conceptual elements just noted, are immense. The concept of 
territory is a central part of the political construction of a 'reality' based on complex 
local indigenous expressions of place. That reality, as we shall see later in this thesis, is 
about the development of robust and autonomous local economies and governance 
structures. Thus, it is now necessary to explore how the assertion of cultural identity 
and indigenous territoriality and the associated possibility of resisting and mobilising 
may lead to opportunities for indigenous people to access and control biophysical and 
material resources, the third element in the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
2.4 Access to and Control of Natural Resources 
The processes of territorialization have gone hand-in-hand with the historical 
development of the nation-state. The latter has depended in turn upon the management 
and exploitation of natural resources, with state agencies set up to regulate access. The 
state has thus developed both the role of the policeman and the trader. Bryant and 
Bailey (1997) drawing upon a wide political ecology literature discuss this 
contradictory role and suggest that state intervention and regulation of the environment 
has been necessary to allow capital accumulation and a prospering of the modem 
capitalistic system (see also Bankoff et al. 2004; Bunker 1985; Hall 1998,2000a; Hecht 
and Cockburn 1989; Peet and Watts 2004; Neumann 2004; Schmink and Woods 1992). 
They also argue that the power of the state and its pursuit of economic development 
noticeably depend on the exploitation of the environment and its ability to facilitate the 
modem capitalist system (see Redclift 1987). Although the state has formal 
responsibility for finding solutions to environmental problems, therefore, it is more 
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likely to allocate resource access rights in a manner that contributes to environmental 
degradation (Escobar 1996). There are clearly consequences here for questions of 
access to and control of natural resources. This thesis examines the role of indigenous 
people in such a political and economic context and considers the socio-economic 
impacts on these actors of restricted access to and control of land and natural resources. 
The subject of the state and environmental management has evoked much pessimism 
among scholars (see Barry and Eckersley 2005; Greenough and Tsing 2003). Johnston 
(1996) argues that the state's role as the facilitator of the capitalist system links that 
actor to contemporary environmental problems that are essentially a by-product of that 
system. Yet, the state is also the key actor in finding solutions to the problems but is 
largely prevented from doing so because it is more or less beholden to the interests of 
capitalists. Walker (1989: 32) gloomily adds that "explicit state responsibility for 
management of the biological and physical resource base, though effectively 
unavoidable, has never been accepted". Such pessimism stands in sharp contrast to the 
expectations of state behaviour by some writers that the state is supposed to be 
dedicated to the promotion of collective goods, of which the environment is a leading 
example. Using the arguments based on the 'tragedy of the commons' 13 (Hardin 1967) 
various scholars have argued that there is a need for a powerful state to tackle the 
world's growing social and environmental problems (for example, Axelrod 1984; 
Ophuls 1977). 
Here, it is useful simply to point out that the flip-side of that justification was a critique 
of the ways in which grassroots actors managed- or more to the point, were seen not to 
manage- common resources. Yet, the reality of grassroots environmental management 
has usually been a far cry from the abstract description described by Hardin. Thus, far 
from being 'free' and open for all, use of the commons has usually been regulated 
through communal practices (Ecologist 1993). As many scholars point out, what Hardin 
is actually describing is an 'open-access' situation whereby resources are open to use 
by all actors, and there are no resource management structures to regulate such use 
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002; Peters 1994). Such 
13 Hardin's thesis on the 'tragedy of the commons describes a situation in which Individual herders graze 
their cattle on a common pasture. Each herder seeks to increase the number of cattle on the commons 
until eventually the limit has 
been reached. However, rather than reducing the grazing, each herder 
continues to add cattle to the pasture resulting 
in the 'tragedy of the commons' as resources are over- 
exploited and the herders are ultimately 
impoverished, for a critique see Goldman (1997). 
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arrangements can be quite complex and may involve multiple and overlapping user 
rights to land and resources (Blaikie 1989; Schroeder 1999). The management of 
common property resources has been especially important yet complicated, and has 
often resulted in the development of highly complex property regimes that bring 
together different communities with the aim to manage those resources (Ostrom et al. 
2002). The development of common property regimes is one way in which, for 
example, indigenous people have long sought to regulate resource use through specific 
management practices (Lawrence 2002). 
In fact, research by political ecologists has pointed out that Third World environmental 
problems usually reflect mainly a 'tragedy of enclosure' (Ecologist 1993; Bryant and 
Bailey 1997; Robbins 2004). In this process, states, often acting in conjunction with 
business corporations and multinational institutions, deny local access to commons 
hitherto managed by local communities. In effect, the control of common resources is 
taken over by the state for large-scale commercial exploitation or by allied corporate 
interests using the legal powers of the state. A notable case in point has been the 
creation of reserved forests, national parks and 'government lands' in many parts of the 
Third World (Anderson 2004; Bryant 1994b; Colchester and Lohmann 1993; Feamside 
2003; Fox 1998; Neumann 1992,2004; Painter and Durham 1995; Peluso 1992, Utting 
1993). The habitually exploitative practices --styled 'development' in the postcolonial 
era (Escobar 1995)--carried out in these 'nationalised' territories have included large- 
scale logging, mining, cattle ranching, cash-crop production and dam construction 
(Watts 1994). The ways in which traditionally powerful actors have benefited from 
these activities is a reoccurring theme in political ecology and is of central interest as 
well to the concerns of this thesis. 
Indeed, the social, political and economic marginalisation of indigenous people has 
explicitly been linked to how states turn locally-owned and operated common resources 
into state-run territories (Goldman 1998; Hong 1987; Howitt 2001; Jomo et al. 2004; 
Neumann 1998; Peluso and Harwell 2001; Peters 1994; Schroeder and Suryanata 2004; 
Tuck-Po 2004). Rather than being an actor with possible solutions to environmental 
problems, therefore, the state has typically exacerbated those problems. In effect, there 
seems to be a continuing potential conflict between the state's role as a developer and 
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as a protector and steward of the biophysical environment (Walker 1989). However, the 
privileged position of the state as a protector and steward of the environment has now 
changed as a result of the growing power of other actors, notably transnational 
corporations and multilateral institutions, linked to the forces of neoliberal policies and 
globalisation (as initially mentioned in Chapter 1). As such, multiple political-economic 
processes that influence access to resources, such as markets, government institutions, 
and regulatory policies, often today play crucial roles in the ways resources are used 
and managed (Moore 1986; Simmons 2002; Steinberg 2001; Vandergeest 1996). To 
take but one example, this thesis investigates how oil-based development has resulted 
in local people being denied access to 'traditional' lands and natural resources as 
companies acquire the right to exploit oil in state-sanctioned blocks (see Chapter 7). 
Still, all is rarely lost for indigenous people. As Peluso (2003: 216), argues, for 
example, "broader global trends and market or government incentives for privatisation 
and individualisation of resource access have not unilaterally transfon-ned the common 
aspect of community and descent-group claims on property rights". 
As was the case elsewhere at the close of the twentieth century, neoliberal economic 
reform in Latin America has represented the dominant arrangement of practices that 
constitute what Michael Foucault (1991) called 'governability' or the 'conduct of 
conduct'. Indeed, throughout the 1990s neoliberal policies became primary measures 
through which to shape the behaviour and condition the movement of populations, 
capital, and resources (Neumann 2005; Sawyer 2004). Policies and programmes 
seeking to privatise the public sector, to liberalise trade, to deregulate the economy, and 
to decentralise administrative functions also seek gradually to release the state from its 
formal role of championing social development and the betterment of its people. 
Through trickle-down economics, it is thought that the market forces of a robust 
economy and the greater circulation of transnational capital will resolve social 
problems and inequalities, and will thereby establish the conditions necessary for 
democracy to flourish (Sawyer 2004; Stiglitz 2002). 
In general, neoliberal policies implemented across the globe have progressively sought 
to relieve the state of many of its responsibilities to govern its subjects. This is a 
process which scholars have referred to as the 'degovernmentalisation' of the state, or 
'decentralisation' of government (Foucault 1991; Rose 1996; Escobar 1995). For some, 
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it has produced a set of conditions that has compromised and undermined the very 
tenets of the modem nation state. As I explore in this thesis, while neoliberal rule aims 
to transform the state and sites of governance notably by facilitating transnational 
capital accumulation, neoliberal policies do not seek to eliminate government per se. 14 
Rather, what the Ecuadorian case (among others) seems to demonstrate, is how 
processes that govem subjects are transforming, displacing and replacing sites of 
government. Neoliberal rule has created new governance arrangements in which 
transnational corporations have played an important part in shaping the environment, 
notably through their involvement in oil development (see Chapter 7; see also 
Sk aerseth and Skodvin 2003). i 
Here, it is necessary to clarify what Foucault means by 'government' and therefore how 
the biophysical environment enters into the constitution of regulatory practices and 
political strategies, and indeed into the creation of particular sorts of governable spaces. 
According to Foucault (1982: 221) government is the "exercise of power in guiding the 
possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome", and it "designates the 
way in which the conduct of individuals and groups might be directed". This definition 
is useful because it allows for a multiplicity of institutional forms and relations even 
beyond the state. Further, "to govern is to structure the possible field of action of 
others" where freedom is implicit in this exercise of power because individuals and 
groups face possibilities and have a choice of relations to them (Foucault 1982: 221). In 
this sense, environmental initiatives are government insofar as power is exercised to 
'guide' local people and groups to 'proper' use of the environment. Hence, 'proper' use 
opens up a field of opportunities for various actors including indigenous people. 
In a broader sense, words like 'guiding' and 'proper' use raise the issue of 
cgovemability'. Governability is a form of power exercised through an "ensemble of 
institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections which results in forming specific 
apparatus and a whole complex of power" (Foucault 1991: 102). 
There exist a 
multiplicity of power relations; hence there are many governabilities 
(Foucault 1991). 
In recognising different sorts of governabilities, it is possible to consider 
how we think 
about governing-both through collective and 
individual action (Dean 1999). As 
Foucault states, "governability is more concerned with how thought operates within our 
14 Government here understood in the Foucualdian sense of the term, see below. 
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organised ways of doing things, our regime of practices and with its ambitions and 
effects" (cited in Dean 1999: 18). However, as Ferguson (1994) and Bryant (2002) 
observe in different environment and development contexts, the unintended effects of 
these practices may be equally important. Here, and in keeping with the themes of this 
thesis, potential opportunities may be based in how local people are governed through 
regimes of practices associated with land and resources, "the conditions under which 
regimes of practices emerge, continue to operate and are transformed" (Dean 1999: 23). 
In this way, it is possible to explore how the environment enters into the constitution of 
regulatory practices and political strategies, and into the creation of particular sorts of 
governable spaces (Braun 2003). 
Two issues emerge from this discussion on environment and governance in relation to 
the concerns of this thesis and its Ecuadorian case study. First, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) have played an increasingly important role in shaping the 
environment through new governable spaces (Levy and Newell 2004). Indeed, through 
neoliberal policies that role has become even more central (Peet and Watts 2004). 
However, transnational corporations have generally tended to have an adverse 
environmental effect, especially in the natural resource sector, because these actors 
privilege profit maximisation over social justice and environmental conservation in 
their day-to-day operations. Given current neoliberalism, an important question is 
therefore whether businesses can be persuaded that 'sustainable development' is worth 
pursuing in its own right, on the basis that it might afford them glittering new 
opportunities for capital accumulation (Bryant and Bailey 1997). The evidence here is 
so far ambiguous to say the least. A growing number of local and transnational 
businesses are pointing out their involvement in 'green' business activities by using 
'environmentally-friendly' technologies and operations as evidence that they are 
leading the way in the quest for sustainable development and ecological modernisation 
(Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Lyon and Maxwell 2004; Sawyer 2003). At first glance, 
such activities would appear to be ideal for the principle of profit maximization on the 
one hand, and environmental conservation and social justice on the other. However, 
when specific cases are examined, a less rosy picture emerges. 
Sawyer (2003), for example, shows how one oil company, ARCO Oriente, claimed that 
it had adopted 'environmental I y-friendl y' technologies and operations in central 
53 
Ecuador. However, the firm's focus on the environment went hand in hand "with its 
continual attempt to contain the presence of indigenous people and erase the role of the 
military in securing its oil operations" (Sawyer 2003: 72). From the time the company 
began exploring for oil in the region in 1988, it emphasised its focus on the 
environment while simultaneously concealing its part in setting local communities 
against each other, weakening indigenous political capacity, and using state and private 
security forces to stifle protest--a set of issues that loom large in this thesis in the 
context of detailed empirical work taken from a different region of Ecuador. 
In the case of TNC-allied multilateral institutions, Goldman (2004) examines the 
'greening' of development institutions, such as the World Bank. He argues that the 
World Bank has had an important role in shaping the environment notably through its 
involvement in promoting 'green' business activities that address global environmental 
problems (see also Horta 2000). The World Bank has strengthened itself through re- 
invention as a catalyst for 'green' institutional change, and it has enlisted scores of 
social actors and institutions to generate a new development regime that is 'green' as 
well as neoliberal. In short, the institution has been at the centre of constituting a 
hegemonic yet fragile project of 'green neoliberalism' that is of recurrent interest in this 
study. 
The second issue to arise from the preceding discussion of environment and governance 
is related to the prospect that other actors may be able to force reluctant local and 
transnational businesses and institutions to pursue environmental I y-friendl y practices 
through diverse political strategies. As discussed at greater length in this thesis, the 
6empowerment' of a broadly understood civil society vis-a-vis the state has increased 
the power not only of corporations but also of indigenous organisations and NGOs. In a 
sense, the growing assertiveness and power of the latter two actors is directly related to 
the widespread sentiment that neither the state nor business is capable of promoting 
sustainable development since both actors have benefited so handsomely from 
environmentally destructive practices in the past (Bryant 2005). 
Here, we draw once more on Foucault to understand these processes as well as to 
appreciate how shifts in environmental governance may uncover new possible local 
opportunities. Foucault's analysis of the fluid nature of power relations removes the 
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myth that power sits permanently within structures, persons, roles and institutions. 
Foucault's (1982: 220) definition of 'conduct of conduct' thus broadens our frame of 
analysis so that opportunities in governance may occur in both formal and informal 
practices affecting both organisations and individuals. Further, the opportunity "to 
govern is to structure the possible fields of actions to act on our own or other's 
capacities for action" (Dean 1999: 14). Yet, this presupposes the existence of freedom 
and the capacity to think and act for both governed and governor (see Cruikshank 1999; 
Rose 1999). Freedom is therefore the capacity to struggle in these fields of power 
relations (Foucault 1982). Analysing changes and struggles in these power relations is 
therefore the challenge. To assist this task, Foucault suggests that the discursive 
practices be analysed since they indicate shifts in micro-power relations, which in turn 
may result in broader social and political transformation. 
Of general interest in this thesis, therefore, is how the possibility of participating in 
environmental governance may lead to shifts in the nature of resource use and control 
of benefit to indigenous people. Gordon (1991: 5) states that, power in a society is 
44 never fixed and closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game". This 
interpretation can be positive in the light of the concerns in this thesis. As noted, 
indigenous communities are made up of complex systems of practices, procedures and 
processes involving many institutions, groups and individuals, with complex micro- 
powers operating between them. As strategic struggles over micro-power occur, there is 
always the possibility that a shift seen to be beneficial to many if not all local 
communities can be obtained. 
Here, the implications of struggles for resource access and control require some 
discussion in the light of our interest in the politics of indigenous action. The first thing 
to note is that restricted or denied access to natural resources and land usually serves to 
further marginalise indigenous people (Gadgil and Guha 1992,1995; Richards 1997; 
Ribot 1998). Doolittle (2005) argues that changes in property rights rarely follow an 
evolutionary trajectory from open access to common property to private and state 
property. Instead different actors are motivated to alter property regimes and increase 
their opportunities through their struggles for wealth, power, and identity. The resulting 
changes in property regimes can be unexpected and can have unanticipated impacts on 
natural resources. Indeed, not only is access to common resources ended, but 
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indigenous people have often been forced into a situation in which they must join the 
degradation of the local environment on the principle of 'if you cannot beat them, join 
them' (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bryant and Bailey 1997). Many indigenous people 
have often adopted strategies that aim to minimise adverse effects on them while at the 
same time avoiding direct confrontation with powerful actors. 
One such adaptive response is to utilise diverse social and economic 'coping' strategies 
which may originate with 'traditional' responses to environmental change, but which 
are also deployed in the context of enclosure or environmental degradation. Such 
strategies notably encompass the modification of 'traditional' agricultural practices, the 
sale of livestock or the request of economic and technological assistance from external 
actors, such as state agencies, transnational corporations, or non-govemmental 
organisations (NGOs) (Bebbington 2004). As Chapter 6 relates, the Shuar have been 
'forced' to take up economic activities, such as cattle ranching, which involve the 
destruction of local forests in a manner similar to rival mestizos, in an attempt to secure 
their land. If they would not clear forests in this way, the Shuar might lose their land to 
colonists able to claim 'undeveloped' forest as their own under the Ecuadorian law (see 
also Bebbington et al. 1993). Yet, the ability to fight marginalisation through coping 
strategies alone should not be exaggerated because the economic strategies resorted to 
may lead to the depletion of essential local resources, and ultimately, the intensified 
impoverishment of the indigenous people in question (Blaikie 1985). 
The second thing to note is that restricted or denied access to natural resources and land 
is typically related to the dissolution of those resource management arrangements that 
had hitherto managed the commons. As power over local resources shifted from local 
people to states and other actors external to the community (such as national or 
transnational corporations), the need for these grassroots institutions largely 
disappeared and with it the utility of local cooperation in environmental management 
(Ghai and Vivian 1992; St. Martin 2001). Yet, not all of these institutions have 
disappeared, as the Ecuadorian case analysed in this thesis shows. Indeed, local people 
have often resorted to fierce conflict over access in the face of outsider management of 
local resources usually conducted by covert or overt means. In marked contrast to 
diverse forms of adaptation, many indigenous people have thus sought to fight the 
oppression of the more powerful actors in order to secure access to natural resources 
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through what Scott (1985) calls 'everyday forms of resistance' and/or by creating 
indigenous organisations, as being highlighted in Chapter 1. Here, it is important to 
note that the growing emphasis on indigenous organisations seems to clearly indicate 
that everyday resistance and adaptation strategies have clear limits in the quest to 
secure access to commons resources (Bayliss-Smith 2003; Hviding and Bayliss-Smith, 
2000; Howitt 2001; Gauld 2000). 
Indigenous movements are increasingly seen to be the most effective way in which to 
secure indigenous access to resources and land (Sawyer 2004). Yet, there are other 
factors that encourage a more cautious assessment of their ability to transform 
politicised environments. First, there is the problem of the limited scale and impact of 
many of the projects developed by indigenous organisations. This 'Achilles heel of 
localisation' (Esteva and Prakash 1992) may constrain the effectiveness of initiatives in 
that those initiatives do not assist and/or represent the people that need them most. This 
situation in turn may limit the ability of these organisations to change local political, 
social and ecological conditions. Non-govemmental organisations may be critical here 
in helping indigenous organisations to overcome such difficulties but there are often 
constraints on the ability of NGOs to assist local people (Perreault 2003b). As Vivian 
(1994) observes, there are no 'magic bullets' where the abilities of NGOs are 
concerned. For instance, Slater (2003) observes that the struggle to preserve the 
rainforest involves a series of dramas in which local, regional, and transnational 
elements regularly collide and intertwine (see also Brown and Purcell 2003). While 
local people may be interested above all in securing access to needed resources and 
land, national and international NGOs may paint them as innate preservationists, 
thereby setting up a clear tension between these 'allies' (Bryant 2005; Brosius et al. 
1998). 15 
Second, even with the assistance of NGOs, there are no guarantees that indigenous 
organisations will be able to overcome the serious political and economic obstacles that 
traditionally powerful actors may throw in their way (Hall 2000). At a local scale, 
political leaders often seek to subvert the autonomy of 
indigenous organisations that 
they usually regard as a threat to their political and economic position. 
For example, 
15 For an example of how the related idea of the Noble Savage 
has served several groups, including 
foreign anthropologists, see Redford (1990) and Ellington (2001). 
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both Vitug (1993) and Lawrence (2002) note that in the Philippines there are thousands 
of grassroots organisations, but many of them have found it difficult to dislodge local 
bosses involved in economic activities which degrade the environment. The growing 
activity of indigenous organisations thus does not in and of itself signal a shift in power 
relations between indigenous people and more powerful actors in many Third World 
countries. 
Third, indigenous organisations are not always unified in their aims and interests. Here, 
internal divisions may weaken the political effectiveness of these organisations. In so 
far as indigenous organisations base their operations on democratic principles, they' 
must confront the heterogeneity of local people's interests (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, 
Fairhead and Leach 1995; Hodgson and Schroeder 2002; Lawrence 2002; Rangan 
2000,2004; Rocheleau et al. 1996). In the well-known case of the Chipko movement, 
for example, Agarwal (1992) argues that conflict within that organisation developed in 
one village when the men sought to fell a community oak forest in order to establish a 
potato-seed farm from which they would primarily benefit, while the women were 
opposed to this move on the grounds that they would thereby lose their main local 
source of fuelwood and fodder. 
Further, as indigenous organisations develop resource management projects to secure 
access to resources and land they must confront the possibility that some members may 
seek to benefit from these projects without assisting those most in need 
(O'Faircheallaigh 1998). Thus, as projects unfold, the prospect of internal dissent is an 
ever-present threat--especi ally in the context in which powerful opponents of these 
organisations may seek to subvert their activities. The complex processes arising from 
this distinction are discussed further in Chapters 5 to 7. Here, it is important to 
understand generally that these internal differences may become manifest in struggles 
within and between indigenous communities. These struggles in turn encompass how 
people relate to the environment and access local land and other resources (Robbins 
2004; Seracombe and Sellato 2005). 
Finally, the dependency of most indigenous organisations on the political and financial 
support of NGOs, states or multilateral institutions suggests that the activities of the 
former are extremely vulnerable to disruption in the light of the shifting interests of the 
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latter (Bebbington 2004; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Gibson et al. 2000; Igoe 2003). That 
money plays a pivotal role in the operations of both social movements and non- 
governmental organisations is a recurring theme in the literature. Generally, funding is 
widely seen as the 'Achilles heel' of the work of these actors as the need for money can 
lead them into trade-offs at odds with their original aims (Bryant 2005; Fowler 2000). 
Money is seen as rendering actions ambiguous and core aims and goals may be 
compromised (Smillie 1995; Hulme and Edwards 1997). Weisbrod (1998: 12) thus 
observes that the central dilemma facing NGOs, for example, is "how to balance pursuit 
of their social missions with financial constraints when additional resources may be 
available from sources that might distort mission". For others, the problem is 
dependency (Fowler 2000). McCarthy and Zald (1987: 385) highlight the insidious 
impact of dependency of social movements on state, transnational or church funding 
and such dependency has the effect of "directing organised dissent into legitimate 
channels", thereby "diffusing the radical possibilities of dissent in general". Thus, this 
literature shows how the need for money can distort missions-- with the result that the 
promotion of the political autonomy of actors and causes may be threatened. 
Indeed, this thesis will examine how the selective success of the Shuar federations in 
Ecuador has been linked to the provision of political, financial and technical support 
from diverse benefactors, such as national and international NGOs. Yet, reliance on 
outside support has meant that sometimes the decisions made regarding the design and 
implementation of projects may come from outside support agencies rather than from a 
Shuar organisation itself. In these cases, what may have been intended originally to be a 
process of grassroots organising turns out in practice to be merely participation 
by 
grassroots actors in a programme that is planned by outsiders--rai sing troubling 
questions about the long-term viability of 'alternative' resource 
initiatives (see Chapter 
7). Thus, it is important to highlight the ambiguous nature and possible contradictions 
of indigenous organisations in order to fully understand 
how and to what extent they 
may be able to challenge the policies and politics of powerful actors. 
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2.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to set out the theoretical framework of the thesis 
through reference to key conceptual themes and issues. In doing so, that framework has 
seen to combine the concerns of political ecology and new social movement analysis in 
order to investigate the ways in which notions of cultural identity, territory and place, 
and control over resource access have become central to indigenous politics and 
struggles. 
The first research theme guiding this thesis is therefore that of cultural identity politics. 
The chapter highlighted how the elaboration of indigenous identity reflects a complex 
and hybrid genealogy of identification that has emerged over decades. That identity has 
been made around a strong inter-connected sense of territory, culture and tradition, but 
in the context of cultural, economic and political change. This elaboration was achieved 
through complex negotiations over culture and identity, even as the rise of indigenous 
politics nationally and internationally unleashed considerable political energy among 
indigenous people resentful of their marginalised status. It also became the tool used to 
build the political strategies of indigenous people who sought to articulate collective 
political, economic, and cultural views critical of neoliberal policies and state-designed 
development projects as well as associated understandings of nation and democracy. 
The second research theme guiding this thesis then demonstrates how indigenous 
territoriality has been articulated in contradistinction to state territoriality. This 
discussion emphasised how the idea of state-designed development projects has often 
been associated with a threat to indigenous notions of territory. However, state 
territoriality is a highly contested space where indigenous movements have increasingly 
resisted the spatial ordering favoured by the state. The practical considerations 
surrounding the articulation of an indigenous territoriality were 
based on three 
conceptual elements --namely place-based relations, 
local sense of place and place- 
based cultural identity. These elements, it was suggested, may in turn create new 
opportunities for local indigenous people to claim rights to 
land and resources. 
The third element in the theoretical framework of this thesis concerned the question of 
resource access. The chapter here examined the role of 
indigenous people in a 
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Politicized environment and considered the socio-economic impact on these actors of 
restricted access to natural resources and land. Neoliberal policies have become 
primary measures through which to control this vital ingredient of indigenous life. 
Here, Foucault was used in order to understand these processes as well as to appreciate 
how shifts in environmental governance may uncover new local opportunities. Of 
general interest to this thesis, therefore, is how the possibility of participating in 
environmental governance may lead to shifts in the nature of resource use and control 
in relation to indigenous people. 
If this set of concerns constitutes the theoretical framework of the thesis, it next remains 
to explain the methodology used in this study--the task of chapter 3. Chapter 4 then 
provides the essential background of an Ecuadorian context involving state-designed 
development projects and land reforms, neoliberalism and oil-dependency, and 
associated indigenous mobilisations. It thus presents an overview of indigenous 
struggles and oil politics in Ecuador that sets the scene for the empirical analysis of 
Chapters 5,6, and 7. 
The theoretical framework set out in this chapter is thereafter assessed in the empirical 
analysis of chapters 5 to 7. In Chapter 5, the aim is to examine the way in which the 
Shuar struggle has been partly about the articulation of Shuar cultural identity and its 
deployment in political battles with both the Ecuadorian state and transnational oil 
companies. In contrast, Chapter 6 considers how that struggle has itself come to be 
defined in terms of particular geographical notions of Shuar territoriality and a local 
sense of place. Here, the effort by the Shuar movement to advance indigenous interests 
through the interweaving of ancestral and ecological claims is explored. In turn, 
Chapter 7 examines struggles over both material and natural resources and how the 
Shuar have elaborated various resource management projects in order to safeguard 
these resources. Finally, Chapter 8 relates these findings back to the theoretical 
framework to assess the broader validity and importance of the study, and to suggest 
further research opportunities and issues pertaining to indigenous struggles. 
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Chavter 3 Metho 
3.1 Why Ecuador and the Shuar people? 
The aim of this chapter is to explain why Ecuador and the Shuar people were chosen as 
a case study while also outlining a variety of practical, ethical and political implications 
of undertaking research in the Amazonian region. Further, the general methodological 
approach and precise methods that I used to undertake the field research will be 
discussed with a focus on the ethnographic approach and participatory methods. 
In order to examine the complex and multi-faceted ways in which an indigenous 
political movement is constructed and operates, this thesis focuses on a case study of 
the Shuar people in the south-eastern part of the Amazonian region in Ecuador. Choice 
of the site was driven by my research interest to encompass an area and an indigenous 
group with distinct means and experience of indigenous mobilisation and political 
organising. For ten months between 2003 and 2004,1 collaborated with Shuar residents 
on a daily basis in the quotidian practices of indigenous organising (or indeed the lack 
of it). This collaboration shaped my research so that it spanned multiple spaces (local, 
regional, national and transnational) and encountered multiple perspectives 
(indigenous, campesino, state, corporate, elite). In the Shuar federations, 
FederaciOnInterprovincial de Centros Shuar (FICSH) and the Federacion 
Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador (FIPSE), headquartered in Macas and 
Sucua, in rainforest communities or in regional assembly meetings, I sat on hard 
wooden benches with federation leaders and community members drinking chicha (a 
traditional fermented drink made out of juka) and eating platano (plantains) and juka, 
debating the realities that affected Shuar lives. I trekked for days into the rainforest to 
stay with far-flung Shuar communities, I slept on banana leaves on mud floors, 
preparing food from the open fire, I worked with villagers in the chakras (agricultural 
plots) and I followed them when they went fishing and hunting. I accompanied the 
Shuar on their marches, ministry occupations, protests and mobilisations, and I 
followed them into meetings with oil company executives and state officials. 
Even after being in Morona Santiago for more than one month in 2003 1 was still rather 
apprehensive about the practical feasibility of my research. The constituency of the 
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Shuar federations convened in the Morona Santiago province, and I had heard stones of 
federations opposition to the projects of volunteers and scholars wanting to work in the 
region. As elsewhere in Ecuador, working with indigenous organisations can be tricky 
and difficult--a politically sensitive endeavour, given the history of discrimination, 
marginalisation and exploitation that have been the reality in the region for a long time. 
Being a researcher, however, made a person multiply suspect, especially as all 
researchers were believed to be anthropologists. Indeed, that discipline was long 
defamed for having played handmaiden to many 'civilising' missions in the region 
(Sawyer 1997). However, my prospects of working with an indigenous organisation 
trying to confront oil development were further placed in doubt as many other foreign 
people before me had expressed similar interests but nothing had come to fruition. 
However, I had done research previously in the Oriente (the Amazonian region) during 
the summer of 2002 for my MA dissertation. I knew that attitudes towards researchers 
and northern collaborators were changing within Ecuador's federation system-- 
although how and in what ways remained unclear. Those leaders I had come to know in 
2002 no longer held office in 2003 as their three-year terms had ended. Most of 
FIPSE's and FICSH's leadership was unknown to me and me to them, other than 
through my previous ties with a few Shuar leaders. As I look back, my links within a 
growing network of indigenous rights and environmental organisations, and the 
openings such networks facilitated, eased nevertheless my ability to work with the 
Shuar federations and allowed me to visit some Shuar communities. The occasion also 
marked what was to be the form and content of my PhD field work: the intensive day in 
and day out collaboration with two of the most progressive Amazonian federations at 
the time as they struggled with US-based oil companies, Ecuadorian development 
projects and a highly dependent neoliberal state. 
The account that this thesis tells primarily emerged from collaboration with FIPSE and 
FICSH and with some Shuar communities in what was inevitably a political and social 
exercise. As such, my research inevitably dispensed with any pretensions of 
'objectivity'. Yet, my engaged research afforded methodological richness that could not 
have been acquired in any other way. Establishing my political allegiances was critical 
to being able to collaborate with the Shuar federations and to stay in the communities; 
the Shuar would never have permitted my visit otherwise. The connections that came 
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from working daily with the Shuar also allowed me to build deep trusting friendships 
with federation leaders and community residents. However, I became acutely aware as 
the research progressed of the lack of trust that existed between the federations 
themselves and many community members--a situation that complicated in particular 
my efforts to build trust with community members. These local connections rather 
derived fortuitously from my previous field research undertaken in 2002 that had 
allowed me to work in selected communities. This engaged research allowed me to 
grasp the complex and multi-faceted situation faced by the Shuar--a situation that led 
some Shuar to challenge authority while others capitulated to the powerful even as they 
captured new economic opportunities. In short, my political I y-en gaged form of 
participant observation helped me to understand the circumstances that politicised the 
Shuar struggles as well as the differentiated responses that emerged from the Shuar 
people. 
Inevitably, I encountered a variety of practical problems in the field, including having 
to get used to the tropical weather, flood-prone livers, omnipresent insects and animals 
(some quite dangerous), and transport difficulties (especially after heavy rainfall). As a 
result, I became very ill at the end of my fieldwork after having caught a number of 
tropical infections and viruses. However, since I was a young female on my own meant 
that the villagers wanted to look after me. Nobody seem threatened by me, which they 
possibly might have done if I had been an older, male researcher, since people often 
fear that such a person is a government or oil company employee trying to infiltrate 
their communities. 
However, my constant questioning would sometimes frustrate a few of the research 
participants, and hence I felt a need to give something back as a token of appreciation 
for their time and patience. For example, on my trips to the towns I brought back 
requested items such as a bag of salt or rice, or pens and notepads for the children. 
Caution had to be taken never to promise to do something that I would not be able to 
fulfil, since local people are disillusioned with outsiders whose promises to improve 
their lives never materialise. From the beginning I emphasised that the project and my 
research were to be studies with no direct material benefits, although copies of the 
project findings, reports, maps and photographs would be left with community leaders. 
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Field relations were strengthened over time, and as I learned more about the lives of the 
people in the communities, they learned more about me. This shared knowledge 
enhanced a mutual, if unequal relationship. In some respects, it proved to be ethically 
uncomfortable for me because, as I gained their trust, they would open up to me more, 
enabling me to acquire richer data about their lives. Sometimes, I felt like I was 
manipulating friendship in order to get good data (see Punch 1986). Such close contact 
could also prove problematic as I found it increasingly hard to switch from a very 
informal conversation to a more formal semi-structured interview situation to talk about 
particular issues. 
My desire to collaborate with the Shuar federations and to work with the communities 
emerged from both my connections to environmental and indigenous rights NGOs 
based in Europe and Latin America and the education (both formal and informal) I have 
had the privilege to obtain as a European. From having worked with environmental and 
indigenous rights' campaigns in Latin America and having visited other 'Third World' 
countries by the time I started the thesis, this experience had imbued me over the years 
with a keen knowledge of and distaste for global inequalities. Similarly, undergraduate 
and graduate studies in English universities deepened my understanding of social 
injustices, which in turn disciplined me to write about and think through the social and 
political reality that people in the 'Third World' face under capitalism and neoliberal 
policies. These analytical insights complemented indigenous movements' practical 
aims in the field designed to rethink, oppose and capitalise upon broader political and 
economic processes and networks (of which I formed part). 
The research used an ethnographic approach and participatory research methods to 
understand the complex and multi-faceted nature of indigenous political movements 
and to examine the case study of the Shuar people's struggles against oil 
development 
and neoliberal policies in the south-eastem Amazonian region 
in Ecuador. Other 
methodologies could have been employed, such as survey, 
historical or archival 
analysis. However, the research is looking at contemporary events surrounding 
indigenous political movements and oil 
development in a real time situation with 
groups whose behaviour cannot 
be controlled (Hamel et al. 1993; Yin 1994). 
Furthermore, as the investigation is explanatory and descriptive in content and multiple 
variables are involved, a survey would tend 
to miss the complex and multi-faceted 
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discourses and storylines within and between the different actors involved in the 
struggles (Bennett 2000). Discussion topics changing over time, or shifting opinions of 
groups in response to context, are normally seen to be a problem in some types of 
research. Yet, shifting discourses and storylines in regard to indigenous political 
movements and struggles against oil development are precisely the interest of this 
study. 
This section has briefly explained why Ecuador and the Shuar people were chosen as a 
case study in my PhD research and it has described a variety of practical, ethical and 
political implications of my undertaking that research. Let us now turn to a discussion 
of the central methodological approach that I used to undertake the field research, 
namely the ethnographic approach. 
3.2 Methodological Approach 
Ethnographic research has long been a distinguished part of academic work (Denzin 
and Lincoln 1998). This is particularly the case within anthropology where 
fieldworkers have long gone to 'foreign places' to chart the customs and habits of 
'other' societies. However, in recent times ethnography has 'come home' (Jackson 
1987) and Western social scientists are increasingly utilising these methods to study 
complex issues in their own societies as well. Both contextual considerations and 
epistemological reflections have stimulated this renewed interest in ethnographic 
research. The increasing complexity of social contexts, especially the dissolution of 
'old' social inequalities into the new diversity of subcultures, social movements, and 
ways of doing politics has required new sensitivity within empirical study (Flick 1998). 
Thus, contemporary theoretical concerns with social movements have promoted a 
change in methodological fashion from quantitative research methods to more in-dept 
qualitative techniques (see Atkinson et al. 2001; Burgess 1996; Burgess et al. 1988; 
Cook and Crang 1995; Phillips 2000; Pile 1991). 
Rather than simply a set of research techniques that centres on a very particular 
epistemological standpoint concerning the objectivity of knowledge, the ethnographic 
approach recognises the researcher's subjectivity as an explicit part of the research. 
Indeed, ideas of 'value-free' research are rejected in favour of a recognition that the 
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researcher's positionality, reflections, ideas, thoughts and feelings form an integral part 
of the interpretation process (Hughes et al. 1999). The researcher is not a detached 
neutral observer (or participant) but rather equally positioned in and interconnected 
with the research context as the researched (Cook and Crang 1995). Thus, the 
ethnographic approach accepts that the researchers may influence the research context 
since they become a part of the social world they study (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1995). Barnes and Duncan (1992: 3) argue that "the worlds we represent are inevitably 
stamped with our own particular set of local interests, views, stands, and so on. To 
understand our own representations, and also those of others, we must therefore know 
the kinds of factors bearing upon an author that makes an account come out the way it 
does". Therefore, it must also be recognised that what we choose to observe, what we 
consider to be data, what we write about and how we do it, will always be affected by 
our personal and institutional values and underlying assumptions absorbed through our 
training. Focusing on the day-to-day processes by which an understanding of situations 
are carved out, this reflexivity links ethical concerns about presenting 'truth' with 
concerns for the relationships between the fieldworker and the people studied 
(Devereux and Hoddinott 1992). 
Another feature of ethnographic research is that it grounds research in the 'life-worlds' 
and the experiences of the research participants to understand how societies or groups 
work 'from the inside' (Escobar 1997). Such an approach takes into account the fact 
that the participants' knowledge and viewpoints are negotiated through and shaped by 
different cultural, social, political and economic practices, which are embedded in the 
research field (Francis 1992). As Flick (1998: 6) puts it: "Inter-relations are 
described 
in the concrete context of the case and explained in relation to it". By using the 
ethnographic approach the research participants are choosing the research methods, not 
the other way around (Clifford and Marcus 1986). The researcher uses the tools of 
his 
or her methodological choice and adopts whatever methods are appropriate. 
In this 
way, the choice of research practices depends on the questions that are asked, and 
the 
questions depend on their context (Nelson et al. 1992). 
Ethnography was the most appropriate research strategy for my study 
for several 
reasons. First, a key process to be examined 
from an ethnographic perspective is the 
growing participation in and influence of 
indigenous politics and organising. It is Cý 
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through this set of practices and strategies that the dominant political and economic 
discursive formation is contested. Escobar (1998) has argued that more ethnographic 
research is needed on how these organisations articulate their visions and issues in 
terms of specific links to culture, politics and nature. These organisational networks are 
prime examples of the emergent set of transnational practices and identities that link 
place-based modes of activism to broader political and economic processes. Thus, by 
using an ethnographic approach, the focus has been upon documenting one empirical 
example of how indigenous movements are facing these questions from the perspective 
of culture and politics. 
Second, ethnography is a practical approach to employ when, as in the case of this 
thesis, the research setting is in a remote place as opposed to an easily accessible rural 
area where daily visits to carry out interviews or observation would be possible (Madge 
1994). The relative geographical isolation of many Shuar communities from wider 
national and transnational centres also meant that the research participants had limited 
in-depth contact with outsiders. They tended therefore to be timid and unaccustomed to 
social interaction with people from outside their community. Indeed, many of the 
people had never seen a white person before my arrival in their community. 
Consequently, at the start of the research, they reacted with stares and nervous giggles. 
Initially, conversations involved single-word answers until they became accustomed to 
my presence after I had stayed for some time. Living in the communities and taking 
part in some of the residents daily activities meant that I could form a relationship of 
trust vital for gathering data which were sensitive to their own perceptions of their 
lives. 
Finally, understanding ethnography as an approach allowed me to encompass a range of 
participatory research methods, including participant observation, 
in-dept interviews, 
oral histories, discussion groups, and community mapping techniques. 
As noted, 
methodological strategies applied in the field were still very much 
based on observing 
what was going on in the field by collaborating with the 
Shuar federations and 
participating in the everyday life of Shuar communities. 
This type of approach may be 
interpreted as showing (in a positive way) flexibility towards the subject under study 
but also holds the danger of methodological arbitrariness. 
However, such an 
understanding does not preclude work 
based on the interpretation of narratives, story- 
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lines, and images, which are integrated into this kind of participatory research design 
where they hold out the promise of further knowledge or the affirmation of field 
insights. 
A particularly important element in an ethnographic approach is the validation of the 
researcher's findings by local people themselves. Questions of validity arise in several 
forms that relate to theory, practice and analysis. To ensure theoretical validity the 
study was related to a real-world situation and the methods that were chosen were 
appropriate for the theories discussed (Kitchen and Tate 1999). To ensure 
methodological validity, correct operational procedures needed to be established that 
were valid for the practices being studied. By asking different groups to validate the 
results, the effect of informant bias could be minimised. Validation was carried out 
either through community meetings, involving as broad a cross-section of the 
community as possible, or in small group discussions. The validation process provides 
the researcher with an opportunity to compare her/his interpretation of the information 
that has been collected with local people's understanding (Punch 2002). This can be 
valuable both as a means of validating the information itself and as a way of 
understanding how local people's viewpoints and interpretation might differ from that 
of 'outsiders' such as the researcher. 
Perhaps most importantly, the validation process plays an important role in ensuring 
that local people acquire a sense of ownership of the investigation and its findings, and 
that the researcher continues to learn about the community even as she or he provides 
feedback on changes and the impacts of project activities. In turn, this may led to 
changes to research aims and /or valuable information is added in the course of the 
research. Thus, validity is enhanced by research techniques that 
build trust and 
openness and which give the informants scope to express the way they see things, and 
to encourage them to illustrate, expand and clarify their responses 
(Kitchen and Tate 
1999). There is clearly the possibility of introducing researcher bias and subjectivity 
into the study. These are legitimate concerns that cannot be eliminated, 
however, in any 
method. In any case, an effort was made to reduce this possibility 
by using appropriate 




3.3 Participatory Methods 
This section is intended to outline the participatory research methods used and how 
these came to be applied in the research. Participatory field research projects are 
generally used to identify, describe and understand strategies relating to local 
communities, and in particular those strategies that seek to empower local communities 
by enabling them to articulate, document, and share their strategies. Participatory 
research methods offer ways to open up discussions in a non-threatening way, notably 
by focusing on local classifications, concepts and explanations. In doing so, the 
objective is not merely to find things out. By actively engaging people in the process of 
exploring and representing what they know, the participatory research process can 
validate such knowledge even while research participants may be capable themselves of 
interpreting and changing the research situation themselves (de Koning and Marion 
1996). As such, these methods reflect a 'leaming approach' (Korten 1980) in which the 
conventional separation between researcher and participant is broken. 
In participatory research, knowledge is also not seen as a timeless static entity that can 
be possessed, transferred or lost. Knowing is rather regarded as a dynamic process that 
takes place through interaction. The research aims to create new forms of knowledge 
and new opportunities, for an analysis of the different experiences and knowledges of 
those taking part (Fals-Borda and Rahman 1992) calls for changes in the roles, attitudes 
and behaviour of researchers, who become facilitators and learners rather than only 
researchers (Chambers 1992). Through a process of mutual learning, people are 
equipped with the skills to do their own research and to enact their own solutions. 
Participatory research is, then, a personal and political process aimed at transforming 
diverse inequalities. 
As noted, in the ethnographic approach the concern is to understand how societies and 
groups work from the 'inside' and how people's knowledge and viewpoints are shaped 
and negotiated by different social, cultural, political and economic processes which are 
embedded in the research field. The participatory research method, then, 
is a central 
research strategy by which researchers have done this 
(Cook 1997). The main features 
are that the researcher dives headlong into the 
field experiences, tries to observe from 
the participants' own perspective, but also influences what 
is observed owing to his or 
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her own participation. Thus, the researcher must deliberately immerse him/herself into 
the everyday life of a community, developing relationships with people who can reveal 
what is going on there, and writing accounts of how these relationships developed and 
what was learnt from them. This highly participatory and 'relaxed' technique enhances 
data gathering (see Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Flowerdew and Martin 1997). 
By using participatory research methods, however, I had some concerns about raising 
expectations in the Shuar communities--expectations that I was not in any position to 
fulfil. For example, at the initial point of access into the communities, I could not 
anticipate how the work would evolve and how community residents would perceive 
my presence in the communities. Even though my intention had been to participate and 
work with the communities in an 'overt' manner, I sometimes had to conceal that I was 
staying there as a researcher since some Shuar communities were not interested in the 
research or were even openly hostile towards researchers. Thus, I would not have been 
allowed to work in the communities if all of the information had been provided that 
might be considered necessary for informed consent. This of course raised very 
important ethical concerns. 
The complex issues at stake here revolved around not only my personal responsibility 
as a researcher to behave in an ethically appropriate manner but also the ability to 
respond to changes in the field research experience itself. Taking responsibility for 
raising expectations and awareness are important but taking responsibility for providing 
what people want is another issue altogether. In many of the communities in which 
participatory methods are used, the root problem is poverty, marginalisation, and 
perceived powerlessness (Katz 1994). Without commitment to empowerment and to 
seeing the process of change as a wider project, therefore, participation soon 
becomes a 
rather empty endeavour. Indeed, for pragmatic, as much as 
for political reasons, the 
research would have faltered without using participatory methods. 
Thus, putting participatory ideals into practice raises a number of ethical, political, 
practical and professional dilemmas. Wading 
into communities with ideas about 
empowerment and representation for those who are marginallsed and 
powerless can 
create all sorts of problems (Punch 
1986). In some cases, research may only involve 
greater participation for those that are most 
influential in the communities. In other 
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cases, problems may arise from a conflict of interests provoked by the demands of 
certain agendas, for example issues arising from deciding upon whether to resist or 
negotiate against the oil companies or involving women as equals in often strongly 
patriarchal settings. Not only can this kind of research threaten established interests 
within communities it can also unleash a backlash that further disempowers those 
taking part. However, participatory methods offer ways of sharing ideas and 
constructing new forms of knowledge that can bridge the gap between the researcher 
and participants. Extending this to focus on the concerns of different people within the 
communities by identifying issues for further study together with local people, takes 
this a step further. In the context of a larger project of social transformation, these steps 
bring professionals closer to understanding and appreciating some of the most 
important personal and political aspects of participatory research as well as (hopefully) 
to helping to promote peaceful and positive change in communities themselves. 
The interview is a central strategy in participatory research. In general, interviews are 
generally unstructured or semi -structured, thereby taking on a conversational, fluid 
form, as each interview varies according to the interests, experiences and views of the 
participants (Keats 2000). It is characteristic of the interview that more or less open 
questions are brought to the interview situation in the hope that they will be answered 
freely by the interviewee (Flick 1998). Baxter and Eyles (1986) describe an interview 
as 'conversation with a purpose'. This sort of conversation offers the chance for the 
researcher and interviewee to have a far more wide-ranging discussion than would 
occur, for example, when a questionnaire is used. Although structured interviews may 
ensure less bias and error, they lack flexibility and often obscure rather than illuminate 
the interviewees' viewpoints. Unlike a questionnaire, the aim of the interview is not to 
be representative but to understand how individual people experience and make sense 
of their lives. The emphasis is on considering the meanings people attribute to their 
lives and the processes that operate in particular social and political contexts. 
The 
advantage of this method is that it is sensitive and people-oriented, allowing 
interviewees to construct their own accounts of their experiences 
by explaining and 
describing their lives with their Own words (Flowerdew and Martin 1997). 
Thus, interviewing can be used as a powerful tool in helping people to make explicit 
things that have hitherto been implicit- to articulate their tacit feelings, perceptions and 
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understandings (Bennett 2000). They can be used both as a source of information about 
events, and as revealing the perspectives and discursive practices of those that produced 
them. Not only will this add to knowledge directly, but it can also throw light on the 
kind of threats to validity that we need to consider in assessing the information 
provided by an account. The fluid and individual nature of conversational-style 
interviews means that they can never be replicated; only corroborated by similar studies 
or complementary techniques (Valentine 1997). 
In fact, it is impossible to understand strategies and forms of indigenous politics 
without reference to intentions, ideas and language of those that practice it. Geertz 
(1973) argues that only by inquiring into the experience of the actors, the shared 
understandings, the meanings they attach to an event, is it possible to gain insight (and 
even then we must allow for misunderstandings). McCracken (1988) stresses that the 
best gains from interviews are that they open up in-sights on meaning and reasons for 
actions, and they enable a researcher to getting closer to lived experiences; to exploring 
beliefs and ideas in terms of those under investigation. 
Thus, two types of interview were crucial to my research since they provided 
explanations and understandings of the kind of struggles that are taking place in 
Ecuador, namely the semi-structured interview and the unstructured or informal 
interview. The former was used when for example interviewing state officials, 
corporate representatives, lawyers, NGO officials as well as various environmental and 
indigenous rights" group leaders. The semi-structured interviews with key informants 
were used to identify individuals that, because of their position or experience, were 
likely to have particularly broad or in-depth knowledge about particular aspects of 
certain issues and information that were of importance for my research. The semi- 
structured interviews were based on written lists of questions (see Appendix) or topics 
that need to be covered in a particular order but with a fairly open framework, thereby 
allowing for focused, conversational, two-way communication. In fact, the majority of 
questions were created during the interviews, allowing both the interviewees and 
interviewer the flexibility to obtain important details or discuss broader issues. Semi- 
structured interviewing is guided only in the sense that some 
form of interview guide is 
prepared beforehand, and provides a framework for the interview 
(FAO and IIRR 
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1995). The less an interview is structured, the more it allows for an exchange between 
the interviewer and interviewees, leading to a mutual understanding. 
The unstructured or informal interview was used with research participants from the 
Shuar communities. Open-ended guided questions (see Appendix) were prepared and 
woven into the conversation, as appropriate. These unstructured interviews encouraged 
open-ended communication in a community setting where interviewees felt at ease. 
Here, opportunities for an interview often emerged spontaneously and unexpectedly 
from field contacts, such as when we sat around the fire while drinking chicha, 
preparing the food, or when I worked with the community members in the chakras or 
when we went fishing or hunting. This was a good technique for obtaining very detailed 
information. The unstructured interviews encourage a two-way communication and 
those being interviewed can even ask questions of the interviewer (Silverman 2001). 
The interviews also confirm what is already known but also provide the opportunity for 
learning more. Often the information obtained from the unstructured interviews will 
provide not just answers, but the reasons for the answers (Case 1990). 
However, a problem when conducting research in a highly charged political situation is 
that people may be reluctant to be interviewed or unwilling to state their opinions 
candidly (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). Here, it is important to note the difficulties 
I experienced when attempting to interview key state officials and corporate 
representatives. In fact, in almost all cases, it was impossible even to make contact with 
these actors because they never returned my calls or answered any of my e-mails. 
Therefore, the data I collected from them are mainly based on other primary sources, 
such as official documents, minutes from conferences and meetings as well as web- 
based material. Conversely, some people were keen to be interviewed in order to score 
political points. For example, some Shuar leaders sought to be interviewed in order to 
present political views or to make a statements on campaign issues of the 
day. 
Consequently, it was always important to be aware of where people were located within 
the complex network of political affiliations in order to attempt to evaluate the nature 
and utility of the evidence they provided (see also Madge 
1994). Although it is 
impossible to arrive at an objective 'truth % through awareness of the political 
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positionality of sources, it is possible to make a more plausible interpretation of 
evidence, and to identify the different discourses in play on a particular topic. 
Further, individual interviews restrict interaction to direct communication between the 
researcher and the participant. Group discussions were therefore used as a 
complementary method to interviewing to enable the exploration of differences 
between various actors since they provide possibilities for multiple interactions (Gross 
1996). Thus, group discussions are particularly effective in capturing tacit or 
experimental knowledge, seeing understandings and feelings as socially situated rather 
than independent (Moore 1993). It would be false, however, to assume that because 
people have some externally identified commonality, such as membership of an ethnic 
group or gender, that they constitute a clearly defined interest group. Without a more 
subtle approach to differences and to the dynamic interaction within communities, 
there is a danger that the differences that matter locally can be overlooked to the 
detriment of the research. This is often the problem with gender differences, where 
Western notions of gender are often unproblematically imposed on other cultures (de 
Koning and Marion 1996). 
Nevertheless, group discussions played an important role in my research. The major 
benefits of group discussions are that they encourage a co-operative approach to 
identifying and solving problems. Indeed, they can provide a forum for decision-making 
by consensus, provide the practical means of developing shared leadership, promote 
shared activities, and make it possible to share experiences generally. Furthermore, 
group discussions can bring together those who have a particular problem, for example 
those who cannot speak up at larger meetings (such as women). Flick (1998) argues that 
another feature of group discussions is that corrections made by the group concerning 
views that are not accurate, not socially shared or extreme, are available as means 
for 
validating statements and views. Group discussions therefore may reveal 
how opinions 
are created and above all, changed, asserted or suppressed in social exchange. 
Burgess et 
al. (1988: 310) suggest that "groups enable researchers and group members 
to explore 
together the embeddedness of environmental experience and values within 
different 
cultural contexts". Because group discussions often tend to promote enjoyable 
discussions, researchers are able to gain insights into the social, cultural, economic. 
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political and personal dimensions of an issue and a discourse, without informants feeling 
that their knowledge is being challenged or simply recorded by the researcher (Bedford 
and Burgess 2001). 
To draw an example from my own field experience, workshops were held with 
villagers in Shuar communities to explore their knowledge about oil development and 
environmental degradation as well as to assess gaps in the elaboration of alternative 
development projects. In one of these workshops, representations of livelihood options 
made by federation leaders were also contrasted and discussed. I thus asked the 
villagers to describe their perceptions of oil development and livelihood options and to 
draw maps to illustrate this. As I had done this individually during the course of the 
research, I was interested to see what would emerge from the group. Relations of 
respect and kinship, as well as different perceptions of appropriate behaviour of men 
and women as well as of the different generations, limited what some individuals in the 
group felt they could say. In particular, it was interesting to see how Shuar women 
responded to the workshops since they are generally very quiet and withdrawn in other 
community meetings. One of the older men began a heated discussion about the 
problems that the oil companies had caused and how oil exploitation threatened the 
very survival of all indigenous people living in the Amazon region. This continued as 
they drew their maps. One man was handed a pen to write down what was said and to 
draw a map, as he was deemed more educated. All of the others called out what they 
thought should be included. When it came time to go through what the villagers had 
discussed and drawn, one of the women spoke confidently and explained the ideas and 
suggestions. As it had by then become part of the group process, rather than being 
4'merely' the product of her own ideas and experiences, she felt more able to talk about 
it in such a setting. Indeed, some points that she raised might have been difficult to 
speak about otherwise. 
However, this strength of the method compared to interviewing individuals 
is also its 
main weakness. During data interpretation, problems often arise owing to 
differences in 
the dynamics of the group and the difficulties of identifying 
different views and 
interests within this dynamics. Thus, some community members may 
dominate (Shuar 
men) while others may refrain from entering into the 
discussion (Shuar women). The 
problem the researcher faces in mediating between the course of 
discussion and his or 
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her research interest is aggravated by the problem of having to accommodate the 
shifting dynamics of the group participants themselves (Hoggart et al. 2001). Yet, even 
though group discussions were difficult to facilitate and implement, they became 
central to my research. In fact, Burgess et al. (1988) emphasise the benefits of group 
discussions in that they bring together individuals with a shared interest in a particular 
topic and/or similar social background such that they may provide insights into the 
collective understanding of the complex political, social and economic situations. 
This section has so far emphasised how the participatory research methods of 
interviewing and group discussions have been central to my thesis. There are many 
things, however, that cannot be expressed or observed verbally. These may concern the 
ways in which things are done or refer to things people take for granted (de Koning and 
Marion 1996). Furthermore, styles of interaction, from strategies of resistance or 
domination to the complex processes of negotiation and power in decision-making, 
cannot be easily described. For those working through translators, language issues can 
complicate interpretation. I am fluent in Spanish but many Shuar-organised assembly 
meetings and seminars were held in the Shuar language and in some Shuar 
communities few residents spoke Spanish, which inevitably complicated data 
collection. Thus, I had to rely upon the good-will of some younger men to act as 
translators. However, in turn this meant that some information may have been 
misinterpreted or chosen strategically according to what the translator 
deemed 
important. Further, terms may be assumed to have a shared referent when people mean 
quite different things and what people say may seem incoherent or incomprehensible 
to 
the researcher while making prefect sense to the interviewee 
(see also Irvine and Gal 
2000). 
As a result of these difficulties, the field research also 
drew on highly visual techniques, 
notably community mapping, to effect triangulation of 
the data as well as to reduce the 
impact of language barriers. Visualisation offers a powerful strategy 
for working with 
those whose voices are rarely heard, as well as 
for bringing about critical awareness and 
self-confidence among participants 
in the process (Chambers 1992). The Principle of 
visualisation is to offer a means 
by which the information is not only collectively 
produced but also represented in a 
form that remains open to collective reference, 
both 
for cross-checking, validation and analysis. 
While the presence of the researcher 
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continues to influence the production of these representations, the focus activitv shifts 
from the researcher to the representation (Lawrence 2002). The process of constructin, L11 
a visual representation is in itself an analytical act: reflecting on what is included or 
why, as well as on the interactions between various aspects invites further analysis and 
discussion. In this way, maps, created by local people, can provide an invaluable visual 
reference for discussions with them. 
There are numerous different approaches to the creation of maps, although for my 
purposes, the community mapping technique was most helpful. Community maps can 
be simple or detailed drawings of people, places, objects, actions or specific events 
(ELDIS 2004). They can also illustrate relationships and complex concepts, tell stories 
or simply make information more interesting and easier to understand. People 
remember pictures better than text and community maps are useful for recording 
indigenous knowledge, experience, and understandings of specific processes and 
actions. They are especially effective in communities with high illiteracy rates, as well 
as in cultures with oral rather than written traditions. They can help generate ideas and 
stimulate discussion and deepen the group's sense of identity, thereby even helping to 
create social consensus (Lawrence 2002). 
Furthermore, community mapping techniques can offer ways to break the ice in initial 
contacts with people whose previous experiences of researchers and ' outsiders' may 
have been far from the kind of learning participatory methods aim to encourage. By 
providing an alternative mean for communication, community mapping techniques can 
involve participants in a research process driven by their own concerns and 
interests, in 
their own ways, using their own criteria and categories. It is an important tool 
for 
letting local people play an active role, not just as 'informants', 
but also as 'teachers', 
explaining to the researcher how they 'see' their community, as opposed 
to simply 
answering questions posed by the researcher 
(ELDIS 2004). 
I would like to draw on an example from one 
Shuar community in Ecuador to illustrate 
how extensive differences within a community can 
be and how these differences maý- 
be represented in the community mapping exercise. 
I arrived at the Shinkiatam village 
for the first time in March 2004 and began to gather people 
for a participatory mapping 
exercise. After the purpose of my visit and 
the exercise had been explained, a small 
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group of men began to create a map, starting with the demarcation of the communitN, 
boundary. Within a few more minutes, more men came to join them. As the men 
marked out the terrain using sticks on the ground, a debate started on the features the), 
wanted to include. I noted points to bring up in later discussions and occasionally to 
probe further. Soon there was a crowd of people. Women stood at the margins, arms 
folded and silent. Children tried to join and were shooed away. Only the men were 
initially involved in making the map. I therefore suggested that the women and the 
children could make their own maps. The women then gathered twigs and stones and 
started to outline the rivers and the streams in the area, moving on to represent the 
village. As they did so they talked about the problems they faced. The children got very 
exited and started gathering stones, twigs and leaves and began to create a very detailed 
map. When the maps were finished, each of the groups in turn was asked to explain 
their maps to me and the others present. All had quite distinct and different concerns 
and it was very interesting to see that the children and women represented on their 
maps some of the very resources men had excluded and had been complaining about, 
revealing different ideas and priorities. It was clear that the villagers knew about their 
environment in a very detailed way. The mapmakers were proud of their product, which 
had absorbed their interest for several hours. I came away surprised at how much I had 
learned about the community in such a short time and how quickly a rapport had been 
established with people. Important lessons about difference and about the politics of the 
community had been learned. 
Thus, community maps offer ways to explore knowledge, ideas and perspectives of 
different actors within the community who, in verbal settings, may remain entirely 
silent. However, visual representations are never merely 
factual accounts of how things 
are in the community. All are social acts and reflect the 
impact of the actors who 
produce them. This process is never neutral. 
The presumed agendas of the researcher, 
as well as those that take part in the exercise influence representations 
that are 
produced. It also gives the researcher a chance 
to observe the dynamics within the 
community to see who are local 'opinion 
leaders', who tend to dominate the discussion 
and who participates less. 
The purpose of community mapping is that the end picture 
gives the researcher an 
excellent basis for identifying 
different views, interests and knowledge in the 
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community. The outputs of community mapping are particularly important, as the. % will 
usually create a 'framework' for the rest of the investigation. The researcher is unlikely 
to have the time to carry out an in-depth community appraisal, but must make the effort 
to thoroughly understand who is in the community and what they do, as this will allo\\ 
her or him to decide how the villagers approach oil development and different 
livelihood options. As in the rest of the research, reporting should be carried out as an 
6 on-going 1) process. When the researcher reviews the findings and discusses the 
directions of the investigation, key information and leaming should always be pulled 
out and recorded so that, at the end of the participatory research pr *ect, the reportinc, 01 
process should consist of simply 'putting together' what has already been discussed 
during the course of the field work 
Finally, I have rather assumed so far that indigenous accounts take an exclusively 
verbal and visual form. While this may be true in non-literate societies, for many 
settings written documents are an important source of data. In literate culture it is 
possible to draw on all sorts of 'inside' written accounts--documents produced 
especially for the purposes of the researched and those generated for other purposes. 
For the most part, I found myself dealing with the latter variety--there are many 
contexts in which members of organizations and groups produce written accounts. 
There are, of course, a quite bewildering variety of documentary materials that might be 
of some relevance to the researcher. They may be ranged from the infon-nal to the 
formal or official. At the informal end of the spectrum, there are many 'lay' accounts of 
everyday life that the imaginative researcher can draw on for certain purposes. These 
include fictional literature, diaries, letters, web-based sources and media products. On 
the more 'formal' side, reports, documents and statistics, are widely used. Despite their 
authoritative appearance, these sources are not objective. Equally significant, official 
statistics are not bias-free (Arksey and Knight 1999). They are still valuable resources 
as long as the researcher, though, is aware of their limitations and shares the awareness 
with readers too. 
Several sources of documentation exist relating to Ecuadorian state policies, land 
reforms, oil development, and indigenous movements. These included secondary 
sources that I came across before I left for the field research, such as 
books, joumal 
articles and academic reports, as well as primary sources that came to my attention 
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during the field research. The latter involved minutes of indigenous assembly meetings 
or official meetings, reports written by NGOs, as well as newspaper articles and 
magazines. Secondary sources also became useful as interpretations of events of that 
period based on primary sources (for example, a history of oil development, state 
policies and indigenous mobilisations). In short, documents provided important access 
to information and perspectives, even as they enabled me in some cases to corroborate 
insights generated through other methods such as interviews or group meetings. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the ethnographic approach and associated participatory 
research methods that were used in this thesis. It also sought to highlight the specific 
contradictions and opportunities of my field research as It actually occurred. 
Ecuadorian oil development and state policies, the historical background of Ecuadorian 
indigenous mobilisation as well as a general outline of indigenous struggles in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon are the next thing that needs to be explored- a task undertaken in 
Chapter 4. Once this is done, the thesis will then move to the core of the empirical 
analysis of the study in Chapter 5,6, and 7. 
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Chavter 4 The Ecuadorian Context 
This chapter explores the political, economic, social and environmental implications of 
neoliberalism and oil-based development in the Amazonian region in Ecuador (the 
Oriente) in order to provide the context necessary for the empirical analysis that 
follows in Chapters 5 to 7. The chapter is accordingly divided into four main parts. The 
first part briefly reviews the history of the Oriente--a history of marginality until the 
1960s when oil was discovered there. The second part then explains how the 
Ecuadorian state has perceived oil development as key component of nation-building, 
economic progress and 'modem' status generally. The third part illustrates how 
indigenous federations emerged as a result of local land and resources struggles- a 
highly significant socio-political change in Ecuador. The final part introduces our 
specific case study as it describes the history of the Shuar people in the Amazonian 
province of Morona Santiago. 
4.1 Ecuador, the Amazon, and Indigenous People 
Ecuador covers a total area of 283,561 square kilometres sharing a border with 
Colombia to the north and with Peru to the east and south (see Figure 4.1). The 
sovereignty of some 200,000 square kilometres of Amazon rainforest was for more than 
fifty years the subject of dispute between Ecuador and Peru and resulted in several wars 
between the two countries. The most recent conflict occurred only in January 1995 in 
the remote Cordillera del Condor in southern Ecuador (Lucas 2001). The long-running 
dispute was finally brought to an end however in 1998 when former president 
Jamil 
Muhuad of Ecuador and Peru's Alberto Fujimori signed a permanent agreement 
defining a border and awarding Ecuador unlimited (through not sovereign) navigation 
rights on the Amazon rivers (Sawyer 2004). Ecuador's environment, 
habitation patterns 
and land use are determined by three 
distinct geographical regions-- the coast, 
highlands and the Amazon rainforest (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Ecuador 
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Source: Kristian Bjureby 2-UU-ýý 
The coast covers little more than one quarter of the area of the country. The sierra region, or 
central highlands, is situated between the two chains of the Andes, the western and eastern 
Cordilleras. These highlands allow for the growth of subsistence crops and livestock farming, 
and are the areas with highest population density. However, more than half of the population 
lives on the coast where, despite its proximity to the Equator, the climate is moderated by the 
cold Humboldt Current. Cash crops of bananas, cocoa, rice, coffee and shrimps are produced 
along the coast. The Oriente meanwhile covers about half of the country (9,930,000 hectares), 
and is divided into six provinces: Sucumbios, Orellana, Napo, Pastaza, Morona Santiago, and 
Zamora Chinchipe (Gedicks 200 1) (see Figure 4.2.1). 
Ecuador is home to fifteen indigenous groups that represent anywhere between 25 and 50 
percent of the total national population and include the Shuar, Achuar, Quichua, Cofdn, 
Huaorani, Zhiwiar, Zapara, and Siona-Secoya (Gedicks 2001) (see Figure 4.2.2). Clearly, the 
total indigenous population of Ecuador is a contested matter. Thus, according to official 
census data, indigenous people account for only 25 percent of the total national population 
(http: //www. mmrree. )zov. ec/). 1 However, according to various NGOs as well as indigenous 
federations, that percentage is closer to 50 percent (Lucas 2001; www. conaie. nativeweb. orc, ). 
These rival estimates underscore the politically sensitive position of indigenous people in 
Ecuador. On the one hand, the former figure may be an attempt by the state to downplay the 
number of indigenous people in the country. On the other hand, the latter figure may be an 
attempt by the federations and their allies to play up the national position of indigenous 
people, notably by including under the heading indigenous people groups that the state labels 
as mestizos. The problem of establishing accurate population data on indigenous people is 
compounded in the Oriente where diffuse populations and oil-related political strife frustrate 
any effort to obtain agreed figures. Thus, Shuar leaders claim that there are 50,000 Shuar 
there (P. Tsere 2004; Nayandey 2004), whereas official figures specify only 40,000 Shuar 
(http: //www. mmrree. )zov. ec/). However, and for our purposes, the estimate of 50,000 Shuar 
seems most plausible in light of the distribution and size of Shuar settlements in the Oriente 
and indeed is widely used by independent scholars and observers (e. g. CDES 2002., Gedicks 
2001; Koster 2004). 
'Thus, in 2004, they accounted for 25 percent of the total population compared to 65 percent mestizos, 7 percent 
Spanish and others, and 3 percent Afro-Ecuadorians (www. worldbank. orcjec). 
Official figures here are: 
Highland Quichua 3,000.000; Lowland Quichua 60,000; Shuar 40,000; Huaoranj 2,000; Awa 1,600; Chachi 
4,000; TsAchila 2,000; Siona-Secoya 1,000; CofAn 800; and Achuar 500 (http: //xý, ýN, w. mmn-ce-Roý,. ec/). Here, it is 
important to note that I was unable to find any census data of the total number of mest[Zos In the 
Oriente. 
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Figure 4.2.1 Ecuadorian Provinces and Towns 
4.2.2 Indigenous Groups and Protected Areas 
4.2.3 Oil Block Concessions 
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The history of the Oriente has been characterised on the one hand by geographical 
marginality in relation to neighbouring Amazonian frontiers, and on the other hand by a 
marked rise in recent years in the number of connections within the region and with 
Ecuador's main political and economic centres. Despite the increasing importance of 
these relations, however, the Oriente was virtually autonomous until mid-twentleth 
century. If looked at from the perspective of the Amazon basin as a whole, the opening 
up of the region to the world economy brought most territories, except for the Oriente, 
into regular contacts with centres of regional and transnational trade located along the 
main Amazon River. Yet, the Oriente was characterised by what Taylor (1994) has 
called an 'extreme sociological, economic and political marginality'. In historical 
perspective, then, that region did not emulate the changes introduced into other 
Amazon frontiers by the growth of the nation-state, the development of the industrial 
world-economy, or general frontier dynamics until comparatively recently. 
However, since the 1960s the Oriente has been increasingly incorporated into wider 
economic and geopolitical processes linked to other parts of Ecuador and beyond. 
Insofar as these processes penetrated livelihood activities taking place in the Oriente, 
regional, national and transnational processes cannot be viewed as simply happening in 
the background, but rather need to be viewed as constitutive of the Amazonian 'reality' 
itself. In particular, the Oriente has received much attention since the Ecuadorian 
government incorporated the region into large state-designed schemes for land reform, 
colonisation and development (for example, oil-extraction) .2 
Thus, oil-based 
development in Ecuador is best understood against the backdrop of shifts in the world's 
economy over the last three decades. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, Western economies began to experience recession as 
economic growth faltered with declining productivity and profits. In the early 1970s, 
the 'oil shock' intensified this decline. Seemingly overnight, OPEC (Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) increased the price of petroleum, causing production 
costs to skyrocket as energy outlays soared (Karl 1997; Martz 
1986). For nascent oil- 
producing countries such as Ecuador, OPEC's actions prompted an economic 
boom. In 
2 For overviews here, see Rodrigo and Calderon (1988), 
Gerlach (2002), Hvalkof 2000, Sa\ý yer (2004), 
Ydfiez (1992), Pallares (2002). 
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1967, Texaco had discovered the country's first commercial petroleum reserve and 
brought it and subsequent reserves into production in 1972 (Kimerling 19921). In 1973, 
Ecuador's military regime joined OPEC, making the country the organisation's smallest 
producer. New oil revenues launched Ecuador, a small agrarian nation. into the wider 
global market economy (Sawyer 2004). Over the following years, Ecuador became 
heavily dependent on oil exports such that crude oil represented approximately fifty 
percent of the state's budget in 2003 for example (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Main Export and Import Products in Ecuador 
TRADE 
1983 1993 2002 2003 
Tota. expcartsý,, fob, ) '), 196 3,066 CS, : 3, D 6,03E. 
Oil 1 1, e -', 3 2,372 Bananas 143 568 e _q 1,099 Manufactures 544 1,315 1,564 
Tota imports (cil) 1,329 2,562) 6,431 6,534 
Food 
Fuel and energy 56 88 2? 4 664 
Ca pital goods 481 984 ý mlý -2 1,789 
Export pdo. -iindex 09,95=? 001) 139 125 ,3E. Import pr ce index (I 995= 1 YO)' 108 84 79 02 
Tems of trade (19 95= 10,,, ýý' 129 106 157 170 
Source: World Bank 2004 
The military government used oil revenues to finance tax breaks, offer credits, and 
embark on an ambitious project to build Ecuador's infrastructure and social services 
(roads, communication, health care and education systems). This process led to 
extraordinary growth rates in the 1970s (Petroleum Economist 1999). 3 However, in the 
early 1980s the fall in the world price of crude oil as well as the increase in 
international lending rates plunged Ecuador into an economic crisis as the country 
experienced difficulties in repaying its debt (Karl 1997). This occurred at the same time 
as Ecuador returned to democratic rule when Osvaldo Hurtado took over the presidency 
from Jamie Roldos in 1982. Between 1974 and 1982, the foreign debt had risen from 
eighteen percent to sixty percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In his first major 
speech as president, Hurtado declared: "We neither can nor should have continued to 
resort to external indebtedness ... the age of petroleum prosperity 
has come to an end ... it 
is necessary to begin an age of austerity" (Hurtado 1990: 226). 
3 Between 1970 and 198 1, Ecuador's GDP grew by 147 percent (Thourni and Grindle 1992) 
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Thus, over the course of the 1980s three successive democratically elected regimes 
began to introduce a neoliberal program that sought to increase export production, in 
the line with 'comparative advantage' (especially oil), open the economy for foreign 
investment and trade, and reduce the state's productive and distributive functions 
(Yahez 1992). For example, Hurtado implemented Ecuador's first 'modem' austerity 
program when he created new taxes, devaluated the currency, eliminated subsidies and 
public spending (Schodt 1989). The regime of Leon Febres Cordero (1984 to 1988) 
demonstrated an even stronger commitment to austerity and free market plinciples by 
reducing trade restrictions and tariffs (Thourni and Grindle 1992 .4 During the centre- 
left presidency of Rodrigo Borja (1988 to 1992), international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (UVIF) placed stricter 
conditions on Ecuador before the country could receive loans. They demanded that 
Ecuador cut the fiscal deficit, reduce inflation, reform taxes, further fiberalise trade and 
tariffs, and encourage foreign investment--conditions generally implemented under 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs). However, BorJa refused to pnvatise state- 
owned industries and he compensated for having raised the price of fuel and electricity 
by increasing the minimum wage, freezing the costs of basic foods, and creating work 
programs (Sawyer 2004). 
Given these political vicissitudes, it was not until 1992 that neoliberalism really began 
to transform the country's political economy. Ecuador received new loans only on the 
condition that it implement specific policies to intensify export production, privatise 
public property, and cut government spending. This would, it was claimed, stimulate 
transnational investment, boost General Domestic Product (GDP), reduce state 
expenditure, and increase state efficiency (Wray 2000). The hope was that these 
policies would further facilitate national and transnational capital generation and that 
they would therefore be able to pay for amounting foreign debt, which 
had more than 
doubled between 1983 and 2003 (see Table 4.2) 
4 However, by 1987 opposition from the congress, military and popular groups 
forced Febres Cordero to 
reverse many of the neoliberal policies 
he had implemented during the first two terms of his term. 
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Table 4.2 Ecuador's Foreign Debt 
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS 
(US$ m0hions) 
Total debt oiAstanding and disbursed 
IBRD 
IDA 
Total debt serv: ce 
IBRD 
IDA 
Comoosibon of net resource flows 
Cff icial grants 
Official creditors 
Private cred, 4ors 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfo-,, io equity 







1983 1993 2002 2003 
7,595 14,136 16.313 16.585 
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Indigenous leaders were sceptical, however, about the utility of these policies. The 
example of oil development, and Texaco's record in particular, caused them to 
be 
apprehensive about the neoliberal drive to intensify oil 
development in the Oriente. 
Indeed, as will be demonstrated next, over the course of three 
decades oil exploitation 
had transformed the Oriente and not to the liking of most indigenous people. 
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4.2 Oil Development in the Amazon Region 
The Oriente holds a geopolitical and symbolic value for the Ecuadorian state insofar as 
national pride and ambition is conflated with the region's crucial economic value. As 
evidenced in the 1995 border conflict between Peru and Ecuador, as a result of which 
Ecuador lost half of its Amazonian territory, the region has held a special place in 
Ecuadorian national identity. Though politically and socially marginalised, the Oriente 
has been the centre of Ecuador's representations of nationhood: "Throughout 
Ecuadorian history, the Oriente has long been a crucial site in the contest over the 
configuration of the 'nation"' (Sawyer 1992: 75). Over 150 years since the country's 
independence, four wars and five redrawings of the Amazonian borders defined 
Ecuador as increasingly smaller and Peru larger. However, until 2000, official maps 
ignored these 'disadvantageous' redrawings insisting that the nation's 'historical 
heritage' was its sovereign right to much of the western Amazon. 5 
Whether in schoolbooks, on government buildings or on the national flag, Ecuador has 
been depicted as twice the internationally recognised size by expanding its Amazonian 
territory based on prior claims. For example, the national flag depicts a ship on a 
lowland river that meanders towards a snow-capped mountain (see Figure 4.3). 
According to the Instituto Geogrdfico Militar, the mountain peak illustrates 
Chimborazo (Ecuador's highest Andean volcano peak), the river represents Guayaquil, 
the green space represents the Pacific, and the green ship represents Ecuadorian trade 
(Instituto Geografico Militar 2004). Yet, for many in Ecuador, the mountain was the 
central Andes, the river was the Amazon, the green space was the Amazon basin, and 
the ship represented Orellana's voyage in the Amazon (Sawyer 2004). In short, this 
visual topography reflects a perspective based on an enlarged vision of what constitutes 
the Oriente. 
5 The internationally recognised treaty of 1942 (the Rio de Janeiro Protocol) came to represent the 
moment of 'betrayal' when Ecuador lost half of its Amazonian territory to Peru. The 'rightful' border 
according to Ecuador was outlined at independence in 1830 (Sawyer 2004). 
90 
Figure 4.3 The Ecuadorian Flag 
Further, the Oriente's symbolic value as a source of national pride is reinforced by the 
region's growing economic and political importance. Indeed, since the mid-1960s, state 
schemes have sought to transform and integrate the region through new infrastructure 
and communication systems in order release its valuable natural resources (oil, 
minerals, and lumber). As noted, the incorporation of the Oriente has been fundamental 
to the Ecuadorian national economy since oil was found in the region (Wray 2000). 6 
The state still perceives oil development as a key to nation/state building and crucial for 
gaining economic progress and modem status. Indeed, it has attempted to control use of 
major portions of the Oriente by demarcating it as available for oil exploitation. Thus, 
and although the state has always marginalised the Oriente politically and culturally, it 
has nonetheless seen the hydrocarbon and agricultural development as being crucial for 
the overall advancement of Ecuador. 
Here, it is important to provide a fairly detailed history of property rights based on 
Ecuador's legal history as suitable backdrop to the later analysis of this thesis. This is 
notably a history of the adoption of Western models and the incapacity to implement 
these models effectively. It is also a history of reforms that combined some recognition 
of local practices with attempts to make people conform to national laws (Sawyer 
2004). This complex process is crucial for understanding why the Shuar communities 
6 The oil company Shell first found oil in the southern Oriente in the 1920s, but the firm failed its 
attempts to extract the reserves. It was not until 1967 when Texaco found oil in the Northern Oriente that 
oil became a heightened practical state and corporate concern. 
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Source: Instituto Geogrdfico Militar 2004 
have mobilised to defend their land and territory in the way that they have. Two sets of 
legal codes are of particular interest here: the 1964 Ley de Desarrollo Agrario 
(Agrarian Reform Law) and the 1994 Ley de Ordenamiento del Sector Agrario 
(Agrarian Development Law). 
Firstly, the 1964 Ley de Desarrollo Agrario (Agrarian Reform Law) encouraged 
colonisation of the Oriente since the region was considered uninhabited and thus in 
need of economic transformation. The law abolished Ecuador's feudal system of 
serfdom and led to the expropriation of large land holdings and former Church lands in 
the highlands. This political move was included in a transmigration scheme which was 
intended to relieve highland population pressures, using colonisation of the Oriente as 
"a substitute for a land reform that has failed to break up the large estates of the Coast 
and f1ighlands" (Salazar 1977: 22). 7 Indeed, the agrarian reform law created a safety 
valve for the economic tensions and population pressure in the highlands as well as in 
the coastal areas. But the primary focus of the land reform was colonisation, not 
redistribution. To facilitate colonisation, the Government concurrently passed the 1964 
Ley de Tierras Baltidas (Law of Fallow Lands) thereby declaring uncultivated lands 
uninhabited and hence available for colonisation. 8 Moreover, IIERAC (Ecuatoriano de 
Refortna Agraria y Colonizazi0n), the Government land-titling agency, was formed in 
1970 and was made responsible for titling land in the Oriente (see EERAC 1994). 
As a result, state-sponsored as well as spontaneous colonisation rapidly transformed 
agrarian reality in the Oriente. Indigenous land was declared Tierras Baltidas and 
unoccupied, and was thereby distributed to small landholders and peasants from the 
highlands. This is summed up in the words of Fabian Nauas Rodriguez (2004), a senior 
official of the Department of Environment, who stated in an interview: "By relocating 
land to make it available to poor farmers, by establishing the agrarian reform law, the 
state allowed the agricultural sector to flourish". The effect of the 1964 laws was that 
the Ecuadorian state claimed the first right to ownership of all 'unclaimed' land in the 
national territory but with the idea that this would be followed by a transfer of rights 
from the state to citizens and/or to private businesses. 
7 See Hecht and Cockburn (1989) for a comparable account on Brazil. 
8 Between 1964 and 1994 approximately 6,500,000 hectares of the approximately 7,500,000 hectares 
adjudicated as private property resulted from colonisation, not expropriation, and the majority of that 
colonisation took place in the Oriente (4,500,000 hectares) (EERAC 1994). 
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The second thing to note about legal changes introduced by the state since the 1960s is 
the progressive elaboration of a market-driven contest for land and resources. Thus, the 
1994 Ley de Ordenamiento del Sector Agrario (Agricultural Development Law), not 
only ended any notion of land reform, but it also provided that all land (including 
indigenous communal land) could be placed on the open market, thereby transforming 
the reality of Ecuadorian agriculture. 9 In recent years, the Ecuadorian state has further 
modified legal agreements and policies in order to accelerate oil development. The 
administration of President Sixto Duran Ballen (that took office in 1992) had faced a 
difficult time when the price of oil was declining, the national debt was rising, and 
Ecuador was hence under growing pressure to attract foreign oil investment (Melo et al. 
2002). Ballen thus determined to further privatise public lands, including some claimed 
by the Shuar, in favour of foreign investors as a primary means of increasing 
investment and reducing debt. With military backing, as well as World Bank and other 
development loans and grants, a change in policy thus took place (CDES 2002b). As 
part of this change, IERAC was transformed into the Instituto Nacional del Desarrollo 
Agrario (INDA). Much more than simply a change in name, INDA now presented a 
more aggressive policy and discourse for the seizure and redistribution of indigenous 
territories (Bebbington 2001). Incentives for the privatisation of land under a neoliberal 
agenda were thereby strategically incorporated into the 1994 Agricultural Development 
Law (see also Chapter 6). 
The neoliberal reforms embodied in the 1994 law provoked a crisis in governance and 
accountability in Ecuador that framed the Shuar mobilisations that are a central concern 
in this thesis. This new legislation superseded the Agrarian Reform Law established 
thirty years before and was designed to 'modernise' the country. Like the agrarian 
sector, the hydrocarbon sector was a key component of this effort (Sawyer 2004). The 
importance of the Amazonian region in this new national project could also be seen in 
the state motto, El Ecuador ha sido, es y sera Pais AmazOnica (Ecuador has been, is, 
and will always be an Amazonian State), which was regularly proclaimed in justifying 
the neoliberal reforms. 10 
9 The 1964 Agricultural Reform Law gave land to colonists but did not provide for buying and selling 
that land (Bebbington 2001). 
10 This is a long-standing motto dusted down in 1994. 
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The 1994 Agrarian Development Law occurred against the backdrop of a large-scale 
expansion of oil development in the Amazon region that was already heightening 
political tensions in the area. The colonisation of the Oriente was seen by the state to be 
a complement to oil development. Indeed, a new Hydrocarbon Law has been passed in 
1993 to facilitate oil development and this in turn linked to the creation of vast new 
network of roads and other infrastructure. As with the 1994 agrarian legalisation, the 
Hydrocarbon Law was a response to international pressure that linked access to new 
loans under structural adjustment programmes to the entrenchment of neoliberal 
policies based on resource-based comparative advantage (CDES 2002c). This pressure, 
in turn, placed the Oriente at the centre of national efforts to capitalise on Ecuador's 
plentiful resources. Hydrocarbon and agro-industrial development of the region thereby 
became crucial for Ecuador's wider efforts to 'modernise' or even survive in the global 
economy. 
The administration of President Rodrigo Borja Cevallos (2000 to 2003) reflected these 
concerns as it sought to implement further programs designed to boost oil development. 
It sought to further liberalise and privatise oil production, guarantee current and future 
land security to oil TNCs, and intensify export production of oil and other natural 
resources. Indeed, oil development was the centre-point of the administration's plan 
entitled 'Apertura Ecuador: 2000 (The Opening of Ecuador, 2000). The plan was 
announced in October 2002 and included the ninth round of oil block leasing (see 
Figure 4.4)11, the construction of the pipeline Oleoducto Crudo Pesado (OCP), the 
opening of new oil reserves in Yasuni National Park, the leasing of thirteen oil block 
concessions, and the privatisation of the state-owned oil company PetroEcuador. The 
ninth round was planned to include as much as 2.5 million hectares of new oil lands, 
divided into thirteen blocks (Chavez 2002; Figueroa 2002). As originally planned, most 
of the blocks were in the provinces of Napo, Pastaza and Morona Santiago in the 
central and southern Amazon with two further blocks for bid on the west coast (see 
Figure 4.4). 
11 Oil block 24 was incorporated in the ninth round, which is situated in Shuar territory, and has in turn 
made Shuar land (including communal lands) available for oil exploitation. 
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Figure 4.4 Ninth Round of Oil Block Concessions 
Source: Amazonwatch 2004c (www. amazonwatch. org 
The ninth round of oil concessions was thus part of a national plan aimed to develop the 
oil sector through neoliberal reforms promoted by the World Bank and IMF. President 
Lucio Gutierrez (elected in January 2003) continued to facilitate this process. Before he 
was elected, Gutierrez had assumed a more critical stance, attacking Ecuador's 
dollarization" 2, the IN4F, and the FTAA (the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas). 
Once in office, however, his economic policies were firmly based on a letter of intent 
originally signed by his predecessors with the fN4F in February 2002 mandating neo- 
12 On the 9th January 2000, President Jamil Muhuad announced the dollarization of the Ecuadorian 
economy, which was an attempt to stabilize the economy and encourage economic growth. The hope was 
that the dollar would attract foreign investors who were previously reluctant to invest in Ecuador due to 
its economic and monetary weaknesses. This has meant that, on the one hand, inflation is under control, 
the economy is growing and it is easier to do business in the country, however, on the other hand, the 
Ecuadorian economy is becoming less goods-oriented and more service-oriented. Jobs are still scare and 
interest rates are still high. The government continues to rely heavily on borrowing to finance its 
expenditures. 
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liberal reforms. According to the agreement, resources from the ninth round would be 
used to guarantee payments to multilateral banks over the next few years (CDES 
2002b; Lopez 2002). Starting in 2006, therefore, eighty percent of the oil income would 
go to financing debt, whereas just twenty percent of it would go to a stabilisation fund 
to protect the country from oil price swings. In order to make payments on Ecuador's 
debt, the IW measures called for privatisation of the oil industry, including of the 
state-owned PetroEcuador, thereby it was hoped opening up the doors for transnational 
corporations to invest in expensive oil explorations in the Oriente, especially to the 
South (CDES 2002c; Chavez 2002). 
These high-level agreements failed to account for local reactions to oil development. 
Indeed, all ninth round blocks were withdrawn from the offer due to opposition by 
indigenous groups and their allies. In retreat, the Ecuadorian state clarified that the 
Amazonian blocks would not be leased until the right of indigenous people to prior 
consultation had been honoured (Melo et al. 2002; Pachamama 2003a; Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly 2002). Meanwhile, foreign companies also rejected the 
government's attempt to open up the oil sector to private investment by refusing to 
place bids in its latest leasing round in 2003. This was a result of strong indigenous 
opposition against oil development in the Oriente, notably from the Shuar people (see 
Chapters 5 to 7). At the same time, popular social movements in Ecuador have 
demanded that control of the country's oil resources remain in the hands of the state oil 
company PetroEcuador. As the government's oil policy thus fails to appease powerful 
actors on either side of the oil debate, the country's current production of oil is rapidly 
declining due to outdated technology and a lack of new capital. 
Although indigenous movements succeeded in changing some aspects of official plans, 
success here was far from conclusive. Above all, the outcome of the renegotiated ninth 
round of oil block leasing was noticeably ambiguous. On the one hand, the indigenous 
organisations 'forced' the Ecuadorian state to recognise the indigenous movement as a 
potent force to be reckoned with, even as oil companies were unable to initiate oil 
exploitation (CDES 2002c). On the other hand, indigenous opposition did not manage 
to change crucial provisions in the plan, such as the expropriation of communal 
holdings or that these holdings could still be sold should two-thirds of the residents 
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wish to sell the land (Chavez 2002). Most frustrating for indigenous actors was the 
dissonance between their constitutionally guaranteed right to control and manage their 
ancestral territories collectively, and the obstacles that were put in the way to carrying 
out that right. All of which is not to imply that indigenous opposition failed. If nothing 
else, the negotiations showed that indigenous people had become imposing political 
actors and that, if only momentarily perhaps, they had carved out a novel terrain for 
political expression. 
4.3 Indigenous Mobilisations 
Following the struggles over local land and resources that began in the 1960s, the 
emergence of indigenous federations has been one of the most significant socio- 
political changes in contemporary Ecuador. In fact, the Shuar founded the first Latin 
American ethnic federation in 1964 with the help of Salesian missionaries, the 
FederaciOn de Centros Shuar, which by 1997 had begun identifying itself as the 
FederaciOn Interprovincial de Centros Shuar (FICSH). At the time of my research, 
FICSH represented the majority of indigenous people in Morona Santiago and was 
arguably one of the most active indigenous federations in Ecuador. 
In 1980, meanwhile, Amazonian indigenous groups formed Confederacion de 
Nacionalidades Indigenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriano (CONFENAIE) in order to 
defend their lands against state-designed development projects and colonisation. In 
1986, these same groups linked forces with indigenous groups in the highlands and on 
the coast to form the ConfederaciOn de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador 
(CONAIE), a national indigenous movement dedicated to defending indigenous 
people's concerns as well as agitating for social, political, and educational reform 
(CONAIE 1999). These federations organised specifically to defend indigenous lands 
and resources and have thereby played a key role in representing indigenous concerns. 
Indigenous claims and discourses have meanwhile evolved within the context of rapidly 
changing national politics, on-going international debates and new legal instruments 
regarding indigenous rights. Generally, indigenous claims have been based on the right 
to self-determination, the right to local land and resources, and the strengthening of 
indigenous identity and cultures (Espinosa 1999; Stiffler 2003). 
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From the beginning of the 1990s, large-scale indigenous mobilisations shook the 
country in response to state-led initiatives discussed above. One such mobilisation took 
place in May 1990 when highland indigenous people occupied the Santo Domingo 
Cathedral in Quito and embarked upon a hunger strike. Launched to protest the long 
unresolved agrarian issue, these acts of protest inspired the first CONAEE-led nation- 
wide indigenous mobilisations to obstruct the economic strategies of the Ecuadorian 
state (Field 1991,1996; Meisch 1994; Ruiz 1992). A week-long nation-wide 
Levantamiento (uprising) paralysed the country with roadblocks, market boycotts, local 
government office occupations and land repossessions (Lucas 2001). Through the 
leadership of CONAEE, indigenous people forced the government (however 
momentarily) to enter into negotiations over land disputes. As a part of these 
negotiations, the OrganizaciOn de los Pueblos Indigenas de Pastaza (OPIP) from 
Pastaza province presented a proposal called the Acuerdo Territorial (Sawyer 1997), 
which contained two themes that challenged conventional understandings of indigenous 
place in the nation--namely plurinationality and self-determination. The proposal called 
for the communal titling of ancestral lands as well as political, economic and social 
control over them by indigenous residents. The Borja regime publicly denounced the 
Acuerdo Territorial by maintaining that OPIP was seeking "to dismember national 
territory" and that "you are not a state within a state". 13 
Another indigenous-based mobilisation took place in April 1992 when OPEP embarked 
upon one of the most effective such initiatives in Ecuadorian history. The march 
resulted from several years of inconsequential negotiations with the state described 
above. Ironically, the demands of the 1992 march were in principle the same as those of 
the 1990 Acuerdo Territorial, yet the state's reaction was different (Abya Yala 1992; 
OPIP 1992). Thus, the Borja administration sought to cleverly circumscribe indigenous 
control of ancestral lands by formally granting indigenous people approximately fifty- 
five percent of their territorial demands (through allotted communal titles to nineteen 
land blocks) (EERAC 1994). However, while having these land titles would help to 
impede further colonisation of indigenous lands, these titles crucially did not guarantee 
control over activities within them. Importantly, titled ownership of territory does not 
supersede the state's right to subsoil resources, which is guaranteed by the Constitution 
(Article 247)--a crucial factor of course to the fate of oil development. 
13 The quote is cited in Sawyer (2004: 45). 
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However, the 1992 accord gave the indigenous communities back some control over 
their territory. At the same time, though, the titled blocks of land were demarcated in an 
arbitrary and haphazard way that disregarded natural boundaries like rivers and ridges, 
and ignored specific ethnic claims. This step showed a vast and intentional disrespect of 
any notion of indigenous nationality. Further, and as a result of the 1994 Agrarian 
Development Law which was intended to strengthen individual titles to land (see 
above), it was now possible for communal plots to be subdivided and sold. This 
appeared to threaten the geographical integrity of indigenous communities and led to 
another massive protest in 1994. This was the most militant demonstration to date 
(Zamosc 1994). The roads to more than fifty oil wells throughout the Oriente were 
blocked and most of the main highways were shut down, even as at least two dozen 
people were killed (Sawyer 2004). The president declared a state of emergency, but the 
protests continued for over a month. In the end, the government was compelled to 
negotiate with CONAIIE, and the agrarian law was revised in May 1999. CONAEE thus 
forced the state to recognise the diversity of the agrarian sector and the specific role of 
indigenous interests as a mobilising force. The Agrarian Development Law now speaks 
of the agrarian sector in social rather than simply economic terms. Local subsistence- 
oriented food production is theoretically as important as agribusiness export production. 
Agrarian reform is to be 'perfected' rather than abolished and the distribution of land is 
seen to be as important as its concentration (Bebbington 2004). Yet, at crucial 
junctures --articles pertaining to communal land holdings, expropriation, and land 
rights--CONAIIE only succeeded in softening the wording and adding a few points to 
the legal phrasing making the law simply more ambiguous rather than fundamentally 
challenging its neoliberal tenets (Ruiz 2000). 
Finally, in January 2000 thousands of indigenous people marched into Quito where 
they demanded (and got) the resignation of President Jamil Muhuad even as they called 
for the dissolution of the executive, legislative and judiciary powers of the state (Ruiz 
2000). The levantamiento (uprising) started on 21't January with the taking of 
parliament by the indigenous people supported by army officers rebelling against the 
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government, IMF implemented policies, fuel prices and transportation costs. 14 Two 
weeks of demonstrations, strikes, and road blockages brought the country to a standstill 
and forced the government to negotiate with the leadership of the uprising. As a result, 
leaders of the civic-military insurrection installed a 'Junta of National Salvation', 
consisting of Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, Antonio Vargas of CONAEE, and the former 
president of the supreme court of justice, Carlos SolOrzano (Lucas 2001; Macas 2001). 
The record of mobilisation combined with the ability to mobilise and the growing 
influence of indigenous people as political actors led to the idea of indigenous 
participation in national elections. This decision resulted in the birth of Movimiento de 
Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Pais Nuevo (Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational 
Unity-New Country) in the 1996 election that sought to field candidates at the local, 
provincial and national levels. The first candidate was Luis Macas who was one of the 
founders of CONAIE and indeed its president at that time. When asked why the 
indigenous movement was taking part in the 1996 elections, Macas stated it was just 
another form of struggle: "The organisations have various ways of fighting for their 
claims ... until now we 
did not see the need to take part in elections, because we did not 
have the process in place. Now we are facing the challenge" (Macas 2001: 5). In the 
election, conservative Abdala Bucaram won but Pachakutik nevertheless won ten 
percent of the vote. At the end of 1996, a National Constituent Assembly was convened 
by indigenous and social movements represented by Pachakutik to put forward 
proposals to reform the National Constitution. This resulted in the 1998 popularly 
constituted National Constituent Assembly, which introduced a series of constitutional 
reforms recognising the collective rights of indigenous people and which declared 
Ecuador a multicultural and pluriethnic country. 
This constitutional process represented a watershed in Ecuadorian history. The 1998 
National Constitution thus incorporated rights specifically related to indigenous people 
and recognised them as members of the 'indivisible Ecuadorian state' even while 
allowing them to 'define themselves as nationalities that have ancestral roots'. Implicit 
14 There had been a growing discontent among officers in the army since early 1999 demanding action to 
put an end to the corruption of bankers and imprison those that were still 
in the country and the 
extradition of those that had fled the country. The 
Government ignored the officers' demands. The 
announcement of the 'dollarization' in 2000 was the 
last straw and turned both indigenous peoples and 
many in the military against the Government. 
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in this new language was the collective rights of the indigenous people to protect their 
territory and natural resources. For example, Article 84, number 5, states: "Indigenous 
and afro-Ecuadorian peoples will be consulted regarding plans and programs of 
exploration and exploitation of non-renewable resources found in their territories and 
that may affect them environmentally or culturally; to participate in the benefits these 
projects bring to the extent possible, and receive compensation for social and 
environmental harms caused by these projects". Article 88 states that "all state 
decisions that may affect the environment, must take into account ahead of time the 
criteria of the community, which must be informed. The law guarantees its [the 
community's] participation". 15 
Another milestone in Ecuadorian legal history also came in 1998 when the country 
ratified the International Labour Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Rights, which most importantly guarantees the collective and participatory rights of 
indigenous people in development projects (ILO 1989). This treaty reinforces 
Ecuador's Constitution by stating clearly that indigenous populations have the right to 
be consulted regarding administrative decisions that affect them, particularly when it 
comes to the use of natural resources. It specifies that "the peoples concerned shall have 
the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their 
lives, beliefs, institutions, and spiritual well being"(Article 6 of the ILO 169). Article 
15 declares that where the state retains control over subsoil resources, governments 
must consult with affected populations to determine what impact exploitation of such 
resources may have. This is of critical relevance to Ecuador, because as we have 
already noted Article 247 of the Ecuadorian Constitution preserves the state's claim 
over subsoil resources, such as oil. 
Despite these new legal measures, several major issues, such as the declaration of 
plurinationality, conflicts related to oil development and the recognition of indigenous 
people's legal regimes remain unresolved. The 1998 Constitution does not recognise 
indigenous groups as nationalities, although it does state that indigenous people, who 
define themselves as nationalities, for instance, are part of the Ecuadorian state 
(Espinosa 1999). Further, the Constitution mentions the right to participate when it 
concerns the use of renewable resources, but when non-renewable resources are at 
15 These articles are obtained from the Government Registry, Quito, in 2003. 
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stake, indigenous involvement is limited to the lesser right of being 'consulted' about 
decision-making. 
As a result of these legal reforms, the struggle between the Ecuadorian state, 
transnational corporations and indigenous people has increasingly become based upon 
legal issues. The thesis thus notably examines in Chapters 5 to 7 the emergence of a 
highly organised indigenous movement and its struggles against two US oil companies, 
ARCO Oriente and Burlington Resources, and Ecuadorian neoliberal policies at the 
turn of the millennium. Against the backdrop of mounting government attempts to 
privatise and liberalise the national economy and introduce oil-based development, 
Shuar people have incorporated new legal and political measures into their strategies of 
resistance, partly as a result of recent changes in national laws and newly signed 
international agreements. Through collective action and new political and legal 
strategies, the Shuar have sought to reconfigure the material, political and symbolic 
meanings of territory, nationhood and sovereignty in Ecuador. 
4.4 Shuar History and Culture 
Before turning to the details of Shuar struggle, it is important first to understand how 
the Shuar have become organised politically and to see how Shuar federations have 
emerged from a specific historical, cultural and political context. 
The term Shuar signifies 'man' or 'people' and refers to the indigenous group Untsuri 
Shuar, which today simply are called the Shuar. The Shuar belong to the Kvaro 
linguistic group of the western Amazonian basin, which includes the Shuar, Achuar, 
Huambisa, Aguaruna and Mayna people (Hamer 1972). In most of the literature, the 
Untsuri Shuar have been referred to as the JiVaro, but this latter term, which has no 
meaning in the Shuar language, has been discarded because of its 
derogatory 
connotation (Hendricks 1996). They occupy the region Transkutuku 
in the province 
Morona Santiago (see Figure 4.5). Their long-standing territory is bounded on the west 
by the eastern scarp of the Andes, and much of it is further isolated from the highland 
passes by the steep Cordillera Cutucu, which along with their position above the reach 
of navigable rivers, have proved to be substantial 
barriers to colonisation in the past. 
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Figure 4.5 Morona Santiago Province 
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It is not known how long the Shuar have occupied their territory. Archaeological 
evidence suggests that a portion of Shuar territory was occupied by pottery-making, 
horticultural populations 2.5 millennia ago (Salazar 1981), but a direct link to the 
contemporary Shuar is difficult to establish. Shuar households were traditionally 
organised in dispersed neighbourhood groupings, and operated relatively 
autonomously. There was a sexual division of labour which made subsistence 
agriculture and food preparation the focus of women's' activities, while men hunted, 
fished and participated in revenge raids and war. According to Hamer (1977), a 
hierarchy of shamans also existed, called Uwishint' by the Shuar, and they provided 
curative or vengeful bewitching services in exchange for material goods. 
In the past, the Shuar fiercely defended their territory against foreign penetration and 
were known for shrinking the heads of their enemies. Hamer (1972) states that the 
Shuar practice of shrinking the heads of their enemies after inter-tribal war raids 
(tsantsa) aimed to contain the avenging soul of the victim in the head, and killing was 
thus seen as a necessary action to acquire 'arutam soul power'. Rituals conducted with 
the tsantsa (shrunken heads) were believed to transmit power to the killer and his 
family. The shrunken heads belong to the past now (thankfully! ) and can only be seen 
in the collections of some museums in the country. 
While little is known about their history prior to the Spanish conquest, in the 1520s the 
Inca emperor, who had conquered all the highlands of Ecuador, attempted to conquer 
the Shuar. Yet, the Shuar resistance was so fierce that he fled, allegedly attempting to 
placate the Shuar with gifts as he retreated (Salazar 1981). 
The Shuar were characterised by a particular form of resistance to Spanish colonial 
troops through the use of guerrilla techniques (Taylor 1984). Indeed, during the 
colonial period the Shuar resisted conquest whether by the Spanish conquistadors or the 
missionaries (Salazar 1977). Such opposition culminated in a Shuar uprising in 1599 
when more than 20,000 Shuar destroyed the mining town of Logron6, killing over three 
quarters of the population, and poured molten gold into the mouth of the governor so 
that he died. As a result of these actions, the Spanish had to retreat to the highlands, 
Hamer (1972: 1) observes: "Only one tribe of American Indians is known ever to have 
successfully revolted against the empire of Spain and to have thwarted all subsequent 
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attempts by the Spaniards to conquer them: the Jivaro, the Untsuri Shuara of Eastern 
Ecuador". Indeed, among anthropologists as well as the Ecuadorian public, the Shuar 
are famous for their "fierce independence and courageous resistance to conquest' I 
(Hendricks 1996: 1) and it is argued that the Shuar were never conquered, either by the 
Incas or by the Spaniards (Hamer 1972; Karsten 1935). 
The sustained hostility of the Shuar people to outside intervention is perceived as the 
major cause of the colonial failure in the Oriente. Shuar success here is related to 
differences between Shuar and Spanish culture and to the fact that the conquerors were 
totally alien to and unable to comprehend the Shuar culture and environment 
(Perruchon 2003). Indeed, that the Shuar settlements were widely dispersed, their 
political structure was atomised (good for carrying out guerrilla attacks), and the 
biophysical climate was viewed as inhospitable by the Spaniards who were unfamiliar 
with the dense and hilly terrain as well as great distances, all posed difficulties for the 
would-be conquerors. 
Beginning in 1892, the Spanish missionaries nonetheless started arriving in Shuar 
lands. The Catholic Salesian Order was granted 'mission reserves' there by the 
government (Barrerera and Trujillo 1997). According to Botasso (1983), the latter 
supported the missions because it was believed they would 'tame' the ferocity of the 
Shuar and thereby make colonisation possible (and indeed, white and mestizo 
immigration from the highlands increased from about the mid-twentieth century). Since 
the colonists were seen as 'civilised', the regime encouraged them to move into Shuar 
lands as their presence was believed to have a 'civilising' effect on the Shuar. In 1955, 
the then President Velasco Ibarra, wrote: "The Salesians are obliged to civilise and 
indoctrinate the savage tribes of Shuar territory, to support and to increase the founding 
of colonist and aboriginal settlements, and to carry out all activities necessary to bring 
about these ends" (cited in Salazar 1981: 605). In return, the Salesian mission received 
tax reductions, financial assistance, free medical treatment, free trips in government 
planes, and even salaries for missionaries devoted to teaching activities (Salazar 198 1). 
The Salesians thus established successful missions in the 1920s in the Upano Valley 
linked to colonisation which followed on the western frontier of Shuar territory; cattle 
ranching also grew there as a result (Salazar 1981). Such 'development' continued 
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throughout the twentieth century. Thus, Hamer (1972) observed significant changes in 
Shuar culture between the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Interior Shuar 
(those east of the Cordillera de Transkutuku) had very little contact with whites or 
mestizos and in the mid-twentieth century when missions had been successfully 
established in this part of Shuar territory. Military bases accompanied some missions, 
and these together with the teachings of the missionaries largely halted revenge 
assassinations and tsantsa (inter-tribal head hunting) raids by the 1960s. The Shuar 
were thus forbidden to kill, to visit their sacred falls, to take Ayahuasca for the practice 
of their rituals, or to drink chicha (a traditional alcoholic brew made out of juka 
(cassava) mixed with the saliva of the women for fermentation) (Whitten 1981). 
Further, the Salesian missionaries concentrated the Shuar population into centros, and 
separated children from their families in mission boarding schools, creating significant 
changes in Shuar social structure (see Chapter 5). 
A small evangelical mission was also established in Makuma in 1945 (see Figure 4.5), 
which grew to have several outstations, and provided medical assistance (Hamer 1972). 
These activities meant that the evangelic missionaries won the faith of the Shuar and 
were able to significantly decrease the level of assassinations and war raids. Indeed, 
while many Shuar never converted to Christianity, in the communities where I 
conducted most of my research between 2002 and 2004, the missionary influence 
nonetheless remains visible and strong. 
Against the backdrop of the 1960s struggle for land in the face of rapid land 
colonisation and of impending petroleum development, the creation of federations of 
Shuar communities proved to be one of the most significant socio-political changes in 
modem Shuar history. This will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 to 7. Here, it is 
important to note that their creation reflected concerted attempts to maintain control of 
Shuar lands and resources, notably while asserting Shuar culture and identity. Thus, 
with an awakening of Shuar identity and an awareness of their 
fragile political 
situation, the Shuar response thereby shifted steadily from individualised everyday 
resistance strategies (Scott 1985) to collective political action. 
The first action to unite the Shuar against the colonists took place in the town of Sucua, 
in Morona Santiago, with the assistance of the Salesian missionaries. Thus, In 1964, 
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some Shuar leaders founded the first indigenous federation in Ecuador, the Federacioll 
de Centros Shuar, which developed into the FederaciOn Interprovicional de Centros 
Shuar (FICSH)--one of the local-level federations that plays a central role in the 
episodes related in this thesis. Salazar (1977: 29) regards the creation of the federation 
as a rather "unexpected move on part of the Shuar, considering the independent, 
individualism, egalitarianism, and even hostility among groups that have characterized 
Shuar social structure". Ironically, the very form of this resistance reflected state 
practices. Thus, the basis for collective action against state policies originated in or was 
a result of a prior state policy. 
The hierarchic and centralized structure of the federation differs notably from the 
traditional egalitarian and decentralized social organization characteristic until then 
among the Shuar. By the early 1970s, many Shuar families had settled in administrative 
units called centros. These units were independent but as they became aware of the 
need to coordinate their operations with neighbouring centros, they founded 
AsociaciOnes (associations); the first one was notably the AsociaciOn de Sucua. As 
Salazar (1977) points out, even the centro represents a clear deviation from a traditional 
concept of a Shuar community. Similarly, Perruchon (2003: 149) stated, "the only 
similarity between a centro and the traditional settlement pattern is the distribution of 
households within the centro". The Shuar formerly lived in widely dispersed and 
politically autonomous settlements composed of extended families, where membership 
was not formally, or even often clearly defined (Barrera and Trujillo 1997; Hamer 
1972). The spatial and cultural distance between the missionaries and mestizo society 
based in the near towns and the communities was great indeed. 
Thus, the centro and asociaciOn system of the Federation developed in response to the 
Ecuadorian state's interest in the Oriente as a political solution to land shortage in the 
highlands and the subsequent migrations of colonists from the highlands into the area. 
Beginning in the 1960s and intensifying with the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law, mestizos 
from the highlands colonised a vast corridor along the forested plateau at the base of the 
highlands in Morona Santiago (see Chapter 6 for a detailed analyses of land reforms in 
Shuar territory). As noted, Instituto Ecuatoriano de la Reforma Agraria y la 
Colonizacion (IIERAC), the state land titling agency, issued a series of agrarian reform 
laws thereby legalising state possession of all 'undeveloped' land and encouraging 
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colonisation of the 'uninhabited' Oriente. Land titles were then given individually to 
colonists that cleared and put the land to 'productive use' (Ley de Desarrollo 
16 
- 
Large-scale Agrario) . For the Shuar communities this policy shift was a disaster 
colonisation stemming from this shift placed immense pressure on Shuar lands. 
Property rights were granted by EERAC and it initiated appropriating Shuar lands in the 
1970s. 
Thus, this system had several disadvantages. First, IIERAC declared that the majority of 
Shuar traditional lands were not in use (FederaciOn Shuar del Ecuador 1974), even 
though these were forests used for hunting, fishing and gathering, as well as important 
uncultivated areas supportive of Shuar traditional agriculture. Second, these lands were 
therefore put up for sale as individual plots to non-Shuar for farming and cattle 
ranching (the buyer was likely to be a colonist since most of them had better economic 
resources than local Shuar). As stated by Hendricks (1996: 218): "The new laws 
emphasised the right of the peasant to obtain title to the land, and later ones added to 
the concept of 'social function' of the land". That is, the land, being a productive asset 
must benefit the nation as well as the individual owner. The result was to force 
indigenous groups such as the Shuar to imitate the colonists' modes of production or 
risk losing the land to colonists. 
Faced with this wholesale land grab, Shuar communities themselves initiated a process 
to secure titles to their lands by clearing the forest for approved practices such as cattle 
ranching. Thus, Shuar cattle ranching grew initially in response to colonist threats to 
their land, and the difficulty in obtaining land titles on other grounds. The easiest way 
to do this was to clear the land for cattle ranching. In the sense that the creation of 
pastures had the effect of preventing the government from expropriating it, the adoption 
of the cattle industry by Shuar families protected their claims to land (Hendricks 1996). 
The Shuar that lived along the colonisation frontier used the clearing of land for 
pastures as a way to demonstrate that the land was under cultivation and thereby 
acquire legal title to it from IIERAC. This strategy proved successful for the Shuar in 
16 The legal requirements for gaining titles of the land at this time in fact stated that fifty percent of the 
area targeted in land claims must be cleared and put to productive use. 
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securing a land base for their communities. In particular, the Shuar that lived along the 
colonisation frontier used the clearing of land for pastures and cattle ranching. 
Consequently, with the guidance of the Shuar federation, the Shuar gradually changed 
from being semi-nomadic, hunting and gathering horticulturists into sedentary cattle 
raisers (see Chapter 6 and 7). This important transition generated a new sense of 
cultural identity. It also involved steady growth in this Shuar federation, which by 1997 
incorporated thirty-two centro-based associations, with the average centro consisting of 
twenty-five to thirty families, mostly related by marriage (Barrera and Trujillo 1997). 
By 1997 the Shuar federation had also begun identifying itself as the Federacion 
Interprovincial de Centros Shuar (FICSH). At the time of my research, FICSH 
represented the majority of indigenous people in Morona Santiago and was arguably 
one of the most active indigenous federations in Ecuador. 
Meanwhile, in 1990, some Shuar associations created a new federation, the Federacion 
Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador (FIPSE)--the second local-level 
federation that plays a central role in this thesis. FIPSE was created in Makuma, with 
the assistance of the Evangelic missionaries as a response to the new discourse and 
politics of indigenous territories and cultural identity. 
The mobilisations that took place in Morona Santiago between the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s were the culmination of the Shuar federations' long-standing struggles and 
to gain legal titles to indigenous lands, to assert Shuar cultural identity, and to control 
the regions natural resources. Shuar leaders and community members, some with 
relatives in the northern Oriente and others who had actually worked there as contract 
labourers for Texaco, believed that along with further colonisation, the devastating 
effects of oil in the north would soon threaten their territory (Chumpi 1999). Self- 
organisation represented the most secure vehicle through which the Shuar might 
have a 
voice in influencing, if not directly shaping, the direction of their future. 
One clear illustration of this is when the FederaciOn Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar 
del LI7:, f--uador (FIPSE) organised a protest march and a political strategy 
in 1998 to 
present a legal injunction under the 1998 National 
Constitution and the ELO Convention 
169 (ELO 1989) against the oil company ARCO Oriente (discussed in detail in Chapter 
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5). As we will see in the next chapter, this represents one of the first legal 
interpretations of the collective and territorial rights of Indigenous people under 
Ecuador's new constitution and recently ratified international treaties. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has explored how indigenous movements have developed in response to 
land reforms, neoliberal policies, oil development, and agricultural and rural 
development strategies foisted on them by outsiders, and the ways in which these 
movements have engaged in formal and informal political processes. Yet, such 
mobilisation reflects the political and economic context of its day and especially the 
intersection between indigenous people, their organisations and the state. Here, a long 
history of animosity and conflict between the Shuar and the Ecuadorian state has been 
noted. Such conflict will be a recurring theme that unites the main empirical chapters of 
this thesis. 
The following three chapters investigate how Shuar struggles for local authority and 
control have been designed to combat successive waves of outsider-imposed 
development. The increasingly sophisticated discursive and material strategies of the 
Shuar federations that underpin such struggles will be documented in Chapter 5,6 and 
7. These strategies can be broadly seen as a desperate attempt to define a clear and 
resolute cultural identity linked to a well-defined ancestral territory with the possibility 
of strengthening access to natural and material resources in the region. Chapter 8 finally 
discusses the broader implications of the study. 
110 
Chapter 5_Cultural Identity Politics 
This chapter examines the cultural identity politics of the Shuar movement in Morona 
Santiago with a particular focus on recent cultural and political strategies enacted by it. 
Specifically, the aim is to examine how indigenous politics developed in opposition to 
state and oil company development plans, concentrating on how the Shuar federation, 
FederaciOn Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador (FIPSE) and Federacion 
Interprovincial de Centros Shuar (FICSH) designed new strategies to assert collective 
rights mediated by locally distinctive cultural identity. The central concern is to 
understand how cultural identity became central to an indigenous politics of resistance, 
notably in light of a 1998 legal action by the Shuar people against the oil company 
ARCO Oriente. This case is used as a point of departure for unravelling the forces at 
play in the development of indigenous politics in the study area. 
This chapter thus examines the complex relations between cultural identity, 
environmental conflicts, indigenous movements and oil development. This is a story 
not unlike one told by Arturo Escobar (1992,1998,2001), in which local actors in 
Colombia have scaled up their political and organisational practices as a response to 
new state policies and development projects. Escobar (1992: 62) views Latin American 
social movements as simultaneously political, economic, and cultural in character: 
44social movements must be seen equally and inseparably as struggles over meanings as 
well as material conditions, that is cultural struggles". However, while recognising the 
symbolic significance of these struggles, it is also essential to stress the importance of 
structural constraints and material conditions that form the base of such struggles. 
While the issues of cultural identity, resource access and territorial rights have been on 
the agendas of indigenous organisations throughout Latin America, in recent decades 
they have been of particular salience in the Oriente. It was here that in the 1960s the 
first indigenous organisation emerged on the continent, linked to the Shuar people (see 
Chapter 4). While these organisations and the indigenous movements of which they 
form a part, have undergone considerable change, indigenous organisations still play an 
important role in defining regional and national political agendas, in facilitating control 
over land and resources access for their communities, and in helping to recover and re- 
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construct indigenous cultural identity. These processes take place in the context of 
changing economic and political conditions, notably linked to the spread of neoliberal 
policies and oil development. 
A core theme here, as well as in later chapters, is that of indigenous resistance. True, 
we saw in Chapter 4 how the history of oil development in the Oriente reflected 
successful strategic alliances between the state and transnational corporations from the 
1960s onwards that were able to overcome much of this resistance. Here we will see, 
however, how indigenous people can nonetheless exert significant influence over oil 
exploitation. In some cases what James Scott (1985) calls 'weapons of the weak' are 
used and indeed these have been prominent strategic devices used by the Shuar. Yet 
forms of culturally-based resistance have also been used with one such form being that 
of political mobilisation organised around the calculated assertion of cultural identity. 
This chapter assesses this latter strategy starting by exploring the first clearly organised 
indigenous mobilisation against oil development in Morona Santiago. As will become 
evident, over the course of recent years, the relationship between transnational 
corporations and the state, the disputed terms structuring this relationship, and the 
ability of local people to voice their demands within these dynamics, became the terrain 
for considerable debate about culturally informed notions of appropriate social and 
political practice. 
This chapter is organised into three main sections. The first one examines Shuar 
cultural and political mobilisation, and how Shuar organisational processes have shifted 
from purely community-based mobilisation to a more multi-faceted and multi-scale 
political movement. Here, we will consider how Shuar federations politicised notions of 
cultural identity that are then embedded in strategies of resistance. The second section 
examines the concepts of culture and identity in the Shuar communities themselves, 
which is seen in important ways to differ from the cultural identity politics devised 
by 
the Shuar federations. It is crucial to understand these differences among the Shuar 
since there are implications for federation mobilising strategies designed to protect the 
cultural identity of the Shuar. The third section meanwhile explores 
how these 
strategies have prompted new alliances around but separate 
from the state--in some 
cases prompting divisions and factionalism within and among 
Shuar communities. 
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5.1 Shuar Cultural and Political Mobilisation 
In this section the main concern is to make sense of the work of the Shuar federations, 
FederaciOn Interprovincial de Centros Shuar (FICSH) and the Federacion 
Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador (FIPSE). Specifically, it considers how 
the federations have mobilised discourses of cultural identity in strategic ways in order 
to defend existing land claims,, access natural and material resources, and make 
collective rights claims against the Ecuadorian State and the oil companies. Against the 
backdrop of the 1960s struggle for land in the face of rapid land colonisation, the 
creation of federations of Shuar communities proved to be a significant socio-political 
change in modem Shuar history (see Chapter 4). In particular, their creation reflected 
concerted attempts to maintain control of Shuar lands, notably by asserting Shuar 
cultural identity. 
In attempting to understand the ways in which the Shuar people have mobilised to 
maintain access to resources and land, and how cultural identity is embedded in these 
strategies, it is essential to provide a detailed analysis of the specific processes of 
organisation, as well as the symbolic and material forms that they take. There are 
combinations of discrete actions here, emerging out of a continuously shifting relational 
context where interests and ideas are negotiated and resisted. That said, these strategies 
are more or less coherent in that they have emerged as a response and reaction to state 
policies and development projects, notably linked to oil exploitation. 
Table 5.1 Changes in Shuar federation FICSH: discourse and focus 
1970s 1980s 1990S 
Indigenous federations Legal titles Increasing political 
to community land mobilisation 
Organising communities Cultural and Legalising territory 
olitical identity 
Legalising Involvement in national Political and cultural 
community land politics identity, nationality, and 
self-determination 
Agricultural Assistance by NGOs External funding and 
diversification and cattle political support 
ranching activities 
Source: this Author (2004) 
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Table 5.1 illustrates how the Shuar Federation, FICSH, shifted its discourse and focus 
over time. ' First, in the 1970s, much work focused on basic organising in Morona 
Santiago and on seeking a political voice for Shuar communities in the region. One of 
the key roles of the federation was to seek redress for cases of personal discrimination 
and land violation. Here, it became a political advocate, making claims for collective 
and individual rights that had previously been denied the Shuar by the state. In the 
process, the federation sought to carve out its own identity in order to foreground 
problems unique to indigenous people in Ecuador at the time, thus explicitly identifying 
itself as an ethnic ally-b ased federation rather than a class-based organisation like some 
that worked with mestizo colonists (Federacion de Centros Shuar 1974; Hendricks 
2 1996) . 
These were tense times in the region. By the 1970s, much of the land in Morona 
Santiago was being eyed by smallholder colonists or religious-based missions (Barrera 
and Trujillo 1997). Indigenous land claims were not legally recognised by the state at 
the time and Shuar communities were thus vulnerable to encroachment by colonists. As 
such, and as Perruchon (2003: 140) remarked, "obtaining legal rights to land that the 
Shuar inhabited was one of the first and primary goals of the federation". Similarly, 
Elias Catani Tivi (2002) a former FIPSE leader asserted: "By entering the political 
arena as a federation, we have been able to defend our cultural identity and our lands 
and to consolidate our position in the Oriente in the face of advancing colonisation and 
oil development' 
The process of land disputes and legal issues regarding land titles will be examined in 
detail in Chapter 6. Here, it is simply important to note that one of FICSH's primary 
objectives during this early period was the legalisation of Shuar land claims, and many 
of its projects were designed to facilitate agricultural modernisation, 
including cattle 
production and marketing of 'traditional' crops to assist the claims along 
(see also 
Chapter 7). Importantly, the emphasis of the Ecuadorian government of the day was on 
1 Since FEPSE was only created in 1990, this table only examines FICSH. Further, the table 
does not rank 
the different issues in order of importance. However, we can see 
how land claims and cultural identity 
maintain a strong focus among the organisational strategies of 
the federation throughout the period. 
2 In contrast, Perreault (2001) examines how one regional 
indigenous federation emerged during the 
1970s in the Napo region (central Oriente) as an explicitly class-based rather than ethnical 
ly-based 
organisation, which was aligned with, and supported 
financially and organisationally by the Federacl6n 
Nacional de Organizaciones Clasistas (FENOC) and Central Ecuatoriana 
de Organizaciones Clasistas 
(CEDOC), two national class-based organisations. 
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development in order to integrate the Amazonian region with the rest of the nation 
economically and socially. 
Second, FICSH shifted its focus during the 1980s from one centred on land claims to 
one based on strengthening territorial rights by linking territory to cultural identity. 
Shuar claims and discourse evolved here within the context of rapidly changing 
3 
national politics and ongoing international debates . These wider changes led to 
changes within FICSH's orientation as the federation responded to the new political 
opportunities. In particular, the emphasis on territorial rights increased during the 
decade, especially in the aftermath of bitter land disputes involving oil companies and 
the Quichua people in Napo and Pastaza (see Figure 4.2.1). Following these events, 
FICSH was better able to see the nature of the approaching threat and thus hastily 
began the process of defining Shuar territories. In this regard, Pablo Tsere (2004), a 
former President of FICSH, stated that "before the indigenous people of the Amazonian 
region did not have to organise themselves like today. Now with the new threats by the 
oil companies and state development plans we have to develop new strategies to defend 
our ancestral lands". This statement is important since it demonstrates how Shuar 
leaders felt it necessary to organise the communities into a federation in order to defend 
their land against multiple threats. The idea of 'indigenous territory' thus ernerged--an 
idea associated with a significant political shift on the part of indigenous federations 
throughout Ecuador (see Chapter 6). 
Third, in the 1990s, FICSH (as well as by then the newly-created FIPSE) increasingly 
elaborated calls for the recognition of a distinctive Shuar cultural identity 
based on 
territorial and political rights. Through collective language bringing together ancestral 
territory, cultural identity and the goal of self-determination, Shuar leaders from 
both of 
these federations asserted a political and historical entitlement to ancestral territory 
even as they articulated their claims within a discursive 
frame of national and 
3 As noted in Chapter 4, some changes had taken place regarding the protection of 
indigenous rigghts. 
Pressure from national indigenous organisations, such as CONAIE and CONFENIAE on the 
Ecuadorian 
government had important impacts on policy and 
laws to better represent the interests of Ecuador's 
indigenous people. National organizing improved the legal position of 
indigenous people, especially with 
collective rights guaranteed under the 
National Constitution of 1998 and the International Labor 
Organization's Declaration 169 (the Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries). 
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international indigenous rights .4 As with popular actions throughout Latin America, 
Shuar people sought "the social recognition of their existence and a political space of 
expression" (Alvarez et al. 1992: 4). They emphasised the right to self-determination in 
articulating their demands as well as the freedom to determine their own autonomous 
political status and their own economic, social and cultural development. As Tito 
Puanchir (2004), a former President of FIPSE, emphasised "We created our federation 
to defend our territory and cultural identity against the oil companies and the colonists". 
Similarly, Rafael Pandam (2002), another former FIPSE leader, stated, 
"From the time our organisation started, it took the decision to not allow oil 
companies on our lands. We had already seen what our indigenous brothers in the 
north of Ecuador had experienced from oil development--a series of irreparable 
social, cultural and environmental impacts. In my opinion, if the Shuar had given 
the go-ahead to these companies, they would have acted the same as oil 
companies have in other parts of the region, dividing the communities and their 
representative organizations, destroying the environment and threatening our 
cultural identity". 
These statements are important since they demonstrate how Shuar leaders reacted to 
planned local oil development deeming it necessary to organise new political and legal 
strategies to protect Shuar cultural identity and territory. As the discourse and focus of 
the struggle shifted, so too did the organisational practices of the Shuar federations. The 
perceived intensification of the oil development threat was ultimately behind FICSH's 
and FEPSE's increasingly complex activism. Their strategies have been geared towards 
strengthening their own organisational capacity as well as emphasising the inter- 
connectedness of territory, development, traditional production practices and cultural 
identity. To gain a better understanding of the processes here, the discussion will now 
turn to the organisational strategies of FIPSE in particular--a federation whose efforts 
served between 1998 and 2000 formed the basis of one of the most successful 
indigenous mobilisations of the decade in Ecuador. 
5 
one specific mobilisation was especially central to FIPSE's work at this time. Thus, in 
August 1999 the leadership of FIPSE organised a protest march in Macas designed to 
4 Sawyer (2004) examines how the Quichua, Achuar and Shiwiar people organised a protest march at this 
time to call for communal titling of territory in Pastaza and to demand new reforms in the constitution, 
such that Ecuador could be declared a 'plurinational' state. 
5 FICSH was at that time also organising politically against the oil industry. However, FIPSE had since 
the late 1990s assumed a leading role in the struggle against oil development. 
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stop the US-based oil company ARCO Oriente from operating in Shuar territory. Some 
400 Shuar people marched from communities scattered across the rainforests of the 
southern Oriente to the nearest major town Macas, despite this involving a trek of many 
days (see Figure 4.5), to deliver the message that their culture, land and beliefs were 
6 not for sale'. The sheer novelty of this action merits attention. Never before had so 
many members of the Shuar people congregated in one place to take political action. 
Further, the commitment of the protestors can be seen in the time away from their work 
as well as the effort involved in getting to the demonstration. The protestors marched to 
the Supreme Court office located in Macas to present a legal injunction against ARCO 
Oriente designed to prevent further rights violations by the oil company and to demand 
that the government enforce Shuar rights (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Shuar mobilise against ARCO Oriente 
cIGEr LL 
A 
Figure 5.1 documents this crucial demonstration of August 1999. The sense of struggle 
captured in this photo is important in that it reflects how issues of political and cultural 
identity had become thoroughly intertwined by the late 1990s. Two things are 
especially important here. The first thing to note about this protest march and 
legal 
campaign is that it demonstrates organising ability on the part of the 
Shuar in general 
and HIPSE in particular. Community mobilisation had already 
begun in the area in late 
1998 when the ARCO Oriente surveyed oil block 24 prior to starting exploration. Yet, 
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Source: www. amazon watch. orgy 
this area was claimed by the Shuar based on long-term residency. Convinced that the 
oil company would destroy the Shuar environment, culture and livelihoods, the 
leadership of FIPSE galvanised their communities into forming a coalition in order to 
stop it. A crucial first step occurred at a FIPSE-sponsored assembly in August 1998 at 
which it was agreed to prohibit oil development and all negotiations by Shuar 
individuals or communities with ARCO. Hence, as the President of FIPSE at that time, 
recalled, "We're carrying out the will of our people. Our people have said that we are 
going to resist against oil developments because ARCO has disrespected us by entering 
our territories, trying to divide and create problems among our communities. Therefore, 
we say no to oil development" (T. Puanchir 2002). Even allowing for the rhetorical 
tone here, it was indeed a crucial goal of that company to undermine, divide and 
generally cause problems for indigenous communities and their representative 
organisations as had already happened in the Napo, Sucumbios, and Orellanos 
provinces (see Figure 4.2.1) (CDES 2002c; Wray 2000). As ARCO's operations moved 
south, Shuar communities deliberated as how best to prevent similar negative impacts 
on their lands. FIPSE had learned about the strategies used by the oil companies from 
relatives living in the north and even from some local Shuar residents who had worked 
for the oil companies before (M. Tibi 2002). 
FEPSE played a pivotal role in boosting the organisation of individual communities 
notably by underscoring the gravity of the threat and the 'sneaky' strategies used by oil 
companies to infiltrate the area. Thus, it claimed that such strategies involved breaking 
community unity, corrupting local leaders, forming independent organisations in favour 
of oil exploitation, and providing monetary and development enticements. 
Gifts of 
money, medical supplies, school materials, as well as the construction of community 
houses with solar panels, divided bewildered communities even as they established a 
relationship of dependence between them and ARCO. 
As one Shuar leader bitterly 
noted, "We don't want the oil companies. They offered us electric 
light and energy, 
they offered us a health centre and large sums of money, and this 
is how those 
communities became dependent on the oil companies" 
(R. Uwi 2002). 
In this way, the August 1999 protest march thus was built upon a series of meetings 
that, in aggregate, demonstrated organisational ability 
based on community-based 
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mobilisation against the oil industry. The importance of this strategy was made readily 
clear to me in an interview I had with Tito Puanchir, in Macas in July 2002. 
"As a president, I had to strengthen the organisational approaches of the 
federation and unite our communities to be able to defend our cultural identity 
and collective territory. We are demanding that our collective identity, territory 
and the right to develop our communities in a sustainable manner be respected. 
There was a path of division and separation that greatly worried us. They are 
trying to divide us in order to gain access to our territory; if they continue to push 
there will be a confrontation, which will only endanger our communities, 
livelihoods and identity"(T. Puanchir 2002). 
This statement underscores that a key factor in the decision to march was the felt need 
to build political and cultural consensus and unity among FEPSE-linked communities in 
order to reverse divisions encouraged by ARCO. 
The second thing to note about the protest march featured in Figure 5.1 is the 
importance of the explicit and confrontational political discourses that it articulated. 
Thus, the placards and the chants the protestors utilised in that march show how these 
are key discursive points of struggle. Thus, while some travelled by plane and by bus, 
the vast majority travelled on foot. Carrying spears and enough chicha (a traditional 
fermented drink) for everyone, they held signs that read, "Oil companies- ghosts of 
death" and chanted "No more Texaco". The protestors referred to how Texaco had 
exploited sizable oil reserves in the northern Oriente, inscribing the landscape with oil 
wells and infrastructure essential for oil exploration and production. The firm had 
contaminated the surface and subterranean water and soil systems and its practices had 
posed serious problems for local indigenous communities (see AcciOn EcologiCa 2000; 
Kimerling 1992; Wray 2000). In fact, FIPSE was created partly to better confront 
increasing oil development in Shuar territory and this protest march was the 
culmination of Shuar struggles provoked by the federation to oppose the oil companies. 
The Shuar protestors claimed that, since ARCO had bought the concession in 1998 the 
company had violated numerous rights guaranteed under both international law and the 
Ecuadorian constitution. Indeed, when defining the planned oil development for the 
region, neither the state minister responsible for oil concessions nor ARCO thought to 
make contract with FIPSE to "discuss the extent of the project" even though they were 
obliged to do so by law (FIPSE 1998a: 6). Even worse, ARCO had by-passed FIPSE 
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altogether when it supported Shuar 'phantom organisations' in the newly designated 
block 24, notably OrganizaciOn Shuar del Ecuador (OSHE) and AsociaciOn Indigena 
de Evangelicos de Pastaza de la Region Amazonica (AIIEPRA). Leaders both within 
and outside FIPSE's organisational structure repeatedly condemned this divide-and-rule 
tactic. Thus, former FIPSE leader Rafael Pandam (2002) complained how "OSHE 
receive funds directly from the oil company. Their riches make them selfish and 
opportunistic. They do not really care what is happening in the communities. They do 
what they choose. The leaders of OSHE say that they are owners of the oil. But in 
reality they are corrupt". 
ARCO, for its part, clearly rejected these allegations. Thus, in an interview with the 
Ecuadorian newspaper Expreso de Guayaquil, dated 25 July 1999, Herb Vickers, 
ARCO's official representative in Ecuador, justified their practices by stating that they 
needed to work more on the local level since "the large indigenous organisations no 
longer represent the people. The large organisations are political machines". Vickers 
also denied that corporate strategies both facilitated and benefited from dividing 
indigenous loyalties and political structures. To ensure that its exploratory operations 
would proceed successfully, ARCO needed to appease local Shuar people through an 
assortment of development projects. In return, the ARCO-sponsored organisations had 
to promise never to impede ARCO's oil operations. As stated in the standard 
agreement, the organisations were the "only local representative body that could enter 
into a legal contract with ARCO". 6 
At the same time, the leaders that ARCO approached claimed that they were the 'true' 
representatives of the Shuar people. This stance can be seen in a document, 
ReproducciOn Escaneada, written by Shuar leaders, and sponsored by the oil 
companies. It states: "The large Shuar organisations [FIPSE and FICSH] do not 
represent, the communities, their leaders are corrupted and have mismanaged the 
economic resources that were meant to help the base communities". 
7 Similarly, Alfredo 
Pitiur, President of OSHE (2004), declared that, "FIPSE and FICSH leaders have not 
6 Convenio de Cooperaci6n, 25th February 1999, reprinted in CDES (1999). 
7 The document was signed on 27th October 2000 in Puyo, by Jacinto CarInkia, Vice-president AEEPRA, 
Alfonso Chango, Vice-president FENAKEPA, Angel Shakay, AIIEPRA, Hector Mayancha, President 
ASODIRA, Antonio Moncayo, President FENASH, Galo Saant, President Taisha Association, Matrin 
Chamic, President Arutam, and Manuel Maich, Arutam. 
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visited our communities in more than three years. What have we gained from the Shuar 
federations? With the help of OSHE and by working with the oil company we will 
develop and progress economically". In particular, the so-called 'phantom 
organisations' exemplified the shifting terrain of struggle over oil development in 
Morona Santiago. It showed how people were reshaping their identities and allegiances, 
realigning local culturally based understandings of territory and natural resources use in 
different ways, thereby provoking debate over who controlled what. Above all, the 
struggle was over who was to define 'Shuar' identity. 
FIPSE had no choice but to confront the material and discursive strategies of ARCO 
and its allies in the strongest possible terms. Hence, the tone and the message of Shuar 
protestors that can be seen in Figure 5.1 as well as the promotion by FIPSE leaders, 
such as Tito Puanchir and Rafael Pandam, of the need for a legal injunction. Implicit to 
this latter demand was a specific and political notion of cultural identity. FEPSE 
organised a campaign starting in August 1999 to seek a legal injunction against ARCO 
based on provisions in the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 and the 
1998 National Constitution (see Chapter 4). Of particular interest here is the way this 
campaign inter-linked the political and the cultural. Thus, the proposed injunction 
claimed that both Shuar cultural identity and collective territorial rights were 
simultaneously being violated as a result of oil development. 8 
This claim had three elements (FIPSE 1998b). Firstly, the injunction demanded the 
right of the Shuar people to defend their cultural and political identity and territory, and 
the right be consulted on and to participate in activities involving development within 
their territory. As stated in the injunction: "Our collective rights are clearly established 
in Articles 83 and 84 of the 1998 National Constitution as well as in international 
accords and conventions. They are written and already ratified. ARCO's negotiations 
were a clear violation of these laws". 9 Secondly, the injunction would prevent ARCO 
from henceforth entering Shuar territory or approaching Shuar communities without the 
prior consent of FEPSE. Specifically, "ARCO [would] be required to negotiate only 
8 As noted, FIPSE's legal strategies were supported by the Shuar federation FICSH. However, it was 
FIPSE which organised the protest march and subsequent legal actions against ARCO Oriente, hence the 
specific focus here on this Shuar federation. 
9 See Chapter 4 for details on the National Constitution and the ELO Convention 169. Here, the focus is 
on the concrete implications that it has had for the organising processes for defending the cultural and 
political identity and territory of the Shuar in Morona Santiago. 
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with FIPSE and its legal representatives, thereby prohibiting them from meeting with 
local organisations without FEPSE's approval, and [from] engaging in illegal 
negotiations with individual communities". Thirdly, it criticised the disregard shown by 
ARCO and its allies for the authority of FIPSE, which was legally bound to represent 
the Shuar communities in Morona Santiago, and it stated that ARCO had used divide- 
and-rule strategies to divide the Shuar people. 
The material and symbolic importance of this legal strategy cannot be over-emphasised. 
Symbolically, it is significant because it was the first case in Ecuador where an 
indigenous group used constitutional mechanisms against an oil company (or any 
corporation for that matter). Indeed, the court case represents one of the first legal 
interpretations of the collective rights of indigenous people under Ecuador's new 
constitution and recently ratified international treaties. By the end of the legal process, 
in April 2000 and after almost two years of actions, the Constitutional Tribunal upheld 
the injunction in favour of FIPSE. 10 First, the civil court judge, Mauricio Larriva, ruled 
that ARCO had violated the constitutional rights of Shuar residents as well as infringing 
on those rights contained in the National Constitution and the ILO 169 Convention. 
Second, the judge prohibited ARCO from entering Shuar territory or negotiating 
directly with, or communicating with individuals or communities inside the federation's 
territory without authorisation from FIPSE. Thirdly, the judge stated that ARCO's 
behaviour had violated the "disciplinary order that governs and must govern the 
relationship between FIPSE and its associates, which has generated discord". This last 
statement referred to how ARCO had approached selected communities 
for 
endorsement thereby disrupting the integrity and right of the federation to represent 
local indigenous interests. 
The material impact of this key ruling was equally important as part of the overall 
Shuar political mobilisation since ARCO could not initiate oil exploitation as 
it had 
planned. After the court case, ARCO sold off the concession 
for block 24 to the US- 
based oil company Burlington Resources, in April 2000. In November of the same year, 
following a FIPSE deposition that Burlington had adopted similar divide-and-rule 
strategies to these used by ARCO, a civil court 
judge ordered that Burlington Resources 
10 This paragraph is based on the following source: Resolucfon No. 247-RA-00-I. S 
del Tribunal 
Constitucional (FlIPSE 1999) 
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had to comply with the ARCO injunction. " Burlington was required to consult with 
local populations as a condition of its concession contract it acquired from ARCO, but 
FIPSE refused to participate in such consultations and thereby prevented the company 
from moving ahead with exploration plans (see also Chapter 7). 
Beyond this immediate effect, the injunction was crucial to the broader political 
challenge to state policies based on a quest to open up a space for indigenous cultural 
identity in the national political process and imagination. "We believe that to use legal 
and political measures, such as the case of the legal injunction, we will be able to 
defend our territories and identities as indigenous people. We cannot sell our culture, 
lives and our territory, it would destroy our cultures, livelihoods and identity" (T. 
Puanchir 2002). Indeed, the successful legal action taken by FILPSE between 1998 and 
2000 set the stage for subsequent indigenous protests within Ecuador (CDES 2002c; 
Wray 2000). The court decision thus marked an important precedent in the defence of 
the cultural identity and collective territorial rights of indigenous people in Ecuador as a 
whole. 
Yet, to appreciate why the legal Shuar federations responded as they did, it is important 
to understand how oil company strategies under neoliberal policies have fundamentally 
shifted the terms of national debate around the issues of cultural identity, rights and 
representation- in the process transforming Shuar lives. To understand this point we 
need to assess how the concept of cultural identity itself has come to be understood in 
contemporary Ecuador, notably involving recognition of the collective rights of 
indigenous people. As such, we now consider in more detail Shuar political 
mobilisation as a cultural process. Crucial here is the way that the Shuar 
federations 
have incorporated concepts of cultural identity into strategies to confront what they see 
as culturally inappropriate state and oil company development policies. 
Notification bY the Judge in Macas to Burlington Resources Ltd, the 14'hNovember 2000 (CDES 
2002d). 
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5.2 Shuar Cultural Identity 
The integration of the Oriente into national political cultures and the wider market 
economy has brought many changes to Shuar livelihoods as well as to their sense of 
identity. This is particularly the case for those involved with the Shuar federations, 
whose strategies have incorporated both 'modernising' approaches to political 
organising and 'alternative' development designed to promote forms of social change 
deemed most likely to reinforce Shuar culture and identity. Thus, with integration into a 
national political process and a new set of relationships with the state and other external 
actors comes the idea that indigenous people are not just defined as being indigenous 
but may also be understood as national citizens with full civil rights. The Shuar 
movement has therefore been faced with two big challenges. On the one hand, it has 
needed to reflect the multiple identities of those it represents, and to negotiate on their 
behalf a new relationship with the state and other external actors more reflective of the 
distinctive identity of the Shuar. On the other hand, the movement has sought to make 
claims upon powerful outsiders, especially the state, as fully-fledged national citizens 
with the associated right to make demands on centrally controlled resources. 
Yet, these challenges have raised difficult questions about what it means to be 
'indigenous' and 'Shuar' for both Shuar leaders and Shuar villagers, let alone how they 
ought to strategically articulate culture and identity. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
not necessary to unpack every detail of culture as grasped by either Shuar leaders or 
villagers since the aim of this thesis is to address only the key cultural articulations 
made by the Shuar which have had an impact on political organising vis-a-vis state 
agencies and oil companies. 
Above all, it is important to note that Shuar leaders often reveal a discontinuity with 
community residents in the way they articulate and use cultural ideas-- which illustrate 
in turn other differences between them and the communities they claim to represent. On 
the one hand, Shuar leaders have politicised culture through abstract articulations of the 
Shuar as 'defenders of the Amazon rainforest' and as proponents of 'sustainable 
development 1--a style more in tune with outside audiences than with villagers. With 
integration into national political processes has thus come the need to fashion 
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specifically indigenous agendas that simultaneously respond to dominant national and 
international cultural politics while strengthening indigenous cultural identity and 
politics. However, and on the other hand, Shuar community residents 
conceptualisations of cultural identity usually differ markedly from such abstractions. 
This difference has had important implications for the articulation and resonance of 
Shuar cultural identity even as the integration of Shuar lands into the wider market 
economy has also brought other lifestyle related cultural changes to the Shuar. 
For Shuar leaders, economic and cultural integration into the wider world may be 
inevitable, but must not be at the expense of cherished aspects of Shuar culture. It is for 
this reason they promote "incorporation of indigenous politics for the affirmation of 
cultural identity" and an autonomous organising strategy for the "achievement of 
cultural and territorial rights and the defence of natural resources and the environment" 
(P. Tsere 2004). This statement neatly demonstrates for our purposes key issues of the 
identity question, namely: 1) cultural identity is noted as the organising axis of political 
practice; 2) the right to a sanctioned territory that is perceived as a necessary pre- 
condition for the development of an indigenous cultural vision; and 3) the right to 
construct an autonomous perspective for the future, particularly an autonomous vision 
of development based on Shuar culture. Territory and place-based cultural practices 
will be examined in detail in Chapter 6. Here, the task is to assess how the Shuar 
federations have politicised cultural identity, notably by incorporating the concept of 
ethnic nationality into their campaigns. 
Assertion of the cultural identity of the Shuar people has been one the key ways that the 
Shuar federations have sought to halt state-sanctioned oil development. Much of the 
strategic innovation shown by the federations in the late 1990s reflected a keen wish to 
combat the divisive tactics of the oil companies. According to Rafael Pandam (2002) of 
FIPSE, these tactics "pose an immediate risk to the integrity of the organisation, and to 
the integrity of each indigenous person", even as they "pose severe direct threats to the 
cultural identity of the Shuar people". As noted, ARCO had used illegal means to enter 
FIPSE territory, without first acquiring authorisation from its leaders. As such, Shuar 
leaders argued that the oil company had "disrespected the collective rights of the Shuar 
people, and engaged in strategies to divide and confuse the communities, which is a 
violation of our rights for cultural identity" (T. Puanchir 2002). 
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Thus, the Shuar federations' new political vision was founded on attempts to defend a 
local cultural identity. The goal here was to strategically politicise identity and cultural 
difference while increasingly adopting legal measures to defend that identity and linked 
collective territorial rights. Political action laid the groundwork for collective 
indigenous consciousness of cultural identity that entailed simultaneously symbolic, 
material and physical struggles. Far from being an impulsive and 'natural' event 
emerging from indigenous communities rooted in 'primordial' attachments to land, the 
reaction led by the Shuar federations was a highly organised political response based on 
fine-tuned strategic calculation. 
Indeed, by reconstructing cultural identity politically, identity and cultural difference 
became identified as organising axis of both daily life and political practice. On the one 
hand, cultural identity for the Shuar is based on daily community production and 
consumption practices, and it is these practices that are most commonly identified by 
community members as being characteristically 'Shuar' (see below). On the other hand, 
cultural identity has become the tool to build the political strategies of the Shuar 
federations that seek to voice Shuar political, economic, and cultural demands that are 
typically critical of state development projects as well as associated understandings of 
nation and democracy. Shuar leaders thus began constructing discourses about local 
indigenous identities according to the contested political environments within which 
they were situated. 12 The advent of intensified cultural and political identification gave 
rise, in turn, to novel forms of political participation. This can be seen in the court case 
and legal injunction that were initiated as a result of FIPSE-led community 
mobilisation. While we saw above how the court case concerned the violation of the 
rights of specific communities, it is important to note here the broader implications of 
such a strategy for FIPSE and FICSH to collectively defend territorial rights by 
asserting Shuar cultural identity. 
12 Similarly, Garfield (2001) shows how Brazil's Xavante people adapted to the physical intrusion of the 
state and non-indigenous settlers and how they mobilised their identity and culture politically to contest 
the nation- and state-building projects of the modern Brazilian state. 
Here, indigenous leaders 
consciously mixed images of the Indian with the national 
'myth' of racial democracy and patriotic 
rhetoric in order to simultaneously demand rights as Brazilian citizens and as indigenous people. 
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The Shuar federations' image as indigenous organisations representing the region's 
'Indian' population and promoting the region's 'traditional' cultural traditions was 
fundamental to the federations' ability to use legal measures and to attract political 
support and funds. As organising became increasingly politically complex, involving 
simultaneously local, national and international engagement in search of political and 
economic support, some Shuar leaders utilised more self-conscious and strategic forms 
of identity discourse. During the 1980s and the 1990s when national and international 
NGOs became interested in the combined plight of indigenous people and tropical 
rainforests, indigenous federations saw an opportunity to access new funding 
opportunities by emphasising their ' ec o logic ally-friendly' and 'Indian' credentials (see 
Figure 5.2) 
Figure 5.2 Shuar leaders in the Amazon 
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Figure 5.2 neatly illustrates this process. It shows two Shuar leaders dressed up in their 
traditional clothes and tribal decorations apparently in their own territory. The photo 
clearly plays on Western notion of ecologically 'wise' indigenous people going 
back to 
the idea of the 'noble savage' (see also Bebbington 2001). At the same time, there is the 
tropical rainforest in the background, a vital green world of vegetation and 
'biodiversity'. This type of image resonates well with Western concerns of 
environmental destruction and tropical conservation. 
Whether addressing media, state 
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Source: www. pachamama. org 
officials, international NGOs or even other indigenous leaders, the declarations of 
Shuar leaders were embedded with images of 'crusaders' of the rainforest, the last 
patch of tropical 'Eden' left on this earth, and "the lungs of the world" (M. Tsamariant 
2002). Phrases such as these rolled easily off the Shuar leaders' tongues in a manner 
comparable to other indigenous people's pronouncements elsewhere in the tropics (see 
Slater 2003). For example Manuel Tibi, a Shuar shaman, opined, "For centuries we 
have defended the rainforest. We defend the last remaining frontier of uncontaminated 
forest remaining in Ecuador. We live and defend large parts of the Amazon region, the 
lungs of the world and patrimony of all living species on the planet" (M. Tibi 2004). 
Similarly, Adolfo Shakay of CONFENAEE self-consciously mixed ecological ideas 
with Shuar cultural identity by linking that identity to sustainable use of the rainforest: 
"Ancestral forest practices have shaped the ecology of the local forest as surely as the 
cultural identity of those who lived there" (A. Shakay 2004). Eco-defence is thus seen 
to be part-and-parcel of the Shuar's cultural identity and ancestral status in the Oriente. 
Thus, these remarks, which were typical of those made to me by Shuar leaders during 
fieldwork, are revealing on two counts: 1) They suggest that the Shuar are culturally 
disposed to being natural defenders of an increasingly scarce resource; and 2) They 
suggest that the cultural -ecological role of the Shuar is now of global interest since 
forests in Shuar lands are the 'lungs of the world'. Environmental concerns of this kind 
of Western idiom have thus clearly played an important role in shaping the activities 
and representations of the Shuar federations. However, this has also informed wider 
Shuar articulations of cultural identity adding further impacts to the campaign to 
achieve local autonomy. 
Though Shuar leaders have keyed into Western concerns for tropical conservation for 
their own purposes, they have nonetheless condemned aspects of that Western agenda 
where it does not square with the ancestral domain effort. For instance, Shuar leaders 
explicitly claimed that an integral component of indigenous identity was the 
4sustainable' use of the tropical rainforest: theirs was not therefore a pristine wilderness 
or 4untouched' forest. Luis Kuash (2003) reacted especially strongly against portrayals 
of indigenous people as 'noble savages' during our discussions. According to Luis, the 
rainforest was "an integrally managed and diversified space, not some place to be 
preserved for conservationist purposes". Ironically, the language of tropical 
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conservation both helped (financially and politically) to sustain Shuar struggles even as 
it laid the groundwork for state and corporate attempts to manipulate ecological 
concerns so that they could champion their activities in the name of the environment 
(see Chapter 7). 
Another crucial aspect of Shuar organisational strategies linked to the elaboration of a 
politics of cultural identity has been the fact that discussions of identity have largely 
been framed in terms of membership of an ethnic nationality defined in territorial 
terms. This has been associated with a significant discursive and political shift on the 
part of Shuar organisations whereby FIPSE and FICSH adopted a discourse of ethnic 
nationality based on territorial and political rights in the late 1990s. Increasingly, the 
Shuar federations adopted much of the discourse promoted by CONAIE calling for the 
recognition of ethnic nationalities based on the idea of a plurinational and multicultural 
state. As noted in Chapter 4, CONIAE addressed ethnic and cultural issues through an 
even greater integration into national politics acting on behalf of all indigenous groups 
of Ecuador, including the Shuar. Although dating from the 1980s, the concept of ethnic 
nationality has been especially salient after the creation of the indigenous party 
Pachakutik in 1996, and its subsequent consolidation as a political actor at the turn of 
the millennium (Lucas 2001). 
One of the most important outcomes of the strategies of this political party has 
undoubtedly been the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational and multicultural state, 
while also acknowledging Ecuador's indigenous groups as nationalities with distinct 
cultural, territorial and political rights. As stated by Luis Macas (2001: 4) founder and a 
former President of CONIAE: "The ethnic element and the demand for Ecuador to 
become a plurinational country were, in principle, the factors that unified the different 
ethnic groups of CONIAE". Further, Lluco (2001: 9), another former CONAIE leader, 
observed that "the plurinational state is a single state with juridical territories inhabited 
by indigenous nations, and their rights to decide for themselves politically, 
economically, culturally and socially ... the national territory 
is not dismembered but our 
people are accorded further levels of decision-making and autonomy". 
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As a response to the recognition of ethnic nationalities at regional and national levels, 
Shuar leaders shifted their own discourse and politics towards promoting ethnic 
nationalities and territories in order to capitalise on national changes. This type of 
argument was visible for example at a meeting convened in Santiago (situated in the far 
south of Morona Santiago province; see Figure 4.5) in October 2003 where Shuar 
leaders discussed how to develop a Shuar 'nation'. Here, Pablo Tsere, FICSH President 
at that time and who has been the most outspoken leader for creating a Shuar nation, 
captured the essence of this new line of thinking when he stated, "Nationality is the 
product of cultural processes within our communities that involve a collective sense of 
belonging to a people". This statement, which was typical of those made by other Shuar 
leaders at the time, demonstrates, firstly, that the Shuar federations questioned the 
conventional framing of the nation-state thereby inspiring debate on who constitutes the 
nation and who has the power to control resources and land; and secondly that the 
Shuar federations identified themselves as being members of an ethnic nationality and 
wished to be seen as such. In the process, FICSH's and FEPSE's discourse has 
challenged that of the state, which has long downplayed cultural difference in favour of 
a uniform Ecuadorian identity ruled from the centre (Sawyer 2004; Yashar 1998). 
Indeed, meetings such as the October 2003 Santiago meeting revealed how FIPSE and 
FICSH had come to question the very notion of the nation-state and associated appeals 
to 'national unity' and the 'national interest'. Indeed, the Shuar leader's response was to 
reject this 'national myth'. Francisco Sandu (2002), another FIPSE leader, reacted 
especially strongly to this when he declared: "We maintain that the Ecuadorian nation 
is incomplete and does not represent all people within national society, such as the 
Shuar people". He added, "In part, the aim of our federation has been the incorporation 
and inclusion of ethnic, cultural and political concerns within existing nation-state 
structures [in order] to bring into question the very concepts and constructions of the 
state, citizenship and nation". Thus, most Shuar leaders I interviewed, such as Pablo 
Tsere and Francisco Sandu, demanded legislation that would provide for autonomous 
control of a Shuar ancestral territory and that this territory should be granted to the 
Shuar pueblo (people) as a nationality. The meshing of territory and ethnic nationality 
will be further examined in Chapter 6. Here, it is important to note that these sorts of 
statements demonstrated how Shuar leaders have sought to construct cultural identity 
in 
keeping with the idea of ethnic nationalities promoted by CONAIE and Pachakunk 
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nationally and internationally, but grounding that idea firmly in terms of Shuar 
ancestral territory 
Thus, the Shuar federations have utilised discourses of cultural identity in strategic 
ways in order to influence political agendas, access financial or institutional resources, 
and obtain territorial and resource rights. Their discursive mobilisation of cultural 
identity, which we have examined so far in this chapter, is no exception. However, it is 
vital to note the symbolic and material distance between Shuar leaders who have 
politicised cultural identity and articulated it through political discourses at the 
regional, national and international scales and the Shuar residents of local communities 
who define cultural identity differently, notably by linking it to everyday practices and 
beliefs. This distance has had important implications for the articulation and resonance 
of Shuar cultural identity in general. 
Often located in remote locations, Shuar community residents have had less 
engagement with national and international policies and actors and have also not been 
involved usually in campaigns and development projects to the same extent as the 
federations. These different roles, together with the fact that local communities only 
meet occasionally in large assembly meetings whereas federation leaders occupy 
permanent offices in Macas and Sucua, mean that in comparison to the federations, the 
Shuar communities play a minor role in producing discursive representations of their 
own identity for outside consumption. Whereas the Shuar federations write, speak and 
draw explicit connections between identity, territory and political organisation, the 
local communities rarely do so in this fashion. 
To understand identity construction in the Shuar communities themselves, we must 
consider community households, and the way in which, for most people, self- 
identification and cultural identity is embedded within complex relations of everyday 
practices, beliefs, and traditional production and consumption systems. These strategies 
are mainly place-based and largely gendered. Ways of talking about these everyday 
practices are also strikingly different from the more politicised and rhetorical language 
used by the Shuar federations to describe cultural identity that was noted above. The 
most important markers of Shuar cultural identity at the local level thus are: 1) Chakra 
agriculture and the production and consumption of traditional foods, such as chicha and 
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huayusa; 2) the natural environment and the associated use of medicinal plants through 
shamanism; and 3) the nature of Shuar education as well as the use of the Shuar 
language. ' 3 
Firstly, community production and consumption practices play an important role in 
forming ideas of cultural identity, and it is these daily practices that are most commonly 
identified by community members as being characteristically 'Shuar'. The importance 
of such practices was made clear to me when I undertook participatory fieldwork 
during ten months in various Shuar villagers as well as when I conducted in-depth 
interviews with Shuar residents. Far from merely being economic functions, these 
everyday practices are fundamental to the collective identity of the community and to 
the cultural expression of that identity. In particular, chakra agriculture and the 
production and consumption of traditional foods are important markers of cultural 
identity (see Figure 5.3) 






13 To reiterate, this discussion of village-level 
Shuar cultural identity does not purport to be extensive but 
focuses on those aspects of particular saliency to the concerns of 
this thesis. 
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Source: this Author 2004 
Figure 5.3 usefully demonstrates a number of these issues and it shows how Shuar 
women in particular are involved in the everyday practices of chakra agriculture, which 
is one important measure of cultural identity. It is in the chakra that Shuar women plant 
small plots of traditional foods, such as kamote, platano, papachina, and juca, using 
shifting cultivation techniques that allow forest regeneration between cycles. The value 
of the chakra and these foods became apparent to me in one of the conversations I had 
with Maria Martinez (2003), a Shuar woman living in the village of Naparuk in Morona 
Santiago (see Figure 4.5). One night when we sat in her house preparing chicha, Maria 
explained, "The most important aspect of Shuar culture and identity is drinking chicha 
and huayusa, and the use of the chakra". When I asked her why this was so important, 
she responded that, "it is so important since we have learnt from our grandparents that 
we must not forget out traditions and customs, such as the teaching of how to drink 
chicha and huayusa and the Shuar language. Because if we lose them, we would not 
identify ourselves as Shuar" (M. Martinez 2003). 
In this way, then, the drinking of chicha (a traditional fermented drink made of juca) 
and huayusa (a tea that the Shuar drink traditionally in the morning), together with the 
complex practices that bring them into Shuar life, are seen to be important signifiers of 
Shuar identity. Indeed, these production and consumption systems define patterns of 
life and sets of values that differentiate Shuar individuals who engage in these practices 
from the mestizos and whites with which they come into contact in nearby towns. In 
this way, traditional food becomes symbolic and its production and consumption 
informs Shuar identity even as it is integral to the reproduction of Shuar culture 
(Hendricks 1996). 
Secondly, local community perceptions of cultural identity have also been linked to the 
6natural' environment: to spirits, myths, and natural gods. Indeed, Shuar mythology, 
shamanism and the natural environment have important symbolic value and are 
important interlinked signifiers for Shuar cultural identity (Hamer 1972; Salazar 1977). 
Indeed, many people still believe that Shuar cultural identity is represented 
by 
traditional Shuar gods, such as Etsa (the sun), Nantu (the moon), while cultivated 
lands 
are where Nunkui (the goddess of agriculture) 
is present. The natural environment, 
moreover, contains natural powers that 
determine life and death, which can be seen by 
consuming hallucinogenic plants, such as 
Ayahuasca (a hallucinogenic plant taken in 
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the ceremonies), which habitually occurs next to sacred waterfalls allowing the Shuar to 
communicate directly with Arutam, the protecting god of the rainforest. Different 
celebrations throughout the year- for example the New Year (uwi) when the fruits of 
the chonta palm ripen- also represent and reinforce Shuar cultural identity linked to the 
natural environment. Further, shamans (Uwishint') have long been dominant among the 
Shuar, even though the shamans do not possess the same socio-political powers as 
before (Hamer 1972; Karsten 1923,1926). 
This affinity to the natural environment based notably on shamanism is also a 
cultural I y-loaded marker to distinguish the Shuar from others. Indeed, Shuar residents 
are well aware of how they differ from other people, including other indigenous people 
as well as mestizos and gringos (westemers). Perceived differences as to who the Shuar 
are as well as how Shuar identity may be expressed vary according to audience. Thus, 
for example, the Shuar are still familiar to the general Ecuadorian public as the tsantsa 
head-shrinkers, while being described in Western ethnographic terms as hunters and 
gatherers, even as they perceive themselves as "people of shamans and self-assertive 
vision-seekers, though a rather conflict-prone people" (Perruchon 2003: 114). Just as 
Shuar links to the land are complex, so too are the ways in which they understand their 
cultural 'place' in the world--as well as how outsiders place them culturally. 
Thirdly, the Shuar sense of identity has also been directly influenced by the beliefs and 
practices of outsiders with whom they have been in contact. The group that has had the 
most impact here is the Salesian (Catholic) and Evangelic missionaries. Through an 
agreement with the Ecuadorian state in 1955, the Salesian missionaries had the sole 
responsibility to develop health care services, schools and infrastructure in the region 
until the end of 1970s. As noted in Chapter 4, they established missionary stations in 
Shuar lands and small settlements nearby these centres where they provided education 
and religious services. Salazar (1977) mentions two strategies that enhanced the impact 
of the Salesian mission among the Shuar. The first was the separation of the Shuar 
children from their families to attend missionary schools, and the second was the 
concentration of the Shuar in centros. The latter was discussed in Chapter 4. Here we 
will focus on how the missionary schools contributed to a change in Shuar cultural 
identity. 
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The Salesians built boarding schools to evangelise, educate, and 'civilise' Shuar 
children that required children to be separated from their parents and home 
environment. The removal of the children from the work force had a serious impact 
though not only on subsistence production, but most of all on the transmission of 
traditional knowledge and cultural values from parents to children. For example, it is 
while working in the chakra that the major part of female knowledge, both technical 
and symbolical, is transmitted from mother to daughter. One day when I worked with 
Hilda Mukucharn in the chakra in the Mukucham village, she said that "we [the 
women] have been given the control and knowledge over the chakra and most of its 
products by Nunkui [the earth spirit] and this knowledge has passed down from mother 
to daughters for generations" (H. Mukucham 2004). This quote illustrates why men 
cannot tend and harvest the crops--it was the women who made a pact with Nunkui and 
it was the women Nunkui (through her daughter) gave fertile power to make the plants 
and the game grow and reproduce (see Perrechon 2003). This knowledge is thus lost 
when the children are separated from their parents and placed in missionary schools. 
Thus, the centros and boarding schools became major centres of acculturation. Indeed, 
the Salesians aimed to make the Shuar Christian and to change thereby the religious 
world-view of the Shuar by creating a new 'regime of truth' (Foucault 1980) 
concerning what it meant to be Shuar. To the extent that being Catholic and attending 
mass was henceforth identified as quintessentially Shuar, 'traditional' signifiers such as 
the sacred waterfalls, tsantsa, the use of Ayahuasca for the practice of rituals and the 
drinking of chicha were regarded as outmoded and even non-Shuar. The Salesians thus 
regarded themselves as being entitled to decide who is a Shuar and what Shuar cultural 
identity meant. Luis Chumpi (2004) from Mukucham village recalled missionary 
schooling: "What many youngsters leaned in the missionary schools was that the Shuar 
formerly lived in misery because we were lacking essential knowledge about virtually 
everything, such as clothing, work, proper behaviour, and of course religion". 
While seeking to eliminate pagan signifiers of Shuar identity, the Salesians nonetheless 
assisted the Shuar in the creation of the first Shuar federation, Federacion 
de Centros 
Shuar, and educated individuals who became dominant in that organisation and its 
successor FICSH (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the 
Salesians published a series of 
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books, Mundo Shuar, written by missionaries and volunteers originally used for 
teaching in Shuar schools and colleges. These books covered a wide range of issues 
from hunting techniques, gender relations, myths, to culture and ethnohistory. 
Ironically, these works have helped Shuar youngsters to learn about 'traditional' 
customs and myths, thereby re-emphasising Shuar cultural identity, albeit unevenly and 
in ways not intended by the Salesians. 
Recent efforts to re-assert Shuar cultural identity have thus inevitably been partly a 
matter of reversing prior acculturative practices of outsiders such as the missionaries. 
For example, an important aim of FICSH has been the promotion of Shuar education, 
notably through a series of radio schools oriented towards bilingual education that 
utilises both the Spanish and Shuar languages. Overall this initiative has supported the 
values of distinctive Shuar practices and language skills. These schools established 
standardisation in teaching, which, besides having the result that every child is taught 
the same subjects, also "allows Shuar children to transfer from one centro to another 
without noticeable detriment in terms of the child's progress" (Salazar 1977: 39; 
Perrechon 2003). 
Indeed, the bilingual programme was organised by the federation as a way for the Shuar 
people to gain access to previously denied educational opportunities, as well as to 
promote cultural pride in and through Shuar language. This program run by FICSH has 
evolved into permanent bilingual schools in many Shuar centros today providing a new 
focus for the modem construction of Shuar cultural identity. Lauro Kuja (2004), a 
teacher in Ijinti, explains, "The bilingual educational program has enabled our children 
to learn about our cultural values and the meanings and practices of Shuar traditional 
life". 
Not surprisingly, Shuar teachers are a high status group in Shuar society. With their 
knowledge of and capability in handling both Shuar and mestizo culture, they have 
become de facto community-level interpreters of the conflict between Shuar residents 
and the state-backed oil companies. If a teacher is so inclined, 
he, and they are usually 
he (see below), can easily become a leader of the centro where he is working and even 
obtain posts within the Shuar federations. All of the presidents of the 
federations and 
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the associations to date have been educated in mission schools and trained as teachers. 
For the Shuar, they represent an alternative way of acquiring knowledge and power, 
distinct from the traditional methods, and complete with knowledge gained of the wider 
political culture. This is the case of Bartomele KuJa, who has been a leader of the 
centro Shinkiatam, and is currently working as a President for AsociaciOn Taisha: "As 
a teacher I had the opportunity to learn about the political situation in Ecuador and how 
the Government seeks to implement oil development projects in Shuar territory. I then 
understood how this would pose a threat to our culture, identity and territory". In short, 
the teachers play a key role in processes of cultural re-vitalisation that are vital to wider 
political mobilisation. 
Yet, in 2004 there was only one woman, Rosa Shakay, occupying a post as a leader in 
FICSH. Perruchon (2003: 150) argues that "the teachers who have obtained the leading 
posts in Pachakutik are invariably men, the technicians are men, and only 25 percent of 
the bilingual teachers ... are women". The majority of the Shuar men are positive 
towards the participation of women in projects, but only if they (the men) can be sure of 
keeping control over family decisions (Barrera and Trujillo 1997). Ironically, parents 
often complained to me about their daughters' unwillingness to attend school because 
they preferred to marry instead. For example, Armando Chumpia (2003) from the 
village of 1jinti (see Figure 4.5), explained to me how "it is very important for my 
daughters to go to school in order to continue their education". This case points to the 
fact that there is no simple explanation for why girls do not have the same level of 
education as boys. Apparently, it is not always the parents who oblige the girls to 
marry, but the girls themselves who see no point in education since they are going to 
marry anyway. It is rather a structural problem in society which, on the one hand, does 
not usually offer advanced jobs to Shuar women (who are doubly stigmatised as women 
and as Shuar), and on the other hand, does not enable Shuar women (and most men) to 
continue studying at higher levels because of the high costs of school attendance. 
The role of education in shaping Shuar cultural identity thus remains ambiguous. An 
optimistic view sees Shuar education as a modemising project in which the Shuar 
federations try to emulate the results of Western schools and where children can be 
easily moved from one settlement to another. Salazar (1977) sees the positive aspects as 
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predominant: the schools prevented the children from leaving their homes for an 
extended amount of time (as was the case with the missionary schools), they made 
education accessible for more Shuar children, and they represent an effort to protect 
Shuar cultural values, belief systems and language. And yet, fewer children were 
learning Shuar as the first language despite this system. 
These school-based efforts need to be situated in the wider context of regional upheaval 
and change that has served to fragment any sense of a unified Shuar cultural identity. 
Consider, for example, those Shuar who have borne the brunt of development 
intrusions over the years. Thus, those who live close to large settlements or towns are 
often poor and surrounded by mestizo settlers from the highlands who earn a living 
from cattle ranching. The forest is cut down, wild animal populations are decimated, 
and fish supplies are depleted. The result is that here local Shuar lose 'traditional' links 
to the land and must instead scramble for work in nearby towns. Almost inevitably, the 
Shuar language and cultural values are changed here to a greater extent than in those 
communities more removed from such developments. 
There is also the process whereby some Shuar are seemingly happy to go along with 
cultural assimilation. Many younger people (often educated by missionaries) do not 
challenge the outsider instigated changes in Shuar cultural values that transform what it 
means to be a Shuar. Many have welcomed the transformation of their culture under the 
influence of the missionaries and mestizo colonisation, in spite of what they have heard 
from their elders about the negative impacts of these processes on Shuar language and 
customs. For example, Paulo (a pseudonym, 2004), a young Shuar man who 
lives 
outside Puyo, stated that "I have been educated in Spanish speaking schools since they 
provide a better education than our own Shuar schools and with this education 
I am 
able to live and work in Puyo. I can now buy American-styled clothes, use the 
Internet 
and eat in restaurants" 
Clearly, the sense of being a 'Shuar' has changed over the years. 
Yet, this does not 
necessarily mean that people have lost their 
Shuar identity in favour of a 'mestizo' 
identity (Perruchon 2003). For example, cattle ranching is seen by many young 
Shuar 
as a 'traditional' cultural practice, 
in spite of it being introduced by missionaries and 
138 
state agencies (see Chapter 6). Through the colonists and the Salesians (who provided 
the Shuar with loans and other types of support for cattle ranching), some Shuar came 
to have a positive view of the missionaries, cattle ranching and outside development in 
general as they became reliant on outsiders as the main source of income. New 
economic opportunities are linked in complicated ways to shifting notions of being 
'Shuar' 
In fact, most Shuar people have long been active in both embracing and resisting new 
cultural values. Despite changes in clothing and life-style, though, the Shuar do exist as 
a distinct cultural entity, not least according to themselves. There has never been an 
uncritical acceptance of all aspects of development, rather a strategic use of external 
resources, with some critical consequences. As stated by one Shuar villager: "Money 
and modem education, yes, are necessary in order to organise, travel, communicate, and 
unify our people. But we have everything we need to survive in the jungle. First we 
need to defend our territory, manage our natural resources well. We only need money 
and modem education for training and communication" (G. Sando 2004). The question 
of how to maintain cherished aspects of their culture and identity, while simultaneously 
obtaining some of the benefits of modem healthcare, education, communications, 
technology and market opportunities, remain a common concern among the Shuar 
people. 
The question of how to respond to the advances of the oil companies and their impacts 
on Shuar cultural identity thus fits into a wider process of ongoing reflection about 
modem development and the role of the Shuar therein. For some, such as Luis 
Mukucham (2004), an elder from Mukucham. in Pastaza (see Figure 4.5), the message 
was clear: "We, as the base communities, are the ones that have to do most of the work 
in the areas of culture, health, education and development. And we must also be careful 
of not becoming too dependent on foreigners and their development funding". Yet, 
for 
others, especially those already integrated with outsider-controlled 
development, the 
path ahead is less clear-cut. Thus, one Shuar man argued anonymously: 
"The 
federations [FICSH and FIPSE] receive funding from foreign organizations but the 
money never reaches the communities rather the 
leaders keep the money for 
themselves. We have now turned to the oil companies and they 
have promised to help 
us with monetary and development assistance". 
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As this last statement suggests, the practices of the oil companies have thus affected 
Shuar communities as some individuals and groups have decided to negotiate while 
others remained opposed to these firms. This has created strong tensions among the 
Shuar over cultural identity- a topic to which we now turn. 
5.3 Divisions among the Shuar 
The elaboration of the Shuar federations has been one of the most significant socio- 
political processes in Shuar lands (FICSH was created in 1964 and FEPSE in 1990). 
Two other significant institutional changes simultaneously occurred: 1) increasingly 
assertive Salesian and Evangelical missions that engaged with Shuar people through 
development work, and 2) the growth of a non-govemmental organisation (NGO) 
sector. Both of these actors have encouraged federations, albeit often for different 
reasons. What is important for our discussion here is how each of them fostered a 
discussion of the rights of indigenous people as being equal to those of other 
Ecuadorians and/or rights designed to protect a distinctive Shuar cultural identity- 
generally, how these actors set in motion a process whereby federation and local 
community cultural views might diverge. 
The elaboration of the Shuar federations has resulted in part from the significant 
support of these external actors. As noted, the Salesian mission helped with the 
establishment of the Federacion de Centros Shuar in the area in order to counteract 
colonisation and land-grabbing. However, the Shuar federations have also increasingly 
received support from national and international NGOs, such as Centro Derechos 
Economicos y Sociales (CDES), CARE, SNV (Netherlands Development 
Organisation), and Pachamama. For example, Pachamama and SNV have provided 
technical and economical support in a joint initiative to the Shuar and Achuar 
federations in Morona Santiago designed to develop and coordinate strategies for the 
defence of both the Shuar and Achuar territory against the threat posed by Burlington 
Resources and the Ecuadorian state (H. Koster 2004). David Elliot (2004), who is 
working for Pachamama in Quito, stated that the organisation's primary roles are 
"to 
provide access to technical expertise and 
funding to support them [the Shuar and 
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Achuar] with the design and implementation of a variety of projects". The project aims 
include: 1) Developing sustainable economic enterprises based on the renewable 
resources of the land; 2) Capturing and recording traditional knowledge and supporting 
the empowen-nent and revitalization of traditional indigenous education and healing 
practices; 3) Strengthening the ability to defend indigenous lands against outside 
encroachment, including demarcation, mapping, and legal work to secure clear title to 
land; and 4) Supporting initiatives that strengthen their governing federation and its 
leadership. 
Given the power of international NGOs in particular, the Shuar federations' agenda was 
soon influenced by the perceived concerns of these actors. We saw earlier how the 
Shuar played up their role as stewards of the environment (see Figure 5.2). There was a 
clear interest in funding opportunities here. Thus, some Shuar federation leaders soon 
realised that it would be easiest to receive funding if they chose to create projects and 
strategies that suited Western ideals and agendas and as communicated conveniently 
through workshops, conferences and small meetings held in offices in towns. Some of 
these strategies, however, were unrelated to the original ideas of the Shuar movement, 
and rather reflected new ideas of the Shuar movement and its leaders that both provided 
new opportunities and new sources of division among the Shuar. Yet, by focusing on 
participation in national politics using Western-style organisational strategies, 
federation leaders have only seen how local community participation has tended to dry 
up with serious consequences for both them and local communities. 
One clear example here can be seen in the case of the Comite InterfederaciOnal. While 
this entity was not entirely an initiative proposed by the NGOs, it nevertheless emerged 
from an assembly meeting funded by international and national NGOs with the aim of 
making it easier for them to support the legal and political strategies of the Shuar and 
Achuar people (Comite InterfederaclOnal 2001; CDES 2002d; Pachamama 2001 a, c). 
Yet, such political and organisational practices have structural implications for project 
outcomes and for indigenous politics. The transformation of grassroots initiatives 
into a 
new way of organising indigenous politics has tended to create problems among 
Shuar 
communities and the federations. Indeed, even as the 
Shuar movement gained strength 
by using new political and legal measures supported 
by their NGO backers, it soon 
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became clear that the movement was becoming removed from the Shuar communities 
themselves. The Shuar movement had started as a land-based initiative responding to 
the threats to Shuar land from colonisation and other development projects. Yet, the 
recent trend has been to move away from this legacy in keeping with a more NGO- 
influenced agenda 
Problems have also ensued as Western ways of organising have replaced traditional 
ways of operating in Shuar society. Decision-making before was made by consensus 
through public assemblies where all community members (at least in theory, the women 
were often silent in these meetings) could debate ideas and strategies. Luis Kuash 
(2004), thus recalled, "We had assembly meetings where every community member 
was able to have a say and debate livelihood and cultural issues. If there was a problem, 
the whole of the community [would] go together to resolve the issue". Decisions were 
made during informal visits among heads of households or by a community vote in 
assembly meetings. Yet, this set of practices is now often replaced by decision-making 
made in more formal settings including federation -based meetings in the main towns. 
True, local assemblies persist and their role in community-based decision-making and 
the election of leaders can still be important. However, today, more and more of the 
decision-making takes place in small concentrated meetings in the towns with only the 
leaders working for the federations present rather than in the communities through 
communal meetings as before. Indeed, many Shuar leaders today spend most of their 
time in the towns working in offices, using mobile phones and travelling to other parts 
of Ecuador or even abroad. When they visit the communities they remain there for a 
short amount of time, mainly to participate in meetings or workshops, and when they 
approach local people they are no longer seen as being part of a community-based 
indigenous movement but rather as being the connection to national and international 
actors. Estaban Anguisha (2003), of the Naparuk village, bitterly complained: 
"Our leaders never visit the communities, they rather stay in the towns where they 
are working and living comfortably. They receive large amounts of money 
from 
international organisations that should be for the communities, but we never see 
any sign of this money. We also never find out about the meetings or about any of 
the decisions that are taken in such meetings". 
142 
Furthermore, assembly meetings tend to be dominated by those who control the most 
resources and who have connections with influential outsiders, notably in the NGO 
sector. One Shuar villager (anonymously) confided to me in 2003, "We want to search 
for another alternative, how to [best] develop our community, with our own decisions. 
This must be done through the participation of everyone. If there is a small group of 
leaders only making the decisions then they do not represent the interests and beliefs of 
the Shuar communities". This statement suggests how villagers' approaches to political 
and social problems can often be quite different from that of federation leaders who are 
formally there to represent their interests. My fieldwork emphasised again and again 
that the former rather speak about cultural traditions, traditional knowledge, mythology 
and livelihood concerns than of the 'Western-style 'political discourses utilised often by 
the latter. 
Still, Shuar leaders are an in difficult position since they derive power today precisely 
from their position as intermediaries between Shuar communities and powerful 
outsiders. On the one hand, federation leaders have to respond to a complex process 
related to the experience of national expansion and economic development, along with 
the new possibilities to receive political and economic support from their international 
allies. On the other hand, Shuar residents in the interior have not entirely accepted the 
federations' ideas. In Shuar leaders' speeches, a great deal of time is devoted to 
questions of legitimacy- both for themselves and for the political system on which that 
position is based. In fact, they are often divided as to how to best represent the interests 
and expectations of their people in the light of the demands of external actors such as 
national and international NGOs. Certain exasperation can be noted. For example, 
Adolfo Shakay (2004), a Shuar leader working for CONFENAEE, stated that "Contact 
with Western culture has not changed the ways I view social relationships" and 
he 
frequently reminds the Shuar residents that "I too am Shuar and I think as you do". This 
quote suggests Shuar leaders cannot ignore 'traditional' Shuar values and 
beliefs even 
as it attests to certain vulnerability on their part in relation to the people they claim to 
represent. 
Although they speak of laws and rules that are part of the political process they want 
Shuar residents to accept, leaders repeatedly remind villagers that they are 
Shuar and as 
such also find those rules difficult to 
follow. And yet, differences on over cultural 
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identity are sometimes even manifested in the different rhetorical styles of villagers and 
federation leaders. Just as the former tend to evoke an image of 'traditional' values, 
culture, and collective power, the latter usually evoke an image of a new political order 
in which authority is culturally legitimised by newly representative legal institutions. 
Many of the issues addressed here are therefore related to the apparent transition from 
one political order to another, and therefore reveal the complex conflict of ideas present 
in communities, that are subject to ongoing cultural and political change. 
A growing sense of social distance between Shuar federation leaders and Shuar 
villagers became clear to me when I met Gonzalo Nantip, a former FICSH leader, in 
Sucua in May 2004. Like most federation leaders, he had some formal education, 
acquired at one of the Salesian mission schools, and he had been active in the 
federation for many years. Dressed in collared shirts and carrying a mobile phone in the 
FICSH office where we had arranged the meeting, Gonzalo asserted the need for 
further investment in his federation. Yet, at the same time he seemed, to me at least, 
quite removed from the livelihood concerns of community members in Mukucham and 
Shinkiatam where I had been based. Moving his briefcase aside, Gonzalo explained: 
"We are from FICSH, and as elected leaders we understand the realities of our people. 
We are searching for ways to pursue community development". He viewed the Shuar as 
poor and desperately in need of development: 
I have seen how the Shuar people live in the communities and how they suffer. I 
live here [in Sucua] and I live well. But out there [in the communities] there is so 
much need and we need help and projects for development: The role of our 
federation is to represent community sentiments to the outside world" (G. Nantip 
2004). 
However, Gonzalo had not been to the community in several months and some of his 
interpretations about what community members there wanted in terms of policies on 
development and oil exploitation conflicted with what I had just heard from community 
residents. Thus, while he said: "We [the federations] practice community involvement 
in awareness -raising and with it comes 
involvement in decision-making. We need to 
coordinate activities together with NGOs and other outsiders to receive national and 
international aid in order to stop the oil industry and support the base communities. 
That's the only way to oppose the oil companies", residents in the villages told me: 
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"Today the federations are not practicing community participation, there is no 
community involvement. I mean that we lack democracy on decision-making, on 
the distribution of funds, and on the sharing of power. They talk about 
participation and community involvement but they do not involve the 
9 communities' . 
When I participated in a meeting in Puyo organised by the Comite Interfederacional in 
March 2004 that was organised and financed by Pachamama with technical assistance 
from SNV, I made a similar observation. Indeed, this meeting took place in a hotel 
outside the town and the only participants at the event were the leaders from the 
committee itself. It was a high profile event yet it was inaccessible to community 
people. The Shuar living in nearby communities did not even receive any information 
about this particular meeting. As Gonzalo Tseremp (2004), a young leader from 
Mukucham stated, 69 we never found out about this meeting and the resources used for it 
should rather been used for community development". He continued, "Why can our 
leaders live these rich lives in the towns, and participate in these meetings when our 
communities are poor and have nothing? " Indeed, a lack of communication goes hand 
in hand with a growing resentment of the 'rich lives' seemingly lived by their elected 
officials. This is a recurrent concern here. The introduction of the federations into 
community life has presented the interior Shuar with a different image of Shuar life. As 
noted, federation-based leaders rarely visit the centros and when they do they arrive in 
aeroplanes, wearing fine clothes, and bringing gifts. Their wealth is not attributed to 
'traditional' community knowledge and power but to formal education and the ability 
to conduct business with an array of powerful and wealthy outsiders. 
Thus, Shuar leaders are not always considered to represent either the wishes or the 
interests of the communities. Indeed, some villagers even claim that leaders are 
corrupted by the money they have received. Jorge Taki (2003) of 1jinti village, bitterly 
said, "our leaders use the funds for personal use or as benefit from privileged 
associations, often linked to the families of the leaders working for the 
federation 
[FICSH], and the benefits never reach the bases further away and in more need of 
help". Now FICSH is the largest formal representative of the Shuar people in relation to 
the government, development organisations and NGOs. And yet, 
in 2000, the majority 
of the leaders of FICSH came from just one centro 
(Chiguaza in Morona Santiago), and 
it was claimed by many community residents that 
Chiguaza received a disproportionate 
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share of projects and resources as a result. The other communities that were not so 
privileged were unhappy with this situation and people felt that FICSH had no interest 
in their problems. I even heard rumours that some leaders within FICSH had 
apartments in Quito, received huge wages, cars and other luxuries. For example, Silvia 
Tibi (2002), a Shuar woman living in Puyo, sharply argued "our leaders live in the 
towns and get wages from the foreign organizations. This is money that should go to 
the development of the communities, not into the pockets of a handful of leaders that do 
not even visit our base communities". 
While some of these wilder claims are probably untrue, what is nonetheless significant 
is that these accusations are made at all. These statements show how much distrust 
there is between the communities and the leaders working for the federations. In the 
end, it would appear therefore that the new organisational approach of the Shuar 
federations has ironically hindered the formation of a coherent indigenous movement 
among the Shuar based on a uniform cultural identity. As Shuar leaders become 
gatekeepers between Western NGOs and the communities that they wish to assist, more 
and more energy is spent on attracting funding, meeting and reporting requirements less 
of assisting local communities. The leaders of the Shuar federations are now thus trying 
to maximise the gains of these local movements by bringing them into a national and 
international network. Yet, the political legitimacy enjoyed by the Shuar federations 
was in the first place constructed gradually, through the forging of dense networks 
linking local communities, such as Shinkiatam, with regional federations, national 
indigenous organisations and international NGOs. But tensions are now the norm, as 
resources and divisions grow reflecting the complex politics surrounding the 
articulation of Shuar cultural identity today. 
5.4 Summary 
In significant ways, indigenous organisations have utilised discourses of cultural 
identity in strategic ways in order to influence political agendas, access financial and 
institutional resources and obtain territorial and resource rights. The Shuar federations' 
discursive mobilisation of cultural identity has been no exceptIon. What is of concern 
though, is how this seems to have created material and symbolic 
distance between 
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indigenous leaders, who manage identity discourse at the regional and national scale, 
and the residents of local communities, whose conceptualisations of identity seem to 
differ. Whereas much of the political discourse of organisations such as the Shuar 
federations revolves around abstract notions of political identity and ethnic nationalitN,, 
the concerns of self-identification in local communities are often based in everyday 
practices of production and consumption as well as relations to the natural environment. 
This chapter has thus assessed the reciprocal links and tensions between politics and 
culture in the construction of Shuar identity in an age of proposed oil development. The 
Shuar federations have been quite successful in some respects in forging a modem and 
even powerful strategic movement steeped in the assertion of Shuar culture. And yet, 
that 'culture' is hotly contested, not the least by local Shuar residents increasingly 
disaffected by the perceived 'alien' lifestyle of federation leaders. And yet, culturally- 
based strategies do not exhaust the array of ways in which Shuar federations interact 
with local communities as well as with powerful outsiders in their quest to assert Shuar 
autonomy. Indeed, as the next chapter shows, issues of territory and place are also quite 
crucial in that quest. 
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Chapter 6 Territory and Place 
This chapter examines the process of Shuar community land-based mobilisation and 
how the Shuar federations have incorporated ideas of territory and place into their 
political actions. Chapter 5 demonstrated how indigenous organisations have utilised 
discourses of cultural identity in strategic ways in order to influence political agendas. 
access financial and institutional resources and generally advance Shuar rights. 
Meanwhile, in Chapter 7, we will analyse how resource conflicts have moved centre- 
stage as oil-related development challenges notions of 'community' oriented 
development. As will be seen there, Shuar people have resisted powerful state and 
corporate actors notably by asserting alternative community management schemes. 
Here, though, the focus is on the geographical building blocks of the Shuar struggle- 
specifically territory and place. Control over territory is the key political motivating 
force of Shuar mobilisation. Processes of territorial control and associated land-based 
conflicts are central to Shuar strategies of resistance as a reaction to oil development 
projects. As will become clear, moreover, territory has even come to play an important 
role in the formation of Shuar cultural identity itself thereby highlighting the interfinked 
nature of the issues and concepts analysed in Chapter 5 to 7. 
This chapter is organised in the following manner. First, it situates conflict over Shuar 
territory in a larger context of changes in Ecuadorian state policies that simultaneously 
precipitate local conflict and new opportunities for local political action. Second, it 
examines how Shuar leaders work with communities to elaborate a sophisticated and 
multi-faceted strategy of territorial defence. Third, it is necessary therefore to unpack 
how a local sense of place is understood by different actors. Here, we will consider 
place-based relations in several communities. This discussion leads on to an 
examination of how different senses of places evolve representing potential micro- 
power shifts relative to territorial initiatives. By exploring the process of 'placing 
culture', for example, we examine how more than one sense of place in Shuar territory 
can co-exist as well as how one of them may prevail through territorial initiatives. 
Finally, we examine how local place-based opportunities are asserted and how outside 
organisations influence the outcome of 'alternative' territorial initiatives. 
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6.1 Territorialization and Land Conflicts 
In this section, the aim is to situate Shuar conflicts at the heart of this thesis in the wider 
context of state policy shifts related to notions of territoriality and territorial control in 
Ecuador. The Ecuadorian state is following a well-worn path in extending and 
intensifying its use of territorial strategies of resource and population control (see 
Chapter 2). It has increased its capacity (and willingness) to deploy violent means of 
land-use control, in part due to its involvement in the global political-economy and 
associated high stakes export-led growth strategies based on oil exploitation 
(Bebbington 2001; Sawyer 2004). The state has fully taken over the administration of 
rights to land in the hitherto 'peripheral' Ecuadorian Amazon region, the Oriente, 
through obligatory registration of land titles, a process that was initiated in the 1960s 
and intensified in the 1990s (see Chapter 4). The territorial definition of land has been 
expressed via a series of land codes regulating property ownership on indigenous lands 
and committing the state to surveying and mapping the entire territory of the Oriente to 
establish firm boundaries of land control (Perreault 2001; Sawyer 2004). 
In theoretical terms, the nation-building project of the state is seen to be derived from 
the configuration of its territorial and political sovereignty over space and the 
monopoly of the means of violence and physical control therein (see Chapter 2). With 
regard to the 'construction of space', the nation-state relies on certain technologies and 
rules such as cartography, maps, census data as well as the physical integration of 
territories (by means of transport, education and colonisation projects). As such, 
Ecuador has divided its territory into economic and political zones, rearranging people 
and resources within these zones, while creating regulations to control how these local 
resources can be used (Radcliffe 2001b). As noted in Chapter 2, mapping has defined 
the territory, thus maps play a central role in the implementation and legitimisation of 
territorial rule. ' 
A brief overview of Ecuadorian territorialization demonstrates the varying yet 
persistent agenda of state control of land and resources in the Oriente. 
Different 
institutions have been charged with the task, and their relationship with the state has 
1 The map has been central to this process as it 
inscribes and marks objects but also as "a little machine 
for producing conviction in others" (Rose 
1999: 37). 
149 
been at times contradictory. Nevertheless, a specific spatial imaginary has been central 
to the development of the Ecuadorian nation-state (Radcliffe 2001b). In the 
establishment of state territoriality, the state has used different land reforms, 
development initiatives and mapping projects to guarantee geopolitical control, to 
overcome localism, to control international borders, and to provide a sound basis for 
development planning. As noted in Chapter 4, the Oriente was increasingly represented 
in state discourse in the 1960s as a core area in state territorialization --'Ecuador was, is 
and will be an Amazonian country' became the slogan of the Ecuadorian state. 
Although the region was undoubtedly shaped by geopolitical concerns, there was 
nevertheless an extensive effort by both military and civilian regimes of that time to 
overcome profound development problems facing the country. 2 
While in the process of nation building, the Ecuadorian state has attempted to instigate 
affiliations and structures of feeling of nationalism among its citizens (Radcliffe 
2001b). These structures are profoundly geographic, based on popular sense of 
geopolitics, knowledge of 'national landscape' (Smith 1991) and a recognition of the 
national map (Anderson 1992). Geographic imaginations and tools can thereby provide 
the basis for the "collective internalisation of a territorial identity" (Escolar et al. 1994: 
352). As argued by Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 12), "States play a crucial role in the 
popular politics of place-making and in the creation of naturalised links between places 
and people" . Through 
its discourses around an Amazonian development, the 
Ecuadorian state has attempted to generate an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) 
united by a primary affiliation to the nation-state. In this way, it is possible to explore 
how territoriality enters into the constitution of regulatory practices and political 
strategies, and indeed into the creation of particular sorts of governable spaces (Braun 
2003). 
As neoliberalism. was adopted in the 1990s, the Ecuadorian state developed a more 
aggressive discourse and set of practices for the control of the Oriente. Thus, it 
elaborated a market-driven contest for land and resources by introducing legal changes, 
2 As noted in Chapter 4, the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law encouraged colonisation of the 
Oriente since the 
region was considered uninhabited and in need of economic transformation. 
To facilitate colonisation, 
the Government passed the Law of Fallow Lands in 1964 thereby declaring uncultivated 
lands 
uninhabited and hence available for colonisation. 
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such as the 1994 Agrarian Development Law, which provided that all land could be 
placed on the open market, thereby transforming Ecuadorian agriculture. As noted in 
Chapter 4, this legislation superseded the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law established thirt\, 
years before and was designed to rapidly 'modernise' the country through neoliberal 
reform. What is of interest here is the territorial consequences of the new legislation for 
the Shuar. 
The new land reform built upon past policies insofar as lands deemed as 'unproductive' 
were taken over by the Ecuadorian state who could then benefit from the sale or use of 
these areas. This measure has jeopardised in turn Shuar titles to communally-held land 
in the Oriente. Many of these titles had originally been granted to the Shuar federation 
under Ecuatoriano de Refonna Agraria y Colonizacton (EERAC) (see Chapter 4), but 
were now no longer recognised as legally valid by Instituto Nacional del Desarrollo 
Agrario (INDA). In contrast to past policies, property rights to land were granted by 
INDA which now had the power to divide and re-allocate 'reduced' plots of land. Thus, 
Shuar lands are increasingly being sold to outsiders or allocated to Shuar families for a 
variety of reasons thereby fragmenting Shuar collective land control and culture 
(Perruchon 2003). These plots are mainly found close to the towns and along the roads 
where the pressures to buy and sell land are the greatest. As a result, the Shuar have 
sought to secure title to their land claims by 'productive' activities: clearing forest for 
cattle pastures, commercialise agricultural production and other development projects. 
This strategy has indeed proved successful for many Shuar in securing a land base for 
their communities as well as in developing economic activities that enhance 
livelihoods. Yet, 'buying-into' a state-led territorialization and development package 
has also had adverse consequences. 
The case of the Shuar community Chuwitayu is such a case. Chuwitayu is situated close 
to a road that runs from Macas to Puyo in the southernmost part of Pastaza (see Figure 
4.5), where cattle ranching, agricultural production and cash-crop production 
have 
increased especially rapidly in the last decade. Here, many Shuar families have 
developed proposals for acquiring individual land titles linked to subsequent 
development for cattle ranching activities and cash-crop production (for example, cacao 
and coffee, see Chapter 7). Thus, at a meeting which 
I attended during my fieldwork in 
the area, Calixto Kuash (2003), the community's 
leader, asserted his right to acquire 
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private land titles: "With the help of new legalisation we can develop and acquire 
economic progress and legal titles for our land to increase commercialisation and direct 
market involvement". Similarly, Calixto's son, Manuel Kuash, (2003) asserted in the 
same meeting: "Now we [the Shuar] can own our own land or even sell our land to 
colonists. Many communities here in the [Pastaza] area have started doing this since 
they need money". These sort of statements were mentioned by other residents as well 
and are interesting since they show a strong interest in the economic benefits to be 
derived from acquiring or even selling land among Shuar villagers. 
The spread of cattle ranching has occurred even in 'remote' parts of Shuar territory. For 
example, Shinkiatam was formed in 1990 as a way for Shuar communities to access 
and safeguard land and it also had the crucial function of regulating access to 
communally-held land titles as well as mediating land disputes among community 
members and neighbouring communities (M. Tupuki 2004; L. Kuja 2004). This 
community was until recently surrounded by forest. However, in the last decade cattle 
ranching has increased rapidly there (as well as the rate of deforestation). One resident 
thus told me that he now had sixty cattle, while another one owned about twenty-five 
animals. This is not uncommon today in villages such as Shjnkiatam. This change 
became evident when I walked with Lauro Kuja and his brother Than from Taisha (a 
military base in Morona Santiago) to Shinkiatam, a four-hour trek into the rainforest, 
firstly along a dirt road and then on small clear-cut paths. I had stayed earlier with their 
family in Shinkiatam while undertaking research. The road that we walked along had 
been built in the year 2000 to provide access to a port that has been constructed on the 
Rio Panki in order to link local communities to the Taisha military base. It has also 
thereby facilitated increased colonisation of the region, greater market access, rapid 
cultural change (a point made in the discussion of cultural 
identity in Chapter 5). When 
I asked Lauro about this, the answer was unequivocal: 
"We need to clear the land in 
order to acquire legal titles to it, but cattle have also proven to 
be the most profitable 
source of income for our communities" (L. Kuja 
2004). 
The issue of Shuar commercialisation will be discussed 
in Chapter 7. Here, it is 
important to understand how the Shuar 
have changed their understanding of land and 
private property as a practical response to the 
land reform described above (in Chapter 
4). Moreover, it demonstrates that the Shuar who live in areas where 
land and 
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agriculture have become highly commercialised, have started to favour official land 
titling, as a means to ensure individual and collective development. In particular, it has 
heightened the Shuar's need for land in as much as land titles are used as security for 
loans even as the Government has increased its capacity to carry out threats to 
dispossess those without legal documents (Sawyer 1997). These changes have 
convinced many people of the absolute need to obtain land titles if and where they can, 
albeit at the cost of the local environment as well as 'traditional' activities. 
Thus, this process of land re-allocation and associated cornmercialisation of agricultural 
production has notably had positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, some 
Shuar have secured legal titles to their communal land. As noted by Cesar Chumbi 
(2003), who lives in Ijinti (close to Chuwitayu) beside the road from Puyo to Macas 
(see Figure 4.5) and where I conducted fieldwork in 2003 and 2004, "Our family 
moved away from the interior to establish Chuwitayu to enable our family to gain 
economic progress and to generate an income. This land now belongs to us after we 
acquired legal titles to it". 3 This is a positive development, as seen from these villagers' 
point of view. However, on the other hand, Shuar land-based practices have been 
drastically transformed in the process. For example, Jorge Taki (2004), who also lives 
in Ijinti, argued, "Chuwitayu has lost the connection to our ancestral territories. The 
state granted it the land, which originally belonged to the Kuash and Mukucham 
families, and now the land is transformed by cattle ranching and clearing of wood". 
This was borne out by my own direct observations. Thus, when I visited Chuwitayu, 
most men in the community were involved in logging activities to generate further 
income for their families. As one of these men explained this activity "substantially 
enhanced my family's income" (C. Kuash 2003). This case exemplifies the conflicting 
processes regarding land reforms and privatisation of indigenous land that 
have shaped 
Shuar communities with increasing force in recent years. 
Further, the 1994 Agrarian Development Law corresponded to the Hydrocarbon Law 
passed in 1993 by enabling large-scale settlement of remote areas, the creation of vast 
3 Four generations ago, Chumbi Kuash, the father of Luis Kuash who was mentioned previously, 
moved 
away from Shiram Pupunas and became primarily responsible 
for the establishment of Chuwitayu, which 
is situated about three hours walk from Shirarn Pupunas. 
According to EERAC rules, dividing Shiram's 
territory into smaller plots for 'legitimate' forms of development was the 
basis for legally creating 
Chuwitayu. Today, the Kuash family inhabits a large percentage of this 'communally' 
held Shuar land. 
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infrastructure networks, and large-scale expansion of oil development in the Oriente. 
With oil revenues to hand, Ecuador engaged in a number of measures intended in part 
to create an inclusionary nation-state. Oil-based development permitted the extension of 
state sovereignty over the territory for the first time in modem era. In fact, oil 
development became crucial for Ecuador's wider efforts to 'modemise' and 'develop' 
in the global economy and it was the key component of the government's larger 
national scheme- the 'Apertura Ecuador 2000'- and the subsequent round of oil block 
leasing (the ninth round announced in 2000) that was discussed in Chapter 4. At the 
heart of this plan to accelerate oil development was an ambitious attempt to redefine 
territorial understanding of Ecuador's Oriente through what I call oil-based 
territorialization. 
The state-designed oil block concession map most clearly illustrates this (see Figure 
4.2.3). First, the map shows how mapmaking is inherently a political practice and a tool 
used to control land and people. As such, the state gave each oil block a juridical name 
and a title (for example, block 24 in Shuar lands) that bore no resemblance to how 
indigenous people delineated their territories, let alone divisions between people as well 
as their multiple indigenous authority structures that themselves drew upon prior 
legislation administrated by IERAC. Dr. Bolivar Beltran (2004), a lawyer working for 
The Institute for Science and Interdisciplinary Studies (ISIS) argued that "the oil 
concession blocks do not represent indigenous territorial jurisdiction, local authority 
and land-use practices". Rather, they were established merely as means for the 
Ecuadorian state to 'open up' new Amazonian areas, including Shuar territory, for oil 
exp oltation. 
Second, the map demonstrates how oil-based territorialization misrepresents 
local land- 
based practices and thereby transforms the landscape. The land that now 
'belonged' to 
the Ecuadorian state, and subsequently through privatisation to oil companies, such as 
Burlington Resources, was in fact part of Shuar society long used and managed by the 
latter despite being still thickly covered the forest. Mario Melo (2002), of Centro de 
Derechos de Economicos y Sociales (CDES), observed that the Borja administration 
thus "reallocated land titles to meet oil industry plans but which 
bore no resemblance to 
pre-existing culturally and politically 
defined territorial divisions". A territorial vision 
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predicated on oil development was simply superimposed on the complex territorial 
markers that 'defined' Shuar lands (see below). 
Following on from this, oil-based territoriality clearly did not correspond to Shuar land- 
use patterns or understandings of land management. Alfonso Mukucham (2004), from 
Mukucharn community, simply observed in this regard that "the land blocks are ours, 
and we make this land live". He was here referring to the processes by which the Shuar 
managed multiple landscapes. For generations, for example, extended family networks 
had maintained their selva (primary hunting and subsistence grounds) and their chakra 
(managed forest and hunting grounds) near the communities. The forest has thus played 
an integral role in creating the local landscape. What the Shuar call land, la tierra, is 
explicitly related to locally-based cultural practices and the way the Shuar use and 
manage local natural resources. Indeed, it is very much a humanised environment 
where families living in multiple homes that are spread over the landscape shape the 
species content, distribution, and diversity of the forest through planting and selectively 
tending of the vegetation. These places thus emerged from historical relations of land 
use and management of local resources (discussed in more detail below). Patricia 
Kuash Vargas (2003) of Ijinti argued: "You know, the land is ours and theirs too [i. e. 
the state]--not solely theirs. For generations we have maintained the chakras near our 
communities, thus we also claim this land". This observation nicely shows how Shuar 
residents considered part of the INDA defined oil blocks to be within 'traditional' 
Shuar territory (C. Tupcac 2004; C. Jinpikit 2004). 
As such, oil-based territoriality contravened both the spirit and practice of the area 
since the state chose to ignore indigenous perceptions of place and land in favour of 
geometric lines and shapes devoid of any sense of place. Oil-based territoriality is thus 
about the erasure of Shuar notions of place and territory as a pre-condition for the 
smooth exploitation of oil. Bosco Najandey (2004), one former leader of FEPSE thus 
observed, "All these new oil blocks and creation of new territorial boundaries are 
causing a lot of confusion and disruption among our people. Our land cannot be bought 
and is not for sale. It belongs communally and collectively to the Shuar people". 
indeed, according to many Shuar leaders, the oil concession blocks were ultimately 
intended to divide the indigenous people, undermine 
local solidarity, and erode 
embedded cultural practices of living within the 
landscape. In effect, oil-based 
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territorialization shows how 'govemability' was changing within the Ecuadorian 
nation-state and what contradictions may lay therein. 
Inevitably, the new policies promoted by the oil block leasing rounds have provoked 
crises of governance and accountability in Ecuador and have encouraged new political 
actions by indigenous groups. The Shuar federations' strategies that have already been 
initially treated in Chapter 5 were responses to these processes occurring in my research 
area. More specifically here, policies designed to expand oil production and open up 
Shuar lands for oil exploitation instigated antagonism between the Shuar and state plans 
predicated on the subversion of locally meaningful territorialities. 
Nevertheless, attempts to define an oil-based territorialization have not managed to 
eliminate local people's geographical imaginations. Indeed, another form of 
territoriality is being increasingly asserted in Ecuador, notably by those indigenous 
people directly affected by the state's resource-driven territorialization. They have 
challenged state-centred notions of a unified and homogenous space thereby creating 
new spaces through which to express notions of 'alternative' citizenship, community, 
and identity (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996; Radcliffe 2001a). Thus, state territoriality 
in Ecuador is a highly contested space, with indigenous groups generating different 
mappings and images of national space. As the state has increased its' capacity for 
enforcement, though, conflicts have erupted between state agencies, oil companies and 
indigenous communities. As a result, although the Ecuadorian state has increased its 
capacity to implement oil development projects, success has been far from certain. 
Resistance to oil-based territoriality has been reflected in a series of meetings held in 
Shuar territory. To take but one example, it was the focus of a meeting held in 
Shinkiatam in October 2002 that I attended. Here, Shuar leaders stressed the adverse 
social consequences of the state-imposed vision of oil-based territoriality and bitterly 
denounced the neoliberal reforms that underpinned such territoriality (Comite 
InterfederaciOnal 2002). A statement directed to the participants in the meeting 
outlined the assembly's objectives: "By the means of this assembly, the Shuar people 
are exercising our legitimate right to voice our opinion and to decide what will 
happen 
on our lands, especially in respect to oil development. 
We will not allow oil 
development to start" (P. Antuash 2002). Similarly, Sandu Kuamar (2002) asserted: 
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"This event aims to present the government and the oil company [Burlington 
Resources] with the conditions necessary to guarantee socio-cultural and environmental 
security and the defence of land and natural resources in Morona Santiago". These 
4 conditions' did not include the subversion of Shuar notions of territoriality by oil- 
based territorialization. 
Oil-based territorialization was seen to be as nonsensical as it was lethal to Shuar 
interests. Thus, Francisco Sandu, a former FIPSE President, showed an old map of 
Shuar lands which are now located in Morona Santiago province on a large sheet of 
paper at the October 2002 meeting (see Figure 6.1). He pointed out major rivers 
running through the area, located each community represented by FIPSE, and then also 
demarcated Burlington's oil concession. He then repeated words that I was to hear 
many times during my stay in the region: "Petroleum does not only affect one 
community, it affects all of us and our territory. The Government has divided our 
territory into blocks. But these blocks make no sense" (F. Sandu 2002). Francisco thus 
strongly criticised the government's position, even saying that it had no right to make 
oil claims in Shuar territory. He added: "Oil has brought environmental degradation to 
much of the Oriente, and protection of oil interests through militarization of oil- 
producing areas has helped stifle our efforts to understand or resist oil activities on our 
lands" (F. Sandu 2002). Certainly, oil development and ensuing colonisation facilitated 
by new road networks has meant an increasing loss of control over Shuar lands and 
livelihoods notwithstanding the case of Shuar families that have adapted to change 
discussed above. As a result, they have suffered most of the negative impacts while 
enjoying few of the benefits of that development. 
4 
4 Suzana Sawyer (2004) argues that given the imbalance of power, especially between state/oil interests 
and indigenous people, and the lack of enforceability of 
land agreements on the companies, the 
indigenous people have been unable to ensure the protection of their interests 
during oil development. 
She basis this claim on research carried out elsewhere in the Oriente than that area covered 
in this thesis 
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Source: CARE 2003 
The politically fraught nature of the oil blocks was also emphasised. Thus, Pedro Tsere 
(2002), a leader of FICSH said, "If we begin to defend these land blocks, there will be 
conflict. If we allow for divisions within Shuar territory, we will be divided. We 
demand that we get recognition as a people, as a nationality, as a people whose 
ancestral territory is one". This statement was interesting since it exemplified a recent 
shift in the focus of the Shuar federations, in particular by FICSH, which privileged the 
articulation of nationhood and territorial boundaries according to ethnic nationality 
based on processes discussed in Chapter 5. Here, is important to see how Shuar leaders 
consciously meshed ideas of territory and ethnic nationality. 
Pablo Tsere made this clear to me in an interview in the federation's office in Sucua in 
February 2004. Pablo emphasised that "Shuar nationality and the construction of a 
Shuar nation are important components in our strategies for territorial defence". He 
added, "Territory belongs collectively and integrally to our pueblo [people] as a 
nationality. It cannot be bought or sold, it is not an economic status of wealth and 
possession, in which property-regimes can over-lap and co-exist, yet over which a 
specific nationality hold the control" (P. Tsere 2004). This statement shows how Shuar 
leaders here increasingly demanded the legalisation and autonomous control of the 
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Figure 6.1 Shuar territory 
ancestral territory of the Shuar and that this territory should be granted to the Shuar as a 
nationality. 
Thus, FICSH has attempted to strategically link territory and nationality to its own 
strategies. Here, it has sought to propagate a view of the Oriente as the well-defined 
territory of specific indigenous people each with their own unique national identity 
based in turn on place-based cultural identity and ancestral domicile. In fact, most 
FICSH leaders defined themselves as 'members of the Shuar nationality' and 
discussions of identity largely centred around membership in an ethnic nationality and 
occupation of ethnic territory (but not the villagers, see below). This territorial vision of 
the Oriente as a land comprised of ethnic nationalities is of course designed to 
challenge the vision of an empty resource-rich 'frontier' epitomised in oil-based 
development. 
The promotion of Shuar nationhood as part of the strategy of territorial defence is also 
clear in FEPSE's wider initiatives of territorial defence. This can be seen in a document 
produced by FIPSE in 2003 entitled Project IiNunke (Our territory): 
"Territory is the primordial base for the survival of the Shuar nationality that 
guarantees socio-economic, political-organisational and cultural development. 
More than signifying the physical and material aspects of a region, territory for 
the Shuar encompasses both the moral -cosmological and the political- 
organisational complexes that shape identity and social relations" (FIPSE 
2003: 1). 
This statement strategically links the ideas of nationality, territory, culture and political 
autonomy, a conceptual linkage central to the discourse of pluri nationality. It serves to 
legitimise indigenous claims to territorial and political autonomy by interlinking 
cultural identity and place. According to Shuar leaders, indigenous territory was both a 
practical and imaginable realm, extending over a specific geographically bordered 
national 'space' characterised by a variety of specific place-based cultural identities, yet 
in which a distinct overall nationality held sway. In particular, territory became the 
primary political idiom of social and cultural identity that promised self-determination 
over Shuar territory--something that was simultaneously a key component in the 
process of ethnic nationality building. As such, territorial defence has emerged as key 
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strategy among Shuar leaders in their struggle to fend off the threats posed by state 
sanctioned oil territoriality. 
The discussion so far has shown how Shuar leaders in particular conceptuallse territory 
through discursive and political articulations. Anger among Shuar leaders led to a 
common strategy to defend Shuar territory against the oil companies resulting in the 
landmark Shuar mobilisation of August 1999 and the subsequent court case that were 
discussed in Chapter 5. What is important to stress here is that this mobilisation 
organised by FIPSE was the culmination of a long and on-going struggle to defend 
Shuar ancestral lands. In particular, the actions taken by FIPSE between 1998 and 2000 
strategically sought to reconfigure the material, political and symbolic meanings of land 
and territory in Ecuador, in an attempt to re-define the terrain upon which future 
struggles among state, corporate and indigenous actors would take place. Indeed, these 
high-profile indigenous actions were crucial in helping to focus indigenous opposition 
to state-sanctioned oil development (Falconi 2001; Garzon 2002). Yet, they also built 
on a decade of smaller-scale mobilisations by the Shuar to acquire legal titles to 
ancestral lands. Together, then, these multi-scale strategies helped to define indigenous 
opposition in a territorial idiom. The issue of Shuar territorial rights was thereby 
highlighted as an issue needing of attention. 
In attempting to understand the ways in which the Shuar here mobilised to defend their 
lands and livelihoods in the face of state-sanctioned oil-based territoriality noted so far, 
it is essential now to look at the different elements of land based claims and territorial 
defence developed by the Shuar. This chapter will thus next focus on how the Shuar 
federations elaborated initiatives for the defence of Shuar temtory to better understand 
how the Shuar emerged as a movement critical of oil-based territori alization- -all with 
an eye to the geographical articulation of Shuar struggle. 
6.2 Elaborating a Territorial Defence 
My first encounter with the Shuar occurred during my preliminary fieldwork during 
2002 when I visited Morona Santiago and the Shuar federations FEPSE and FICSH. 
Community leaders had founded the federations (FICSH in 1964 and FIPSE in 1990) 
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because they believed they needed their own institutions to advocate for cultural 
autonomy and land rights (see Chapters 4 and 5). They also hoped the federations 
would serve as a catalyst for local people to design and implement their own 
development programs and gain legal titles to their lands. From the beginning, the 
Shuar federations thus organised base communities to work for legal title to community 
lands notably via federation-designed projects that encouraged agricultural 
development (for example, cattle ranching and cash-crop production). 
The federations rapidly generated much enthusiasm with local people who had long felt 
marginalised and discriminated against. As one Shuar community member typically 
remarked: "We have been discriminated against since the first Spanish arrived, that is 
500 years of marginalisation. As a result, we organised our communities into the 
federation since we needed a tool to defend our lands, culture and livelihoods" (L. 
Kuash 2003). As Chapter 4 highlighted, this vision is a reaction to a history in which 
the state has usurped control over indigenous lands and resources both to assert its own 
notion of territorial control and national identity, as well as to promote new economic 
activities. 
Given this political activism, it is surprising to note that it was only in the late 1990s 
that the concept of territorial rights and its defence emerged in the region as a formal 
basis for building the Shuar struggle. Indeed, vigorously promoted thereafter by Shuar 
leaders, territoriality soon became crucial to the political strategies of the Shuar 
federations and was a decisive element in the development of the Shuar movement as a 
whole. In particular, the importance of defending Shuar territory has been linked by 
Shuar leaders to the enhanced threat posed by outside actors, such as the Ecuadorian 
state and Burlington Resources via their oil-based territorial plans. 
For Shuar leaders, territorial defence can only make sense if it is part of a wider 
recognition of the role of the Shuar people in shaping the social, cultural, spiritual, 
political and natural conditions of their lands. That recognition is not compatible with 
oil-based territorialization. Bosco NaJandey of FIPSE stated at an assembly meeting in 
Makuma in Morona Santiago, in March 2004, for example, "currently, Burlington holds 
the concession for oil block 24. But our only wish was that the oil companies would not 
start working within our ancestral territories, the oil 
does not simply affect just one 
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community, many of us manage this land and our lives will be adversely affected by oil 
activities"). Pablo Tsere (2004) of FICSH meanwhile linked the sense of Shuar 
territoriality more widely to the struggle against all unwanted outsider interventions 
when he observed: "We defend our territory so it cannot be manipulated by other 
political interests, or by the colonists, or any other group of people that can damage our 
organisation. This is the reason why we need to strengthen our organisational strategies, 
to be united, to maintain our own politics, and to defend our territory". These 
statements were typical of those made by federation leaders as they sought to mobilise 
Shuar communities. Above all, they demonstrate that territorial defence has emerged as 
a key component in the process of Shuar strategizing. 5 Confronted by new pressures on 
local natural resources and associated 'land grabbing' in the region, the Shuar had to 
quickly develop new strategies to defend their lands, such as the legalisation of 
community land and the definition of a collective sense of territory among the Shuar. 
Simultaneously, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Shuar have learned about the effects of 
oil development from outsiders such as national and international NGOs. CDES, 
Pachamama and SNV in particular assisted in the defence of the culture and territories 
of the Shuar people in Morona Santiago. Pachamama's representatives, Maria Belen 
Paez and David Elliot were thus in attendance at the March 2004 meeting in Makuma. 
Maria asserted there that "though you are in the middle of the forest, you are not alone. 
Your struggle is not isolated. We will support you to build further strength and success 
in your campaign". David continued: "Pachamama will assist in strengthening the 
ability to defend indigenous lands against outside encroachment; including 
demarcation, mapping, and legal work to secure clear title to land, and support 
initiatives of the federations that strengthen the territorial defence". 
Project II Nunke (Our territory) is a good example of this kind of federation-led 
initiative that has been developed to assert collective territorial rights (see Figure 6.2). 
It was first developed by FIPSE in 1997 but only finalised in 2002. This project 
included a proposal for the Ordenamiento Territorial Indigena (POT), which is an 
integral part of legally-mandated Circumscripcion Territorial Indigena (CTIs) and is 
5 Territory is here also deployed as a reason for enhancing the position of the federations themselves in as 
much as one of their central tasks was now clearly one of territorial 
defence. 
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based upon the assertion of collective rights in indigenous territories. 6 The project thus 
incorporated key legal components from recent official legislation (above all, the CTIs) 
to acquire collective titles for Shuar territory and thereby to control the natural 
resources and land within it (Pachamama 200 1 b). 




Source: FEPSE (2003: 2) 
Project Ii e First, 'Nunk' is interesting here for various reasons as seen from Figure 6-2. 
the project was clearly based on a strategy to obtain full legal standing for Shuar 
collective territory. As Manuel NaJandey (2002), a FIPSE leader stated: "The central 
aim of these efforts is to gain collective title to territory for us, the Shuar, as defined by 
Ecuadorian laws. It is possible by the communities, at least legally, to stop the 
continued encroachment of our lands and territory". For FIPSE, this included acquiring 
collective legal titles for the centros affiliated to the federation. While encouraging the 
acquisition of collective titles to Shuar land, it also sought to promote local "cultural 
identity, strengthen ancestral claims, enhance self-determination and protect the 
resources of the region" (FIPSE 2003: 1). 
Second, H Nunke became a centrepiece around which FIPSE leaders would organise 
other political activities in reaction to increasing threats from the oil industry. As noted 
in Chapter 5, FWSE organised new political and legal strategies to defend Shuar 
cultural identity and collective territorial rights in the face of impending oil 
exploitation. In fact, H Nunke became the core around which the federation intensified 
6 As noted in Chapter 4, Article 84 of the National Constitution recognises distinctive collective rights 
related to indigenous territories. Most importantly, CTIs provides the legal means for indigenous groups 
to acquire legal collective titles to their lands and the fight to maintain their own organisation, 
jurisdiction and authority (Article 224 and 241 of the National Constitution). 
7 Note though that Article 247 of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution preserves the state's claim over 
subsoil resources, including oil. 
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its community mobilising activities by organising court battles, demonstrations and 
civil disobedience actions (for example, sit-downs and blockades of construction sites). 
Francisco Sandu (2002), former FIPSE President stated: "Since more oil concessions 
are likely to come, it is critical that we develop a program for the defence of Shuar 
territory to illustrate how we can manage and control our ancestral territory". Similarly, 
Rafael Pandam (2002) asserted: "The project was designed to promote an 
organisational strategy for the achievement of cultural, economic, social, territorial and 
political rights and the defence of natural resources and the environment against the 
threat posed by the oil industry". 
Third, with the assistance of CDES, Pachamama, and SNV, FFPSE leaders used the 
project ff Nunke to strengthen the organisational capacity of the federation itself 
(Pachamama 2002a). Harko Koster (2004), who is working for SNV, an NGO who has 
been assisting FIPSE in the elaboration of the project, asserted: "H NunU was created 
to contest the overall legality of land grabbing and encroachments by the Ecuadorian 
state and allied oil companies and to strengthen the organisational strategies of the 
federation itself'. Jose Serrano (2004) of CDES, similarly noted, "The aim of the 
project was to strengthen the territorial defence of Shuar territory and to elaborate new 
organisational, political and legal strategies to be able to legalise it". These project- 
linked strategies included media awareness, education, national and international 
lobbying, administrative functions and the development of GIS (Geographical 
Information System), in co-ordination with AmazonGISNet. 
The latter component is of particular interest here. Thus, the project involved the 
implementation of GIS systems as a means to systematically map Shuar territory based 
on local social-historical criteria and management plans. The main objectives here 
were: 1) to identify place-based cultural practices; 2) to define territorial boundaries 
based on 'traditional' Shuar knowledge; and 3) to encourage the participation and 
empowerment of local Shuar communities (Pachamama 2002c). Indeed, while mapping 
has been a tool traditionally used against indigenous people who had lacked the means 
to graphically depict the use of their territory, this type of initiative allows the Shuar 
federations to make their own maps thereby 'grounding' in cartographic form their 
alternative vision. To gain land titles or to define their own territorial vision, indigenous 
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federations, such as FICSH and FIPSE, prepare their own maps showing the extent of 
their land claims, thereby denying the validity of oil-based territorialization. 
By providing 'visual' proof of alternatives to oil-based territorialization and to state 
development projects that generally see the Oriente as an 'empty' space promising 
unlimited opportunities for development, these maps provide a distinct alternative to 
that organised by the state. Mapmakers in the Shuar federations are thus key actors in 
the realisation of Shuar projects for territorial defence in terms of finalising legal 
claims. As of 2005, these projects are still relatively new such there has been little 
concrete progress so far. However, they are likely to be vital tools to help Shuar 
communities to map their territory and thereby, it is hoped, to strengthen their ability to 
attain territorial aims. Yet, it is important to note here that many of the specific claims 
made by local communities are not fully incorporated into the project's mapping 
process. The process of community-based claims to land and resources will be 
discussed in detail below. Even so, in the process of elaborating alternative territorial 
projects, such as Ii NunU, such mapping helps to justify and thereby strengthen the role 
of the Shuar federations as essential intermediaries at a time when they have been the 
focus of some criticism, for example, see Chapter 5. 
Much of the energy of this project is specifically linked to the transformation of 
informal grassroots initiatives already discussed in Chapter 5. Indeed, H Nunke is not 
the only project elaborated by the Shuar federations for the defence of Shuar territory 
based on collective rights. For example, FICSH is in the process of defining a project 
for winning legal titles in its main areas of operation (see Figure 6.3, which summarises 
the main territorial areas of indigenous federations in the Oriente) for a collective 
territorial vision based on the provisions guaranteed under the CTIs. While still 
incomplete in 2005, it seems from early drafts that the proposal reflects much of 
thinking behind the processes and strategies that were incorporated in FIPSE's Ii 
Nunkg. 8 This is illustrated from a statement by Rosiendo Nunkias (2004), the main 
coordinator of the FICSH proposal: "The aim of the project 
is to defend the collective 
8 Given the early stage of the elaboration of the proposal, I was unable to acquire a copy of 
FICSH's 
project for legal titling of land in its main areas of operation. 
Here, I refer to data I obtained during 
interviews held with FICSH leaders. 
165 
territory of the Shuar people to protect our culture, identity, and livelihoods as well as 
the securing of our fight to self-determination and autonomous governance". 




The main difference, however, seems to be in how the projects should be implemented. 
On the one hand, the discourses that formed FIPSE-based project Ii Nunke were based 
around the aspirations to "acquire legal recognition for Shuar territory and a plan for 
the sustainable management of local natural resources" (FIPSE 2003: 2). Consequently, 
territory is thought of in terms of an articulation between socio-cultural forms of use 
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Source: Kristian Bjureby 2005 
and the natural environment in a place-specific locality. On the other hand, the FICSH- 
based project uses provisions under CTIs in order to "politically administer their 
ancestral territory ... and so that the Shuar can have their own authority to govern the 
territory" (R. Nunkias 2004). Thus, according to Rosiendo Nunkias (2004), the project 
aimed "to strengthen [our] collective rights and the ownership of [our] ancestral 
territory without contradicting national laws and politics". This statement reflects a 
visible political focus and an emphasis on local political autonomy and territorial 
defence. 
Much of the discussion so far has been concerned with describing different federation 
initiatives to illustrate their strategies and responses to oil-based territorialization. 
Initiatives for territorial defence are seen to be good by proponents in the federations 
because they articulate action plans devised notably by those who would be most 
affected by them--that is, by local communities themselves, albeit with federation input 
and guidance. And yet, they are still devised by the federations who, as we have seen, 
do not respond to all Shuar people judging by the criticisms discussed in Chapter 5. 
Shuar leaders have thus been blamed for using the projects for an alternative territorial 
vision to simply advance their own position within the national political system rather 
than representing the 'true' interests of Shuar communities (see Section 6.4). However, 
rhetoric aside, Shuar leaders still maintain that the projects are important Since "they 
promote cultural identity, strengthen organisational strategies, and enable the 
communities to gain legal title to their lands" (P. Pandam 2002). Above all, these sorts 
of alternative projects provide a sense of hope that the oil companies and the 
Ecuadorian state may finally need to respect the territorial rights of the Shuar as 
political momentum gathers behind the alternative territorial vision of the Shuar 
(even 
though the state has not yet recognised any territorial claims made by the Shuar 
federations as of December 2005). 
It is perhaps intuitive to suggest that federation-led projects will 
dominate claims to 
territory and land because they are the most visible nationally and 
internationally. 
However, as we will see, this is but one of several options open to 
Shuar people. We 
also need therefore to examine other types of place-based articulations. 
Such 
heterogeneity in responses needs to be grasped in order to appreciate the overall 
dynamics of initiatives for an 'alternative' territorial 
defence. First, though, it is 
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necessary to unpack how a 'local sense of place' is understood in the context of local 
place-based struggles. The focus here is on access rights to land and resources that are 
seen as to play a key part in the assertion of local sense of place as well as associated 
place-based opportunities. 
6.3 Asserting a Local Sense of Place 
The aim of this section is to understand how the Shuar people develop a local sense of 
place. To that end, and building on the theoretical concerns set out in Chapter 2, firstly 
we consider place-based relations in several communities where fieldwork was 
conducted. This leads us to an examination of how different local discourses evolve and 
how they come to represent micro-power shifts linked to altered land-use practices. 
Secondly, by exploring the power relations associated with 'placing culture', we 
examine how different local senses of place can and do co-exist as well as how some 
may be advantaged through association with federation-led projects for territorial 
defence. 
Chapter 2 suggested that local people develop and articulate highly specific experiences 
of 'living' in the context of a specific place. 9 These experiences may explain in turn 
local responses to territorial initiatives. The assumption here is that experience of place 
can be inferred by assessing how local people weave elements of their place-based 
experience into discursive struggles. Three communities will be examined briefly here 
now to explore how the place-based experiences of these communities have led to 
distinctive place-linked discourses about place, culture and identity. Such heterogeneity 
pf expression and ideas needs to be grasped in order to understand the wider links 
between local opportunities, place and territorial initiatives. 
The local experience of a place is first examined using the case of Naparuk in Morona 
Santiago. At an initial glance, there appeared to be plenty of resources at the 
9 Oslender (2004) examines recent mobilisations by social movements of black communities in 
Colombia. He draws both on the objective of place and the subjective feelings that are derived 
from 
living in a place to demonstrate how these have impacted on specific 
forms of organising adopted by 
black communities. 
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community's disposal (see Figure 6.4)10. And yet, this condition was scarcely reflected 
in how people described their life--descriptions that suggested an experience of place as 
one of loss and abandonment. A common view was thus that the balance of power was 
not in their hands such that they had to struggle to obtain from the land what was more 
easily obtained in the past. A local woman thus commented: "It is hard to catch fish and 
to hunt animals now because the oil companies have come and polluted the rivers and 
destroyed the forest" (M. Martinez 2004). If local people were keen to fight such 
depredations, they were nonetheless frustrated by the lack of outside support. Indeed, a 
key discourse here is one of the federations coming 'too late' to protect the community. 
As one community resident stated, "we hoped they [the federations] would come to 
protect our area from the oil companies, but so far we have not seen any help" (J. 
Anguisha 2003). Their sense of place was thus expressed in part as one of marginality-- 
forgotten both by federation leaders and outside officials: "We have no radio, so we 
cannot call for help, we have to travel to Santiago to use theirs [the municipal], but it is 
too expensive to go there" (M. Anguisha 2003). 
In the community of Mukucham, meanwhile, the experience of place reflected notably 
a 'reciprocating relationship' with biodiversity" that had been disrupted by outsiders 
(see Figure 6.5). Here, the discourse was one of holistic inter-dependent biodiversity 
being undermined by outside 'development'. Luis Mukucharn (2004) summansed both 
the interdependency and the loss when he said: "The land is our mother and our home. 
It is our sustenance for the indigenous peoples, our ecology, our fauna... it gives us a 
lot. The great oil companies must think about this: that if they destroy our forest, there 
will be no life. The Shuar will use all their strength to protect their lands and the lives 
of our families". Ilda Mukucham, one of Luis's wives, is an older woman who did not 
speak Spanish (one of her sons acted as a translator) but who likewise said, "Our elders, 
our grandparents have told us that la selva [the forest] and the land are the life force for 
us. Thank you I say to our elders, who have left us this great extension of land. It is our 
10 All the community maps that are discussed here are transcriptions of hand-drafted maps drawn by 
community residents during community mapping exercises that I took part in while staying in the 
communities. 
11 There are many ways to describe biodiversity depending on who is assigning the meaning and why. 
Multiple definitions of the term result from different sets of practices and therefore are subject to 
contested meanings (Escobar 1998). However, it is important to note in this regard that indigenous 
people themselves rarely use the term 'biodiversity'. It is rather an externally-imposed concept 
originating from a complex network of actors, such as international organisations, northern NGOs, 
environmental movements, scientists and prospectors to name but a few. 
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own and we do not need to search for a place to go. I hope we are able to defend our 
land, united here in Mukucham" (I. Mukucham 2004). Clearly forest and land are 
central points of reference in the articulation of place here. Further, such articulation is 
predicated on control and access as a key element in place definition. As Chapter 7 will 
further show, local senses of place are flexible and strategic too insofar as they 
incorporate outside protection concepts in order to combat oil-linked relations. 
There is also a sense of vulnerability and extemally-generated loss in the sense of place 
converged in the third Shuar community visited. Thus, in the case of Shinkiatam, place 
became a catalogue of losses: of hunted animals, degraded soils, destroyed forests, and 
so on (see Figure 6.6). As one resident lamented, "Since the oil companies have started 
working in the area, the animals have disappeared further into the forest and it is 
difficult for us to find game to hunt, the rivers are getting polluted so we cannot fish, 
and the soil is so bad so we can not grow juca and plantains as before" (Pedro Kuja 
2004). Others noticed, similarly, changes in species availability and the reduced quality 
of catches: "Before we could catch fifteen kilos of fish every day, but now if we are 
lucky we get one or two kilos, and high quality fish are now rare" (P. Himpikit 2004). 
In response, there was a protection discourse articulated that sought an immediate stop 
to all 'illegal' activities and urged the Shuar to "resist all oil companies" (B. Kuja 2004; 
M. Tupuki 2004). As one resident explained, "we must stop the oil companies from 
destroying the forest and polluting the rivers, we must conserve and sustain the balance 
in the forest" (R. Anguash 2004; Armando Kuja 2004). Here, the sense of place was 
expressed in terms of sustained access to resources and land for residents, but specially 
those in greatest need. 
The preceding discussion has provided brief snapshots of the possible meaning of place 
in three Shuar communities afflicted by the outside threat of oil development., 
2 All of 
these local senses of places had one important aspect in common--land was experienced 
as a common resource under threat from powerful outsiders. There were too a clear 
indication of how local senses of places were partly articulated as a reaction to the 
spread of oil-based territorialization. Given such a framing, these are seemingly 
implications as to how these communities react to federation-led initiatives for 
territorial defence and possible associated place-based opportunities. 
12 For more on local senses of place, see below. 
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6.4 Naparuk Community Map 
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6.6 Shinkiatam Community Map 
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It is at this juncture that the place-based anxieties of Shuar communities seem to 
coincide with the political interests of Shuar federations that are keen to harness those 
anxieties to the political mobilisation of indigenous people. Territorial initiatives can be 
seen in this way as ways of 'placing culture' through political boundaries and ancestral 
domain claims. Hence, this section will now turn to the consideration of how the Shuar 
federations in particular use 'placed culture' (i. e. place-based cultural identity) as a 
strategy to readdress uneven power relations and access to Shuar resources and land. It 
thus explores the context in which a national strategy of boundary politics and ancestral 
domain claims interacts with an already complex local situation to produce politically 
novel outcomes. 
The Shuar federations have strategically linked the defence of territorial tights to a 
firmly place-based cultural identity. This is very much related to a struggle over who 
has the legal right to dispose of resources that are seen to 'belong' to indigenous 
people. Thus, territory is based in the symbolic and material reproduction of place, 
which in turn is seen as a primary means of cultural identity. Shuar leaders have also 
drawn upon such linkages of territory and place to spell out and define Shuar territorial 
demands at the regional and national levels. Such an approach, which is not restricted 
to this particular movement but on the contrary can be applied to other movements in 
other regions, is of particular relevance here, as the Shuar movement has elaborated 
strategies for defending Shuar territory whose cultural politics are articulated around 
the defence of ancestral lands. Chapter 5 suggested that the formation of these 
strategies reflected cultural practices. Here, cultural practices are seen to be critical in 
determining the extent and importance of difference in the assertion of local claim to 
territory and land. 
The importance of the place-based cultural component in asserting land claims by the 
Shuar federations can be seen in a document written by the Comite InterfederaciOnal, 
the co-ordinating committee for FEPSE, FICSH and the Achuar federation Federacion 
Interprovincial de las Nacionalidades Achuar del Ecuador (FINAE). The document 
was a plan elaborated during a meeting in Puyo in March 
2004 with the aim of 
strengthening processes of territorial defence of the Shuar and 
Achuar people. It stated, 
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"The territory is not like a market, but the base for our identity. Without our 
territory the Shuar and Achuar are no Shuar and Achuar. Our livelihoods, 
spirituality, knowledge and culture depend on our territory. We talk about a 
development of our territory without any external imposition, a sustainable 
development, with a vision for our future generations" (Comite InterfederaciOnal 
2004b: 3) 
This statement is interesting since it links cultural identity and place by emphasising the 
cultural difference between how the Shuar [and Achuar] and 'outsiders' relate to land. 
Bosco Najandey, a former FIPSE President, thus explained that "the land and land- 
based resources the Ecuadorian state has given to the colonists and the oil companies 
have transformed the landscape and given them the 'right' to exploit our land and 
resources" (B. Najandey 2004). For these actors, a monetary transaction leads to a 
functional relationship to the land. In contrast, Bosco argued that land for the Shuar 
could never be a mere functional relationship. Rather it is a cultural I y-i n fused place 
where cultural integrity and identity is sustained and developed, and where "the 
ancestors always lived". Similarly, Luis Kuash (2003) told me, "We maintain our lands 
as Madre Tierra (mother earth) where we have lived and where we will be buried. 
Now, if the land does not exist, neither would we. For that reason we as indigenous 
people say that the land is our Madre Tierra and this is why we need to protect her". 
These representations serve to naturalise linkages between identity and place and 
discursively legitimise indigenous claims to territory. As such, federation leaders have 
articulated a political place-based cultural identity in order to make claims for Shuar 
territory. Here, we have a 'sense of place' that is precisely linked to the cultural identity 
and practices of local communities. 
The importance of the place-based component to Shuar territorial defence can also be 
seen in the FIPSE-led project H Nunke (initially discussed above). This project clearly 
emphasises the need to define borders according to culturally defined understandings, 
unlike state-sanctioned oil-based territoriality whereby borders are defined by state 
officials and oil industry experts. As Manuel NaJandey (2002) of FIPSE remarked 
about the latter: 
"The aim has been to locate new legal boundaries for state control of indigenous 
territories and to enable increased oil exploitation in the Amazonian region. It Is 
therefore only ignoring the concerns of the indigenous groups that live within 
175 
these boundaries, such as our cultural identity, traditional resource use and 
management and production systems. " 
In contrast, the delineation of territory as proposed in Shuar federation initiatives is a 
cultural process that is said to be based on the everyday cultural and material practices 
of Shuar communities. Thus, at one meeting held in Macas in March 2003, Francisco 
Sandu, FIPSE President at that time, explained that "the development of the project [If 
Nunke] arose from various workshops and assembly meetings in the communities, 
where we discussed the problems of acquiring legal titles for our ancestral lands and we 
elaborated proposals for how to defend our territory". This quote is interesting since 
here it shows how FIPSE leaders organised various meetings during the first phase of 
the elaboration of the project between 1997 to 2002 to "inform leaders and community 
residents about the importance of territorial legislation and the sustainable management 
local natural resources" (FIPSE 2003: 2). One aim too was to tap into local senses of 
place. Thus, for example, FIPSE organised an assembly meeting in July 1999 in 
AsociaciOn de Cuchaentza where community-mapping exercises were used precisely in 
order to document place-based cultural identity and the data obtained thereafter was 
incorporated in the proposal that became H Nunke. Thus, these mapping exercises 
sought to strengthen local people's claims and incorporate these into project proposals 
in the face of impending oil development. 
Here, it is important to emphasise the discursive and political work performed by Shuar 
leaders in defining a place-based cultural identity. This becomes clear when it is 
recognised that the concept of Shuar territory does not 'naturally' emerge out of long- 
standing practices of Shuar communities where rights to land are allocated in terms of 
such things as kinship, tradition of occupation or other cultural practices. Indeed, Shuar 
people usually consider themselves to be members of a local community first and 
foremost, rather than seeing themselves as members of an abstract territory as 
suggested in the discourses of political identity propounded by federation 
leaders. For 
example, Bartomele Kuja (2004) from the village of Shinkiatam stated, 
"Our ancestors and their families have lived forever in the forest. The territory is 
more than just the land, it is the trees, the animals, the rivers, the mountains, and 
it is the surrounding nature and territory of our people. Our territory embraces the 
mountains, such as Kutuku and the rivers, such as el Kanus (Upano). And where 
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we live, we identify ourselves as Muraya Shuar from the mountains, or Araullia 
Shuar or Tsumu Shuar from the lowlands" (B. Kuja 2004). 
Here, we have a sense of place precisely linked to its spatial significance to local 
people. Territory is thought of in ten-ns of an articulation between socio-cultural forms 
of use of the natural environment in a place-specific locality. Place is thus linked to 
specific rivers, chakras, and forests. Particular patterns of mobility, social relations, and 
use of the environment also mark these places, each involving a particular use and 
management of the territory. Territory is thus regarded as the space to satisfy the needs 
of the community in terms of spiritual, social, economic and cultural development. One 
resident passionately argued that forms of cultural practices reflect place-based Shuar 
understandings: "The knowledge of where to hunt, where to collect food, where our 
sacred sites exist, where the assemblies are held, are important for our culture and 
identity, as well as for local governance. The rules and regulations are simple, 
confirmed for the survival of our people" (M. Tupuki 2004). Territory is thereby linked 
to the material and symbolic importance of the land and to people embedded in highly 
place-specific local senses of place. 
These sentiments can clearly be seen in a community map (initially discussed above) 
drawn by villagers in Shinkiatam as a part of a FICSH-sponsored workshop held in the 
village in 2004.1 was part of the team that held this workshop. The map, illustrated in 
Figure 6.6, represents what the community deemed important locally. The map shows 
the forest (1a selva) and the river (el rio) as central features. It also shows in accurate 
detail the different locations of settlements, chakras, and other productive activities 
identified in relation to the river and forest. As the map illustrates, a local sense of place 
is articulated through a detailed specification of how people relate to and understand the 
local biophysical environment. The community map thus shows the close relationship 
that exists between local Shuar and their land. This attachment to the land is much more 
than simply a physical matter, however. These places are in fact a central point of 
reference in both identity formation and everyday material practices. 
It is a place out of 
which Shuar livelihoods emerge through an array of spiritual, economic, cultural and 
social practices. Such was Pedro Kuja's (2004) illustration of the 
importance of land: 
"The land is like our parents that educate us. It gives us food and it gives us clothing. 
From within ... there 
is the knowledge and science of the Shuar people. Because of this 
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we should protect her so she does not die". Life in Shuar territory thus meanders in the 
forest, along the rivers, and on the land to which the Shuar are attached, not only 
physically by their settlements and communication patterns, but also emotionally as 
they create a powerful sense of local belonging. 13 
It is only through such a perspective steeped in place that we can more fully understand 
the specific place-based cultural articulations of the Shuar federations. I am not trying 
to construct a 'romanticised' picture of Shuar villagers living harmoniously with the 
local environment here. Rather, it is to convey how local senses of place are created and 
simultaneously appropriated by Shuar leaders in wider political campaigns. 
Pre-existing political and economic factors shaped this process of 'placing culture'. 
Take for example the case of local political boundaries. These are negotiated through 
claims to Shuar ancestral domains and are of considerable importance. Thus, the Shuar 
federations now commonly use boundaries as a strategy to 'place culture' and thereby 
secure officially recognised rights to ancestral domains. 14 Shuar leaders have 
increasingly deployed more strategic forms of identity discourse in asserting ancestral 
domain claims by capitalising on, yet simultaneously transcending, many place-based 
community-level understandings to build claims on behalf of the Shuar people as a 
whole. How Shuar leaders have utilised political and strategic forms of cultural identity 
was discussed in Chapter 5. Here, we will see how the Shuar federations have further 
articulated these claims through a carefully selected set of discourses that reflect potent 
themes of the Shuar, notably as 'caretakers of the environment' and as descendants of 
ancient groups that have occupied the territory since 'time immemorial'. This is a 
complex process that involves identity representation at various scales to achieve 
multiple and overlapping aims and for a variety of national, international and 
indigenous audiences. The complex multi-scale initiatives are crucial elements in the 
wider territorial defence in that they build on the emotive power of place-based cultural 
identity while avoiding the 'Achilles heel of localism' that both state and oil 
representatives seek to exploit. 
13 See Lawrence (2002) for a comparable account from the Philippines. 
14 Hence, this section is mainly concerned with how the Shuar federations use ancestral domain claims as 
a strategy to readdress unequal power relations and shifts in resource and land use towards themselves. 
The following discussion presents some of the arguments made predominantly by Shuar leaders in 
promoting ancestral domain claims. 
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Once again, reference to my fieldwork experience in Shinkiatam is relevant here. By 
the time of the community meeting that I attended there in March 2004, Bartomele and 
his family had become important community leaders in Shinkiatam, also with links to 
FICSH. Bartomele was president of the AsociaciOn Taisha to which Shinkiatam 
belonged. "You remember when the Government recognised our territories the other 
year", Bartomele reminded me one day, referring to the 1999 court case against ARCO 
Oriente (see Chapter 5), well this recognition "is defined ancestrally and from this 
comes our customs, culture and identity. This is our ancestral land. Our ancestors have 
lived on these lands and our children will likewise do so". Bartomele continued, "This 
custom, our culture, our life and our identity, we can simply not live any other way. 
This is why the defence of Shuar territory is so important. This is our land and 
resources, which is related to our history [and] our history only" (B. Kuja 2004) Here, 
we see an effort to quite self-consciously draw upon ancestry in the Oriente in the 
formation of the specific claims related to the protection of Shuar ancestral lands. It 
was a sentiment that I was to hear again and again during my stay in the region (P. 
Tsere 2004; L. Kuash 2004). 
In this context, the Shuar federation FICSH has developed a program in 2003 entitled 
Componente de Recursos Naturales del Programa de Sostenibilidad y Union Regional 
(PSUR) which was assisted by CARE International and financed by USAID. CARE is 
an international organisation that aims to "improve social and economic conditions of 
inhabitants in the Third World" (CARE 2003). PSUR emerged as a backdrop to the 
effort to legalise ancestral territory and to protect local natural resources. According to 
CARE (2003) it aimed to assist local Shuar communities, notably through four 
programmatic components, namely: 1) Income generation; 2) Social services; 3) 
Natural resource management; and 4) Local government strengthening. This 
programme formed a part of a broader effort therefore to strengthen the ancestral claims 
to place embedded in Shuar mobilisation. 
The program was based upon various legal measures that are guaranteed under the 1998 
National Constitution and the ELO Convention 169 that provided the basis for Shuar 
actions related to ancestral domain claims. As noted in Chapter 4, Article 84 of the 
National Constitution recognises distinct collective rights related to indigenous 
territories, including recognition of ancestral knowledge, and the right to consultation 
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when the state wants to use natural resources within indigenous territories. Most 
importantly, CircumscripciOn Territorial Indfgena (CTI) provides the legal means for 
indigenous groups to acquire legal collective territorial titles to their ancestral lands, 
and the right to maintain their own social organisation, jurisdiction and authority 
(Article 224,228, and 241 of the National Constitution). Finally, the ILO Convention 
requires governments to respect the importance of ancestral territory, in terms of 
spiritual and cultural values, which characterise the indigenous people's relationship 
with the territories and lands which they occupy and particularly the collective aspects 
of this relationship (Article 6 and 15). 
Thus, the Ecuadorian state recognises (at least in theory) that indigenous people have 
the right to their ancestral lands. As such, the 2003 program draws upon these legal 
measures to explicitly outline a plan for defending Shuar territory and the local natural 
resources. FICSH stated in the 2003 project proposal: 
"The project aims to defend [indigenous] territory from a historical and present 
perspective, which understands and develops the tradition and the history of 
resistance of indigenous people as ancestral inhabitants of these territories, and 
their aspiration to maintain and develop a different and alternative project" 
(CARE 2003: 1) 
This 'different and alternative project' is materially embedded in the ancestry of the 
Shuar people, but also draws upon new articulations, such as those related to the 
protection of local natural resources. Indeed, this articulation of ancestral domain 
claims reflected a general belief that, for indigenous people, questions of local rights 
and conservation are linked. As has been noted in this context with reference to 
indigenous politics in general, "historically, they have managed to protect their 
ancestral domains thereby protecting also biodiversity" (Bennegan and Lucas-Ferrian 
1996: 156). What is important is the emphasis on 'sustainable' management of natural 
resources. The argument is that the Shuar must be in charge of the resources on which 
they depend since they are seen to be 'protectors' of local natural resources. This view 
is returned to in Chapter 7 in the context of a discussion of alternative community 
resource management. Here, it is crucial insofar as we have seen how the Shuar 
interpret conservation in relation to precise place-based practices and beliefs. Thus, 
Shuar leaders working for FICSH, for example, have stated, "While encouraging 
sustainable resources use, FICSH will promote local cultural 
identity, protect traditional 
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resource use and strengthen ancestral claims" (P. Tsere 2004). In practice, therefore 
these processes aimed to assist Shuar people to strengthen their collibined role as 
caretakers and protectors of the rainforest. 
Without doubt, concern for the environment has played an important role in articulating 
ancestral domain claims as well as protecting locally-based cultural identity in Morona 
Santiago. By the time of my field-based research in 2002 and in 2003 to 2004, the land 
that the Shuar inhabited was not merely described as that area within Ecuador that was 
east of the central Andes. Nor was it the 'jungle' terrain of conquest and possession of 
old. Rather, it was described by indigenous actors as the space in which the indigenous 
people had lived "since ancestral times and which is tropical rainforest" (D. Nayap 
2004). This quote shows how Shuar leaders based their claims on both ancestry and the 
lived space in the tropical 'rainforest'. Similarly, these types of arguments are visible in 
a PSUR document: "Our territory contains a great diversity of plants and animals, 
because our traditional life has not destroyed the forest" (CARE 2003: 18). Thus, the 
program aimed to protect Shuar culture at the same time as protecting the natural 
environment. 15 
This is strategically important in as much as international conservationist groups have 
identified places such as the Oriente as places of high biodiversity under threat of 
destruction. Their sense of place is here notably interpreted as a discourse centred on 
the idea of 'hotspots'. As noted in Chapter 2, a specific place can become imbued with 
certain inherent values, meanings and qualities, such that biodiversity becomes 'placed' 
(Wilson 1999). For Shuar leaders, the perceived need to frame ancestral domain claims 
in relation to the biodiverse forests underpinned federation actions from the late 1990s 
onwards as part of a broader attempt to gain crucial international economic and political 
support for their cause (see also Chapter 5). This came as a direct response to the 
increased interest by national and international NGOs in the plight of both indigenous 
people and tropical rainforests. 
15 Article 248 of the National Constitution states that the state has the right over biodiversity, natural 
reserves, protected areas and national parks. Its conservation and sustainable use must involve the 
participation of affected [indigenous] people, however. 
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Shuar leaders, moreover, recognised that their historical connection to Amazonian 
landscapes was strongly influenced by a history of conquest and exploitation by 
outsiders. As noted by former FICSH vice-president Gonzalo Nantip (2004): "The 
rainforest has been an attractive source of riches for the state, large companies and 
colonists, for example lumber, land, mines and now oil. For other groups, the 
exploitation of these riches has meant wealth and the source of their fortunes but for us, 
the Shuar, it has meant genocide". As noted in Chapter 5, this historical inequality has 
strongly informed the Shuar's cultural identity and their resolve to achieve some degree 
of self-determination via ancestral domain claims. 
Thus, the main objective of PSUR is to delineate and document the Shuar customary 
land boundary, thereby helping to preserve place-based community culture and 
knowledge. As stated by Pablo Tsere (2004), "PSUR can support our communities by 
incorporating their domain claims into planned management zones thereby shifting 
power relations in the area that currently favour transnational corporations who acquire 
land and resources for oil exploitation". This statement clearly shows how threats of 
encroachment into Shuar ancestral land led to demands by the Shuar to delineate their 
political boundaries through ancestral domain claims. Thus, by placing their land 
boundary according to ancestral domains, the Shuar strategically retain access to the 
land. Ten communities 16 were using this strategy in FICSH-temtory at the time of the 
fieldwork and they have had varying degrees of success in changing local power 
relations and discussion. 
This section has briefly illustrated diverse local Shuar senses of place shaped by 
unequal power relations between communities and federations based on differing 
notions of place, but that might nonetheless provide an opportunity for political 
progress. It is the nature of possible opportunities that we now turn. 
16 These communities are all applying for a certificate of ancestral domain 
but still have not received one 
as of December 2005. However, the applications are 
being processed through the system with the hope of 
approval (R. Nunkias 2004) 
182 
6.4 Local Place-based Opportunities 
The concern in this section is to examine how Shuar federation-led projects have 
affected opportunities to assert a local sense of place as part of a wider territorial 
defence strategy. Selected examples relating to 'alternative' territorial projects are used 
to illustrate negotiated shifts in place-based relations and how, in turn, these may relate 
to local place opportunities. Significantly, and building on findings from Chapter 5, 
federation-led projects have tended to rely on the intervention of outside organisations 
to assist local people to assert opportunities- -with an array of associated ambiguities 
and tensions. 
The first example relates to the PSUR project discussed above. Here, we see the 
strategic use of ancestral domain claims as a placing of cultural responsibility for 
biodiversity that attempts to take back from state agencies and transnational 
corporations what (it is asserted) has not properly been managed by them. The example 
of the project PSUR suggests that local people may need outside assistance in the bid to 
shift entrenched and unequal power relations between indigenous people and the 
Ecuadorian state and transnational corporations. And yet, the federation-led assistance 
did not ultimately square with local community perceptions of what needed to be done. 
Thus, for example, for all ten communities, the suggested domain boundary was not 
culturally defined in that the domain claims are limited to the EERAC recognised 
community-titled land and thus reflected what officials perceived the community 
boundary to be rather than what community residents perceived and to be in keeping 
with their ancestral land. Shuar villagers here have a sense of dismay, notably as the 
claim embodied 'modem' notions of land ownership. Yet, traditional 'ownership' rights 
were not transferable: as a Shuar elder from Yaupi commented, "how can you own 
something that lives beyond you? " (Rafael, a pseudonym 2004) The dilemma faced is 
that Shuar villagers recognise the threat from outsiders; as an elder stated, "once the big 
corporations came to take our land, we will move further back into the forest" (L. 
Chumpi 2004). By placing their ancestral domain claim around the community, the 
villagers hope to retain access to the aforementioned boundary--even if it does not 
really correspond with their own perceived domain. 
183 
Yet, federation and state 'allies' appeared to neglect such sentiments. During a 
community mapping activity held in Yaupi, for example a Shuar elder had asked 
FICSH and CARE representatives for a separate activity for their community land to 
enable the villagers to reassert their responsibility over the entire area of their ancestral 
lands by having it at least acknowledged in the proposed protected area. However, the 
6 official' map produced by the federation and CARE did not reflect this more expansive 
local claims. In 'placing culture' in this way, Shuar villagers have typically had to 
compromise their sense of place by fitting into a fairly rigid context acceptable to 
outsiders. 
The second example relates to the H Nunke project also considered earlier in this 
chapter. It shows how the Shuar federations have used 'alternative' territorial initiatives 
strategically to defend Shuar land in a way designed to see off outside exploiters of 
local resources and land. Project H Nunke was thus considered to be critical to solving 
local place-based conflicts. As a Shuar leader stated, "It is the last hope to protect our 
lands and resources. Our project has stopped the oil companies from entering our 
territory to start exploiting for oil" (M. Vargas 2003). This project has been successful 
in bringing together Shuar leaders to defend a territorial vision that has also been 
elaborated and strengthened by the support of national and international NGOs. Such 
territorial clarification also weakens the ability of state and corporate agents to divide 
and rule indigenous people. 
Yet, it is becoming increasingly clear that the upshot of such temtofially-framed 
opposition was mixed and has generally created tensions between the federations and 
communities. The new ideas of a collective territorial vision articulated politically by 
federation-leaders in the context of It NunU do not necessarily mesh with those 
advocated at the community level. As Lauro Kuja (2004) a community resident from 
Juralpa noted, for example, "the energies of the Shuar federation for territorial defence 
were directed almost exclusively towards extra-local political agendas, which in turn 
undermined what local people had already achieved on the ground". He referred here to 
how many Shuar communities had already developed community-based actions to 
acquire legal title to their lands as a means to hinder the entrance of the oil companies 
but had seen these local efforts overshadowed by federation-led initiatives. Not 
surprising then, community participation in Il Nunke and other territorial 
federation 
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initiatives soon declined. Indeed, by the time I left Ecuador in June 2004, some Shuar 
community residents had already complained to me that their leaders had all but 
disappeared from the communities and that the outcomes of federation-led projects was 
generally not representing the 'true' interests of the communities. 
A picture is thus emerging among the cases and issues discussed so far of leader- 
villager relations where the latter distrust the former on some issues- or in some 
localities- and support them in others. For example, Calixto Kuash (2003) of 
Chuwitayu stated: "There are severe problems between the communities and the 
federations over how to legalise Shuar land. Our leaders want to legalise it according to 
a territorial vision but this is exactly what the root of the conflict is. We from the 
communities want to acquire individual land titles which could give us the right to own 
the land". This statement illustrates how even though federation leaders were keen to 
acquire collective territorial rights and used rhetorical language to do so, others were 
however not that eager to follow suit. In fact, as noted, the Shuar that live near the 
roads or in the main towns and/or who are involved with cattle ranching activities or 
commercial agricultural production tend to express rather different views on how to 
claim rights to land. They do not articulate these claims moreover in a political 
language as federation leaders do. In fact, these groups were willing to use the easiest 
strategic tool available to them to assert their sense of place, which included the use of 
individual tenure mechanisms to gain control of local resources and land. 
A lack of transparency and local accountability in the federations was also a key 
complaint surrounding the promotion of an alternative territorial vision for the Shuar. 
For example, these concerns were raised at an assembly meeting organised by Shuar 
women in Makuma in July 2002 that I attended. At this meeting, the women who spoke 
argued explicitly for the need for local people to fully participate in the decision- 
making and organisational processes of the Shuar federations. In particular, they argued 
that one of the major problems within the Shuar federations was the lack of co- 
ordination between the leaders and local communities --indeed that the former never 
even visited the latter. A clear gender bias was noted here: "Our elected leaders never 
visit our communities and nor do they consult us over the decisions to be taken. This is 
especially related to the role of us women. The men who are the leaders, never listen to 
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our ideas and opinions, and we just participate but not (through) speaking" (Makuma 
village women 2004). 
Shuar leaders are clearly aware of these problems. In one meeting organised by RPSE 
in February 2004, for example, Cesar Tupuc acknowledged that the project If Nunke 
had demonstrated various internal problems of FIPSE, including a lack of 
communication and information distribution, as well as inadequate relationships 
between the federation and affiliated communities. Further, he noted that these 
problems have had some worrying political consequences: 
"The main internal problem that FEPSE is currently facing is the lack of co- 
ordination and communication between the federation and our base communities, 
which has led some communities to create other relationships, with for example 
the oil companies. Our communities have felt that if they do not get fair 
representation by the federation, then they may get a better deal negotiating with 
the companies" (C. Tupuc 2002). 
In fact, what was initiated as a community-based land movement has been transformed 
into a struggle for territory based on new types of values propounded by the externally- 
networked federations. The new alliances emerging from these alternative projects have 
not been an unmixed blessing. True, their very creation suggests a sort of political 
utility--a bringing together of actors to advance an indigenous territorial vision. Yet, the 
involvement of these different actors has prompted tension over project strategies and 
political intentions. Just as the oil companies indirectly influenced the structure of the 
projects undertaken by Shuar federations to defend Shuar territory 17, new networks 
have similarly influenced the structure and types of projects that the Shuar federations 
choose to undertake. This has often been accompanied by a fear among some Shuar 
communities that the political processes thus set in motion might deprive them of local- 
level authority vis-a-vis the federations. 
Thus, the quest for an alternative territorial vision has rendered quite visible existing 
community divisions even as it has created new conflicts among the Shuar, even though 
territorial initiatives seem to be powerful tools for the Shuar to more effectively 
demand due recognition and respect of land and territory claims. Still, if an alternative 
17 That is, insofar as the alternative is defined in contradistinction to the predominant (oil-based) 
territorial vision. 
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territorial vision can be seen to be emerging (however tentatively) as part of the defence 
of Shuar territory, it remains to provide a preliminary assessment of the likely effects of 
this kind of project in terms of advancing the defence of Shuar territory. On the one 
hand, the promotion of an alternative vision itself reflects unequal power relations 
between and among Shuar communities as well as between these communities and 
federation leaders. On the other hand, decades of regional modemisation have resulted 
in differentiated cultural and economic interests among the Shuar (as Chapter 5 
documented) such that the very idea of one alternative territorial vision may itself be 
highly problematic. 
6.5 Summary 
Several important points should be taken from the struggles to define Shuar territory 
and place analysed in this chapter. Firstly, it is true that the work for territorial defence 
by the Shuar federations has been a partial technical victory insofar as the Ecuadorian 
state, the courts, and international actors such as NGOs, have started to recognise their 
interests and problems. Most importantly, the rights of the Shuar communities to 
defend their land collectively have been acknowledged which has enabled the Shuar 
federations to use new legally-based means to try to stop the imposition of oil-based 
territoriality. And yet, secondly, these very processes have demonstrated dilemmas that 
are perhaps inevitable in the articulation of an alternative vision of Shuar territoriality, 
including conflict between communities over collective versus individual land 
ownership, problems co-ordinating regional and community-level political 
engagements, and the difficulties combining community mapping with broader legal 
and political strategies. 
Indeed, the practices of the Shuar federations have revealed some very difficult 
problems surrounding the articulation of proposals for indigenous claims to land and 
territory. The struggle over territory has had implications for project outcomes and vice 
versa. Still unresolved, for example, is whether local community-control over processes 
and institutions that determine the future of their livelihoods and culture can be 
privileged over currently predominant federations. 
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In the next chapter, the complex facets of modem Shuar struggles are further analysed. 
Thus, we will examine contested notions over access to and control over natural and 
material resources on Shuar lands. We will consider how the Shuar federations have 
influenced livelihoods and resource access for their members, as well as the manner in 
which territory and cultural identity (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) play out in the 
context of location-specific resources issues and battles. 
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Chavter 7 Conflict over Access to Natural Resources 
This thesis has so far highlighted how Shuar struggles for local control and authority 
have been designed to combat successive ways of outsider-imposed 'development'. A 
complex picture has nonetheless begun to emerge in which selective engagement with 
outside interests and activities has partially altered the Shuar way of life, especially in 
the more accessible communities of the Oriente. Yet, the recent aggressive promotion 
of oil-based development has represented a new order of threat, notably in hitherto 
'remote' forested areas. The increasingly sophisticated discursive and material 
strategies of the Shuar federations that have been documented in Chapters 5 and 6 can 
thus be seen to be a desperate attempt to define a clear and resolute cultural identity 
linked to ancestral territory in order to halt this threat. At the heart of this intensifying 
multi-scale struggle is the effort by oil developers to dispossess Shuar communities of 
land. In this chapter, then, the analytical focus is on this crucial issue of land and 
resource access and how the Shuar struggle needs to be understood as being contested 
on this vital ingredient of indigenous life. 
Here, I examine how oil-based development and neoliberal policies produce particular 
forms of governable spaces and enclave economies characterised by political instability 
and economic inequality. The presence of oil companies, as part of a wider array of 
development projects, constitutes a challenge to community authority, inter-ethnic 
relations, and indigenous organisations principally through the resource and land 
disputes that are engendered. This can be seen via forms of political mobilisations and 
organising to gain access to and to control over both material and natural resources and 
land. Oil-based development generates differing sorts of governable spaces in which 
contrasting identities and forms of rule come into play. 
This chapter is organised in the following manner. First, it examines how Burlington 
Resources (supported by the Ecuadorian state) has used new strategies to control land 
and resources under neoliberal policies, and how it has acquired influence and power 
through new neoliberal style regulations and juridical entities. Second, I explore how 
Burlington's 'environmentally-friendly' practices that have emerged as a response to 
growing international concern about its environmentally destructive practices has 
galvanised Shuar resistance to these practices. Third, the chapter considers how the 
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Shuar federations have elaborated alternative natural resource management projects in 
order to counter state- s ancti oned corporate oil development while providing local 
communities with the possibility of strengthening access to natural and material 
resources in the region. 
7.1 Oil Company Strategies under Neoliberal Rule 
Previous chapters outlined how oil development and neoliberal policies supported by 
the World Bank and the IMF have increasingly threatened indigenous livelihoods. For 
its part, the state has long believed that by opening up the Oriente to oil exploitation it 
would thereby stimulate economic growth, foreign investment and national income (see 
Chapter 4). However, and as this section shows, with the implementation of these 
policies, the oil companies have attained greater power in the region whereas 
Ecuadorian citizens have enjoyed fewer means of resisting. This is so despite the 
apparent victories earned by the Shuar federations in the late 1990s, in particular the 
legal injunction (see Chapter 5). To appreciate this shift is to understand how the Shuar 
struggles that are the main concern of this thesis are always partly an outcome of wider 
political and economic changes. 
Indigenous people have had limited power to ensure the protection of their interests 
during oil development. Indeed, the apparent lack of enforceability of state agreements 
with oil companies that aim to safeguard indigenous political interests is crucial here. 
For example, Jose Serrano (2004), who is working for the Quito-based human and 
social rights organisation, Centro de Desarrollo, Economico y Social (CDES), 
explained that the Ministry for Environment implements laws for environmental 
protection, but that these laws are poorly implemented and often not enforced. This is 
because "there is a severe lack of co-ordination between different administrative offices 
with environmental mandates, restricted funds with which the understaffed 
governmental offices must operate, and an extreme politicization of any matter 
concerning oil development" (J. Serrano 2004). Similarly, 
Mario Melo (2002) of 
CDES, asserted: "The Ministry of Environment is responsible for the protection of the 
environment, but it has been slow to implement the 
laws that are guaranteed under the 
Constitution". 
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These statements are interesting since they demonstrate three inter-linked issues. First, 
there is a bureaucratic delivery problem in implementing the laws even as law making 
itself is a very slow process in Ecuador in the first place. ' For example, more than a 
decade after the implementation of the Convention of Biological Diversity in 1992, 
Ecuador is still struggling to implement it. As noted by Alexandra Almedia (2002) from 
Accion EcologiCa, "'conservation and sustainable use of the environment is not a 
priority of the Government". Further, while the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy and 
Mining (MEM) is responsible for carefully planned oil development in the Oriente, it 
has not even evaluated the possible environmental impacts of such projects nor has it 
informed local indigenous organisations about the potential impacts of oil exploitation 
(Garzon 2002). 
Second, there no dedicated focus in work on environmental protection. For example, 
the Ecuadorian state created an institute, the Ecodesarrollo de la Region AmazOnica 
Ecuatoriana (ECORAE), to develop community management projects in indigenous 
communities affected by oil development in the Oriente (see below for an example of 
such a project). The main objectives, however, are to assist the oil companies in the 
development of 'community relatioW strategies and to use a percentage of the profits 
generated from oil development to 'develop' the region- neither objective showing 
much concern for environmental protection (FIPSE 2002a). 
Finally, as noted in Chapter 4, petroleum now constitutes Ecuador's principal export 
product and main source of income (see Table 4.1). It is thus considered vital to 
enhance such exports for the state's overall wellbeing. However, as the Ecuadorian 
policy concentrates on promoting extractive [oil] industries, this choice in turn makes 
the country highly dependent on externally managed oil developments since it is the 
foreign companies that possess the capital and knowledge to undertake large-scale oil 
development in difficult environments. 2 
1 At least, that is, in relation to environmental protection. Laws to hasten oil development have 
been 
passed more quickly. 
I here Shell Oil has shown little 2 Similarly, Watts (2004) looked at oil production in the Nigeria Delta w 
concern for the environment or for the 
local Ogoni people such that oil development there is 
characterised by violence and instability. 
Thus, there are many conditions that Ecuador shares with 
Nigeria, as well as with other countries in the Third World. 
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The context of oil policies and development was generally described in Chapter 4. but it 
is important to revisit that discussion here since oil development in oil block 24 where 
Burlington currently holds the concession rights, became a key component of a larger 
state-designed scheme. As noted in Chapter 5, the company acquired its interest in the 
block from ARCO in 2000. However, persistent opposition to drilling by Shuar 
residents had prompted Burlington to issue declarations of 'force majeure' in March 
2003, which were confirmed by PetroEcuador (the state oil company) and later by 
MEM (CDES 2002a). This legal provision is recognition by the ministry that local 
opposition has prevented the companies from proceeding with I awful I y-mandated 
exploration. Thus, Burlington took action because it could not continue with oil 
development in Shuar territory. Burlington, moreover, had to comply with the 
guidelines set by the court decision involving FIPSE and ARCO Oriente in August 
1999 that were discussed in Chapter 5. Yet, Burlington argued that those guidelines 
actually affirmed the rights of the state and ARCO (or its successor) to carry out 
petroleum activities (Amazonwatch 2004c). Burlington (2004b) has thus stated that: 
"The decision does not preclude petroleum activities; rather, it provides a 
roadmap for consultation with FFPSE-affiliated communities. Burlington's 
communications with the FIPSE-affiliated communities, such as the facilitation of 
seminars and other informative discussions, have been and will continue to be 
arranged through negotiated and signed agreements with the FIPSE leadership". 3 
This quote is notably of interest here because it re-interprets the court ruling in terms of 
a 'road map' that serves as basis for negotiation over how oil development should 
proceed- thus not whether such exploitation should occur at all. This stance is in sharp 
contrast to how FIPSE leaders perceived the outcome of the court case (see Chapter 5). 
And yet, this court ruling was always going to be only half of the story. Thus, 
Burlington knew that despite the outcome of this court case, and widespread Shuar 
opposition to oil operations, local people could not actually prohibit oil development 
under national law. Under Article 247 of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution, all 
subterranean natural resources belong to the Ecuadorian state. With this legal backdrop, 
the state could guarantee backing for oil production to proceed, if necessary with 
military support. Most importantly, this law has allowed the oil companies to acquire 
3 All quotes that I refer to in the texts are cited from Burlington's web-site since I was not able to travel 
to Burlington's head-quarters in Houston Texas, in the US. Hence I did not have the opportunity to 
conduct any interviews in person with company employees. Nor did I manage to acquire data per phone 
or e-mail correspondence since Burlington never returned my calls or answered any of my e-mails. 
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the rights to search for and exploit oil, even though they do not own the land or even 
the crude oil they extract. Indeed, they only possess the right to exploit the petroleum 
receiving a percentage of the extracted crude as payment for services rendered 
(Amazonwatch 2004e). 
The result of the threat posed by oil development was widespread conflict as Shuar 
communities co-ordinated by the federations stepped up their anti-oil campaign. This 
struggle was visible in, for example, a meeting held in Makuma in December 2003, 
4 organised by the Comite InterfederaciOnal . As this meeting crystallizes key themes on 
actors and access, the discussion goes into some detail on this account. More than 500 
Shuar and Achuar delegates participated in the meeting, which was the third meeting of 
its kind in the region designed to consider oil proposals locally. There was also 
involvement from other indigenous nationalities and Amazonian organisations, as well 
as local, regional and national authorities, such as the Ministry of Energy and Mining 
(MEEM). The Comite had even invited the senior representative from MEM, Minister 
Carlos Arboldea, in order to show state officials the seriousness of the federations' 
concerns about the new policies proposed in the tenth oil block leasing. 5 
Although, the Minister did attend the meeting, he did not seem inclined to listen to the 
arguments of oil opponents. Carlos Arboela came across at the Makuma meeting as a 
typical representative for transnational capitalism. A well-dressed mestizo in his forties, 
carrying a mobile phone and a black briefcase, he spoke with grandiose words about 
how MEM aimed to promote local community 'benefits' from oil development. At one 
point, the Minister even suggested that the assembly participants 'hold him hostage' if 
they disagreed with the government's decision not to cancel the oil contract on their 
lands (Comite InterfederaciOnal 2003). 
As a key individual in the Ecuadorian state concerned with oil development, Arboela 
was notably responsible for overseeing the oil companies through the first stages of oil 
operations that is the long phase in the search for petroleum (Pachamama 2003). When 
the Minister spoke he appeared comfortable and confident in his role as a spokesperson 
for oil development in this meeting held literally in the middle of the rainforest. This 
4 The following discussion is based on my observations of this meeting. 
5 The tenth round of oil block leasing was announced in 2003, but it was later withdrawn hence the lack 
of bids placed by transnational corporations. 
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meeting was far away from urban centres and thus in a setting foreign to Arboela and in 
which people who were hostile to oil development surrounded him. Still, he confidently 
asserted his role as the prime advocate of oil-based development. Arboela thus stated 
that the Ministry welcomed this opportunity to have an 'open dialogue' with the people 
of Morona Santiago. "We are concerned that there has been some misinformation about 
oil development. We hope to clarify these misunderstandings today by stating the 
facts 
... the concern of today's meeting will be an update of our activities in this region, 
what the current situation is and where it is going" (Arboela 2003). This statement is of 
interest notably because it demonstrated themes that became apparent in the course of 
the meeting: 1) that the state had assumed the role as a manager geared towards 
facilitating access to oil development; and 2) how transnational capital functions in a 
country where social relations become progressively shaped by neoliberal economic 
reforms. 
Overall, discussions during the meeting treated issues regarding oil development in 
block 24 and wider state policies that facilitated such development. For their part, Shuar 
and Achuar leaders were disturbed with how the meeting proceeded. In contrast to the 
statements made by the Minister, indigenous representatives questioned the so-called 
advantages of oil development. Thus, Luis Vargas (2003), one of the founding figures 
of the Comite and of FINAE (the Achuar federation) retorted: 
"As you know, Texaco has contaminated and polluted the Oriente causing 
problems for our brothers in the North. And the result is that they live in misery, 
they are sick, poor, marginalised and landless. Texaco has taught the oil 
companies well, creating divisions among the communities, ignoring indigenous 
rights and concerns, and any opposition. Without opposition, they [the oil 
companies] can continue their operations without a thought to ecological and 
social destruction they cause". 
This statement by Vargas stands in sharp contrast to that of the Minister noted above. 
First, it demonstrates how Shuar and Achuar leaders did not want in their lands the 
problems that they believed had been caused by oil companies such as Texaco in the 
northern Oriente (see Kimberling 1992 for a detailed account of the Texaco case). The 
example of oil development in general, and Texaco's practices in particular, caused 
them to be quite apprehensive about the neoliberal drive to intensify oil operations in 
their region. Second, the statement strongly criticises oil company 'divide-and-rule' 
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strategies that had already been employed by ARCO Oriente in oil block 24. As noted 
in Chapter 5, the firm had entered Shuar territory by approaching carefully selected 
Shuar communities which they believed would support oil development in return for 
offer of 'gifts' and other 'development' assistance. It did so without the consent of 
FIPSE, which had in any case declared its opposition to oil development. Third, Vargas 
refers to the need for continuing strong opposition to that development by the Shuar 
and Achuar federations. Indeed, the meeting was specifically organised by the Comite 
InterfederaciOnal precisely in order to strengthen the unity of the three federations 
(FIPSE, FICSH and FINAE) as well as to work for the territorial defence of the Shuar 
and Achuar people through the safeguarding of Shuar access to local resources (Comite 
InterfederaclOnal 2003). 
Thus, soothing talk by the Minister was set against the record of destruction and 
division portrayed by Vargas. Above all, Vargas places politics centre-stage, whereas 
Arboela seeks to depoliticise the process. This strategy of defusing conflict through 
'open dialogue' and 'partnership' was clear in Arboela's words at that meeting, but was 
most systematically developed by Burlington Resources itself. As such, this chapter 
now turns to a detailed discussion of the strategies of this firm as well as the 
relationships between these strategies and conflict over access to Shuar lands and 
natural resources. 
Shuar leaders fiercely criticised Burlington for its 'community relations' campaign that 
sought to integrate the company to Shuar communities through offers of financial 
compensation and/or other fon-ns of assistance (see Figure 7.1). Thus, Burlington 
(2004b) asserted: 
"Although force majeure has existed throughout the time that we have been 
licensed to operate in Block 24, we have worked through the various federations 
to bring much-needed aid to several local communities. Also, as required by 
Ecuadorian law, we have worked with the leaders and representatives of 
approximately 55 local communities. We believe that the only way to gain access 
to these blocks is peaceably, through open and honest dialogue with the 
recognised representatives of the indigenous people in the area. " 
This quote is of interest since it shows that Burlington acknowledges responsibility 
for 
areas where it is a major investor and that the 
firm is investing assets and will 
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potentially earn profits from operations as well. However, it also demonstrates that the 
firm did not engage with communities even in the drafting of this declaration insofar as 
the firm only encouraged what they claimed to be an 'open' dialogue and 'partnership' 
with selected communities and individual leaders. 
Figure 7.1 Burlington Community Relations 
The image in Figure 7.1 is taken from Burlington's own web-site in July 2004 and 
epitomises the firm's 'community relations' strategy. The photo shows a Shuar 
community that has posed with company field-workers. 6 Local people are smiling and 
seem comfortable with Burlington's presence. But the photo is symbolically resonant 
on other counts as well. First, it underscores that Burlington was actively aiming to 
build alliances with those communities that might be receptive to oil development in 
order to facilitate oil exploration. For example, in Juralpa in Pastaza (see Figure 4.5), 
many community members have at some point worked for Compailia General de 
Combustibles (CGC), the oil company that is operating in block 23 in Pastaza, and were 
therefore already receptive to what Burlington had to offer. Lauro Kuja (2003) who 
comes from Shinkiatam but who temporarily lives with his father and mother-in-law in 
Juralpa noted that, "in order to generate further support, Burlington encouraged the 
communities in the neighbourhood to form their own organisations, which the company 
supported financially. Thus, was born an anti-Shuar federation and pro-Burlington 
organisation". Clearly, since the company had experienced opposition to their plans for 
6 This photo is taken from Burlington's web-site and it purportedly represents one community in Shuar 
territory that is in favour of oil development plans. However, the name and the location of the village are 
not revealed to the reader nor is the image clear--it is impossible to see the faces of the people portrayed 
in it. This anonymity is most likely related to the fact that Burlington has entered Shuar lands without the 
permission of the Shuar federations, which violates the guidelines set in the court case discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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Source: Burlington Resources 2004b 
oil operations from FIPSE and FICSH, the existence of a group opposed to the Shuar 
federations themselves suited it well. 
However, according to Burlington (2004a), by supporting local organisations, it not 
only demonstrated the company 9s compassion for local people, but also created the 
support necessary for oil operations to proceed. The company, moreover, claimed it had 
worked with FIPSE and FICSH and other recognised federations and organisations in 
the area as well as with the local communities themselves (Burlington 2004b). Yet, the 
company was simultaneously critical of organisations such as FIPSE, even casting 
doubt on their right to 'represent' the Shuar people. Thus, Burlington (2004b) argued 
they 
"work with duly recognised or elected leadership of indigenous communities 
regarding the impacts of planned operations.... As with any organisation, the 
leaders of these groups change over time. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon to 
encounter individuals who claim leadership of a particular organisation who in 
fact have failed in their re-election bids or who never originally had legitimate 
authority". 
This statement reflects a classic 'divide-and-rule' strategy by Burlington. On the one 
hand, it authorised Burlington cooperation with some Shuar 'representatives' typically 
at village level, thereby fulfilling the claim that they had consulted local communities. 
On the other hand, it dismissed the claims of the federations by casting aspersions on 
their local legitimacy. However, Burlington had not in fact worked with the elected 
leadership in oil block 24. To the contrary, the company had sought to undermine the 
Shuar federations since they and the communities they represent were adamantly 
opposed to oil development that they considered to be prejudicial to local resource 
access and control. 
Indeed, the community strategies of Burlington were strongly opposed by Shuar 
leaders. For example, Rosiendo Nunkias (2004), a FICSH leader stated: 
"The exploitation of strategic resources within our lands has to be dealt with 
integrally and discussed with the rest of the nationalities in Morona Santiago. 
You cannot just deal with a handful of easily manipulated people that express 
pro-Burlington allegiances and do not have the right to make independent claims 
to their lands. Nor do they have the right to define activities with them. Especially 
when these activities will affect the larger indigenous population. " 
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Shuar leaders thus challenged Burlington's 'right' to approach selected Shuar 
communities for endorsement as a violation of the right of the federations to uniquely 
represent local indigenous interests. Indeed, the firm's 6 community relations' strategy 
has involved Burlington in actually signing agreements with local Shuar- -something 
that only the Shuar federations were permitted to do in law. However, Burlington 
(2004b) stated it had maintained "a broad base of contacts to ensure that consultation 
takes place at all levels. Burlington is voluntarily complying with a recently enacted 
Ecuadorian law intended to promote an open and transparent dialogue with indigenous 
communities and federations". A consultation process is generally required in Ecuador, 
so Burlington's commitment is nothing more than an agreement to follow the law, a 
minimal standard expected of all oil companies. As noted in Chapter 4, Article 84 and 
Article 88 of the 1998 National Constitution and Article 15 of ILO 169 specifically 
state that indigenous people must be informed and consulted about the exploitation of 
non-renewable resources found in their territories and receive compensation for 
environmental and social harms caused by these projects. 
Second, Figure 7.1 is also symbolically resonant in that it suggests how Burlington has 
pursued a strategy of bestowing 'gifts' on carefully selected Shuar communities near 
sites where oil has been found. At the heart of this process of gift giving is a corporate 
desire to settle local access for oil development amicably (and inexpensively) with 
residents. Burlington (2004a) thus asserted that they would "provide appropriate 
compensation for property used or acquired from indigenous communities in 
accordance to applicable law, regional custom or as mutually agreed". This measure 
was designed as compensation for letting the company undertake work locally. 
However, 'compensation' has a long history in tandem with oil development in 
Ecuador (CDES 2002c; Garzon 2002; Wray 2000). A standard procedure was followed 
in these situations. Thus, once a target community was identified, Burlington would 
send 'community relation officers' to the locality to offer 'gifts' and 'development' 
assistance such as the building of communal houses and schools, free plane rides, as 
well as the donation of school materials, solar panels, tin roofs, money, candies, 
medicines and foodstuffs. 
Shuar residents were certainly not naYve about such gifts. Patricio Himpikit (2004) of 
Shinkiatarn village noted, for example, one such corporate visit: 
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"Burlington representatives attempted to 'visit' our community to negotiate 
exploration arrangements directly with us rather than approach the federation 
[FICSH]. They said we would receive a new community house, school materials, 
medicines, solar panels and money. However, we know that these are just empty 
promises and will never be implemented. This is why we stopped the 
Burlington's employers from entering our community" 
This statement refers to how residents in Shinkiatam literally stopped Burlington 
representatives from entering community land in 2002 with the aid of machetes, sticks 
and other tools. Burlington's representative had no other choice than to turn around and 
abandon corporate plans for negotiating oil operations in the vicinity. However, where 
access was not blocked in this manner, by distributing gifts, the company's operations 
could often start unhindered in recipient communities, such as in Ifiiayua, Kusutka and 
San Juan (CDES 2002c). 
In effect, access to selected monetary and other resources was offered in return for local 
oil access. Hence, the firm's 'upbeat' take on such assistance. Burlington (2004a) 
asserted typically that they aimed to 'assist' indigenous communities "in the 
development of specific community support plans designed to facilitate access to 
needed goods and services and otherwise contribute to community development in 
ways beneficial to the communities". Assistance was a central plank in that support. 
Thus, in Figure 7.1 for example, there is evidence of a communal house and foodstuff 
that the firm claims to have given to the villagers. 
Burlington staff members sought to woo Shuar villagers in other ways as well. On more 
than one occasion, for example, I saw Burlington representatives entering Shuar 
communities in large jeeps or even airplanes, carrying mobile phones and wearing 
smart clothes. Such calculated displays of wealth and power were designed to show 
community members what they too might be able to afford one day if they permitted oil 
development to proceed. Manuel Maiche (2003), a young Shuar who had lived in Puyo 
for some time, spoke excellent Spanish, and was actively involved in ArutaM7 --a 
Arutam was formed by a group of ex-militaries, which had participated in the war 
between Ecuador and 
Peru. In Ecuador there are several such contraband groups that are working in the Oriente. Many of them 
use 'guerill a- style' methods such as heavy weaponry, camouflage clothes and secrecy 
in order to either 
support the oil companies by threatening local communities or oppose proposed oil 
development by 
assisting local communities. 
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paramilitary group that has assumed a role of opposing oil development-criticised this 
presentation of a seductive new lifestyle: 
"My opinion has changed after having profoundly analysed the policies and 
strategies that Burlington is applying. I was working with the company for one 
year and I have seen how they try to manipulate us by visiting communities and 
showing us what we could acquire if we just signed the contracts for oil 
11 development' 
. 
Such displays of grandeur also emphasised of course that Burlington was a powerful 
actor with good political and economic connections. Implicit here too was the Idea that 
it was not likely to dispense patronage to unsupportive local people. For a corporation 
investing large amounts in oil exploitation, these gestures and gifts were incidental 
expenditures, but for socially marginalised and inexperienced Shuar communities, they 
were potentially enormous windfalls. Burlington (2004b), for its part, maintained that: 
"These efforts have been conducted in an open and honest manner, and we have 
sought to obtain input from all parties to cooperatively develop a plan for access 
to the area. We believe that today, through their official representatives, a 
majority of the indigenous people within the blocks are receptive to petroleum 
activities". 
However, those people the company approached were among the most socially and 
politically vulnerable in the region. Thus, for example, they tended to live in Puyo and 
Macas far away from the rural communities where opposition to oil development was 
fiercest. Indeed, they had become strongly influenced by life in the towns where they 
resided in order to make a living. As such, they seemingly could be easily swayed by an 
array of consumer goods, such as stereos and mobile phones, into supporting the 
Burlington stance on oil development. 
Burlington clearly put much effort into carefully selecting the community residents 
with which it would work. Target communities typically lacked the capital necessary to 
buy essential goods such as rice, salt, soap, machetes, rubber boots, and petrol. With 
help offered by the company, however, the communities could buy the material goods 
they deemed necessary and gain rapid tangible improvements in their living standard. 
For example, Alfredo Pitiur (2004) of OrganizaciOn Shuar del Ecuador (OSBE) 
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suggested that "by negotiating with Burlington, we can develop our communities and 
,8 gain economic growth and an income necessary to improve our livelihoods' . 
The benefits to be acquired from such co-operation are not to be gainsaid. Thus, Pedro 
(a pseudonym, 2004), put it this way when we talked one day in Puyo, the provincial 
capital of Pastaza: "We in the Shuar communities must work, we need to work for a 
living, to be able to educate our children and to offer them a decent upbringing. We 
want to develop". This Shuar man looked smart in his new haircut and carrying a 
briefcase and a mobile phone. He had lived in Puyo for several years and it was a long 
time since he had visited his family's community located near Makuma in Morona 
Santiago. Young Shuar men, such as Pedro, are now often well-educated, excellent 
Spanish speakers, and used to the workings of the outside world. They have thus been 
prime candidates for assuming leadership roles in working with the oil companies. 
They were thus prime targets for Burlington's community relations employees, and 
were indeed often amenable to what the company had to offer. Marko (a pseudonym, 
2003) thus stated, "By negotiating with the oil company I have been able to live well 
here [in Sucua], I have a mobile phone, I can use the Internet and eat in restaurants. 
Now my role is to help my community to acquire the same things and to develop 
economically". This quote is important since it shows how just like Burlington's 
people, Shuar leaders such as this increasingly have access to monetary and other 
material resources and when they visit Shuar communities they come across as the face 
of 'modernity'. However, it is also important to note that Marko had not been to the 
community in several months, and some of his interpretations about what community 
members really wanted in terms of development and oil conflicted with what I had just 
heard from Shuar residents. 
If the promise of access to material resources helped to undermine opposition to 
Burlington in some quarters, often Shuar people pursued different ways of acquiring 
community development assistance without turning to this controversial company. For 
example, Manuel Maiche (2003) explained that the only way to prevent those Shuar 
residents who wanted community development from negotiating with the oil companies 
8 As noted in Chapter 5, OSHE had attempted to strike a deal with ARCO Oriente to receive 
compensation for suggested oil development in oil block 24. The organisation has maintained the same 
approach since then. Shuar leaders both within and outside FEPSE's and FICSH's organisational structure 
repeatedly condemned this tactic. 
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was to provide them with alternative sources of funding: I think that the community, in 
order to maintain its firm position of not permitting the entrance of the oil company, 
needs to find self-sustaining aid. That is the only way to oppose the oil companies". 
Having earlier been tempted by provisions from the oil companies, Manual was bitter: 
"So I feel that we are being deceived [such that] we can't continue working for oil 
development". Burlington would simply not give fair compensation to the Shuar in 
return for winning access for oil development, he believed, and would not provide fair 
community development assistance either. This statement is especially interesting since 
the Shuar federations had criticised this individual for having worked with Burlington 
before. Francisco Sandu (2002) a former president of FIPSE, thus stated at a meeting in 
Shinkiatam in September 2002: "Manuel Maiche is not allowed to either participate in 
this important meeting or to enter FIPSE territory since he has worked for la Compania 
[Burlington] and provided them with vital information about our actions". When I 
asked Manuel why he had done so, he replied that Shuar like him needed employment: 
I think that each person has to look for his own work, for human subsistence, in an 
individual manner" (M. Maiche 2003). 
Given these mixed Shuar views, it is hardly surprising that Burlington believed they 
were inculcating positive ideals in the local communities, even 'civilising' indigenous 
'undeveloped' societies by assisting them in the elaboration of development projects 
and the provision of new work opportunities. Hence, the company aimed to assist 
indigenous communities through specific projects that would contribute to local 
development in ways considered beneficial by the communities themselves (Burlington 
2004a). This logic is profoundly positive and morally propitious--at least when seen 
from the company's point of view. 
Indeed, moralising was a key element in the firm's community relations' strategy to 
smooth access to Shuar lands. For instance, Burlington argued that they managed their 
operations in Ecuador (and elsewhere around the world for that matter) 
in a socially 
responsible manner. This commitment led them to strive to understand and address 
the 
needs of indigenous people in Ecuador. Burlington (2004b) thus stated, 
"As corporate citizens, we are committed to managing our operations 
in Ecuador 
and elsewhere in the world in a socially responsible manner. 
This commitment 
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has led us to strive to understand and address the unique needs of the indigenous 
people in Ecuador. " 
This statement is interesting because it seems to suggest that Burlington need not have 
bothered to consult locally, but had done so voluntarily out of a sense of 'corporate 
social responsibility'. 
Burlington's strategy of 'buying consciousness' also played on the distrust of some 
Shuar for the actions of the federations that purportedly acted on their behalf. The 
contribution of endemic local poverty and such distrust proved fertile ground for 
Burlington's corporate social responsibility strategies. Thus, Burlington's employees 
conjured up the image of immediate improvement in the livelihoods and material 
services of these communities--in short, that the company would single-handedly drag 
them out of poverty. Further, there was apparently no other way to acquire economic 
progress except by negotiating directly with the company. These corporate promises 
were then favourably compared with the 'paltry' efforts of the Shuar federations 
themselves. Some Shuar readily accepted this Burlington argument and hence were 
happy to accept such compensation. Thus, as Estaban Anguisha (2003) of Naparuk 
observed, "Our federations never visit the communities. They live far away in the 
towns, in their fancy flats and with good food and clothes. They receive funding from 
international organisations for community development projects, but we never see the 
money. Many families have now turned to the oil companies to receive help for 
community development projects". Similarly, Jorge (a pseudonym 2003) stated that 
"the oil companies have offered us compensation for the oil operations and our 
federation has offered us nothing. We are poor and our community needs to develop 
and for this we need money. This is why we have been thinking of accepting it [the 
money] from the companies". 
Still, most Shuar residents expressed steadfast opposition to oil development and the 
kind of assistance Burlington offered. For example, Luis Kuash (2004), a prominent 
Shuar leader from Ijinti advocated a different kind of development from that favoured 
by Pedro, Marko, Jorge and Manuel. For Luis, development was premised on an 
altogether different access regime: "To the foreign companies, the oil companies, we 
say, No! We have to pursue our own form of 
development ... The 
best school for me has 
been the jungle... We want assistance, but without conditions, on our own terms. We 
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are going to develop with our own model'. To him, money-making activities or 
involvement in the market were not as important as defending the Shuar way of life as 
well as access to the land and resources associated with that life. Luis added: "Money, 
yes, is necessary in order to organise, travel, communicate, and unify our people. But 
we have everything we need to survive in the jungle. We only need money for training 
and communication" (L. Kuash 2004). Similarly, Luis Chumpi (2004), an elder from 
Mukucham, explained that the Shuar could and ought to pursue means of community 
development that did not destroy their culture or their resources, and that Shuar 
themselves had to work for their own community development, rather than depending 
on outside support. He stated, "We, as the base communities, are the ones that have to 
do most of the work in the areas of health, education and development. And we must 
also be watchful of the oil companies or other companies that always want to try to use 
us in the future. We have to be prepared" (L. Chumpi 2004). Here, then, there is a clear 
rejection of Burlington's approach as well as a call for Shuar unity predicated on a non- 
oil-based set of access and economic relations. 
The multifaceted response of Shuar leaders and residents has occurred against a 
backdrop of wider political and economic changes. Thus, the state's role has decreased 
under neoliberal rule even as the oil companies have gained more power and taken on 
more of a role as a conflict manager in the region, notably with their 'community 
relations' approach. However, the story does not end there. Burlington has acquired a 
further role, namely that of 'protector' of the local environment and upholder of 
'sound' use of natural resources. This new role has been assumed to the extent that the 
state has retreated from its formal responsibility as the protector of the environment on 
behalf of the Ecuadorian people. The next section assesses this apparent transition in 
how environmental governance is conducted in the Oriente and how technical and 
productivity aspects rather than environmental and social considerations are 
emphasised in the process of asserting corporate-led 'sustainable development' and 
access to natural resources in Shuar territory. 
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7.2 Contesting Corporate Environmental Governance 
The oil companies' influence in contemporary Ecuador is not limited to visible means 
of restructuring the power relations between different actors, as described in the 
previous section. Indeed, the very analytical and methodological tools that the oil 
companies and their partners use (including the classificatory systems they establish in 
pursuit of 'sustainable development') represent an exercise of power. These tools serve 
to create a new cognitive mapping of Amazonian nature and society, as well as state 
and people, through new forms of knowledge production and institutional 
collaborations. They are powerful set of discourses of rights, norms and 'truths' of 
global ecological rationality that seek to build upon and replace prior discourses that 
have notably involved indigenous people (Escobar 2001; Watts 2004). At the same 
time, however, that the oil companies are seeking to appease those concerned with 
improving the conditions of indigenous people and their environment, they are even 
more concerned about their ability to bring on new oil ventures in the region. 
How firms such as Burlington seek to diffuse conflict over access to natural resources 
surrounding their operations through skilled discourses about indigenous rights and 
sustainable development is central to current struggles over Shuar territory in oil block 
concession 24. Inaccessible by road, the concession was located in what the company 
called 'primary rainforest', by which it meant an 'untouched' and 'uninhabited' place. 
According to the company, it has not been easy to develop the 'assets' found in block 
24 (Burlington 2004b). 
There are various reasons why this has been the case. First, since the fields were located 
in a sensitive biophysical environment, their development would require special 
measures, including industrial hygiene, waste management and environmental permits. 
9 
Second, demonstrations against the oil company in various parts of Ecuador made it all 
but impossible for Burlington to commence oil exploration given the ease with which 
opponents could disrupt oil work--even with military protection (Amazonwatch 2004a; 
Pachamarna 2002b). Third, protests at Burlington's headquarters in Houston, Texas, 
9 Environmental permitting entails activities that require permitting from environmental regulatory 
authorities which are to be identified well in advance of activity and authorisation sought from the 
appropriate authorities. Industrial hygiene includes potential health hazards, which will 
be identified, 
risks assessed and controls introduced to ensure that these are maintained as reasonably practicable 
(Burlington 2004c). 
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against the company's strategies compelled them to have a re-think (Amazonwatch 
2004b, d; The Houston Chronicle 2004; El UnIverso 2004; New York Times 2004). 
Burlington executives were concerned about further demonstrations and associated bad 
publicity if they continued with oil exploration in block 24 (Burlington Resources 
2003). After all, the firm had already been forced to declare a state of 'force majeure' 
in the block despite it having spent close to a million dollars in community relations 
there (Amazonwatch 2004c). As of late 2004, operations thus remained suspended 
while Burlington negotiated with the Shuar federations over how to proceed. 10 
It is in this politically fraught context that Burlington's promotion of a 'green' image 
can be seen to be invaluable to corporate efforts to build up a 'legitimate' presence in 
the region. Thus, Burlington claims it has started to adopt socially and environmentally 
friendly policies unlike other oil companies, such as Texaco. For example, Burlington 
(2004a) stated: 
"Burlington is committed to protecting human rights and the environment, and to 
minimising impacts to native lands and cultures ... We are applying appropriate 
operating practices to minimise employee and contractor interaction with 
indigenous communities, where desired by the indigenous communities, to help 
preserve cultural integrity ... and apply appropriate operating practices to preserve 
or prevent disturbance of sacred, historical or other culturally sensitive sites in 
native territories" 
This statement portrays Burlington as being committed to protecting the environment 
and human rights by using 'appropriate operating practices' thereby 'minimising 
impacts' on both land and people. Even more intriguing, Burlington purportedly aims 
to protect sacred, historical, archaeological or other culturally sensitive sites while 
operating in indigenous territories--in effect, apparently acknowledging that the land 
'belongs' ancestrally to the Shuar. 
In 2004, Burlington published a document designed to support these grand claims that 
catalogued the firm 's "Environment, Health and Safety Management Systems" 
(Burlington 2004c). Technological innovations and environmental concern are 
portrayed as being central to both the management policy and infrastructure needed to 
10 Even in 2005, Burlington has not been able to initiate its operations in oil block 24 due to on-going 
Shuar resistance. 
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discover, develop and pump petroleum. The glossy tabletop document is packed with 
compelling images about the firm's 'safe' oil operations. 
Figure 7.2 Safe and Responsible Operations 







Two such images are reprinted here as Figures 7.2 and 7.3. Figure 7.2 demonstrates the 
technological aspects of oil operations: heavy equipment, sophisticated technology, 
elaborate infrastructure, and considerable labour power that is used to install these 
facilities in the first place and that are needed thereafter to conduct oil operations in the 
tropics. These operations are performed moreover under an 'environmentally friendly' 
programme tailored to the challenges that the Amazon poses with mountainous terrain, 
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Nource: Burlington Resources 2004c 
Source. Burlington Resources 2004c 
intense rain all and fragile ecosystems. Figure 7.2 provides evidence of this 'sensitivity' 
insofar as it portrays a well site as a compact and self-contained unit, encompassing 
4only' a few hectares, and one that has neither destroyed the natural environment nor 
apparently interfered in ecological processes to any noticeable extent. Burlington's 
oilrig stands alongside a river and behind it there are trees. The only humans in sight 
are small-sized individuals at the base of the oilrig and the only artefact of a human 
presence is the well site itself. Figure 7.3 provides an even better illustration of how 
Burlington claims to operate in a number of environmentally sensitive areas while 
practicing 'sound environmental stewardship'. The forest here seems dense and vibrant, 
and it appears teeming with life. In the centre of the photograph we can see a stand of 
young trees planted at the behest of Burlington to offset forest loss linked to nearby site 
clearance. There are no signs of bulldozers, uprooting or trampling. There is not a 
human in sight and no signs of environmental destruction. 
Indeed, the company maintains that they have even been recognised as a leader in 
environmental management and conservation. Burlington (2004c) proclaims generally: 
"We are proud of our record of environmental protection. As is customary in our 
business, we operate in a number of environmentally sensitive areas, and we are 
determined to practice sound environmental stewardship ... We are determined that 
environmental protection will remain a priority for Burlington". The message is clear as 
far as Burlington is concerned: oil development and environmental conservation can go 
hand in hand. 
Yet, careful analysis of these images and associated corporate pronouncements reveals 
a subtle effort to marginalise the Shuar residents. By depicting the rainforest as being 
without people, Burlington focused the viewer's attention on how its operations are a 
technical feat--that is, to work efficiently in an 'environmentally friendly' way. The 
challenge was thus to extract crude from the rainforest without unduly disrupting the 
sensitive ecology of the region. This green focus came at a time when global concerns 
over the environment increased, notably linked to the emergence of environmental 
NGOs (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Goldman 2004). The latter have emphasised in 
particular the adverse effects of petroleum contamination. For example, Alexandra 
Almeida (2002) of Accion EcologiCa stated that "Burlington is one of the largest 
transnational corporations in the world. Its operations in Ecuador have caused severe 
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negative impacts on the people and on the ecosystems [in the Amazon region]". By 
stressing an environmental discourse in reply, Burlington has sought to find a new 
legitimacy for resource extraction by asserting the claim that it is ideally placed to 
sustainably manage the local resources that it has access to. Thus, insofar as the virtues 
of 'environmentally-friendly' and 'clean' technologies are emphasised, social, political 
and environmental concerns of indigenous groups living in the region are obscured. 
The 'erasure' of indigenous politics from Burlington's vision of 'sustainable' oil 
development runs through the company's 'imagining' of the area. Thus, it was noted 
before that the map of oil blocks in the Oriente (see Figure 4.2.3) presents only a 
handful of towns, the Oleuducto Crudo Pesado (OCP) pipeline, and the parameters of 
block 24 as well as the other adjoining oil blocks. I suggested above that this map was 
developed with only one purpose in mind--namely to outline in purely technical terms 
the existing or potential areas for oil operations. Indeed, we can see how space becomes 
defined as nothing more than a series of oil block concessions. Yet, when viewed again 
in the light of the concerns of the current chapter, the map in Figure 4.2.3 is, above all, 
important for what it leaves out. Here, the rainforest is abstract, drained of people, and 
hence a space dislocated from sociocultural surroundings and historical contexts. This 
spatial reproduction is a crucial part of Burlington's efforts to claim authority over 
Shuar territory and the resources within it. The idea that the rainforest was 'pristine' 
and 'untouched' perpetuated the illusion that there were no competing claims over the 
space designated ahistorically as 'block 24'. 
Yet, the rainforest contained in block 24 is of course neither devoid of humans nor a 
'pristine' wilderness. Today, the federations suggest that 50,000 Shuar live in the 
region (P. Tsere 2004, B. Nayandey 2004). 11 Further, as noted in previous chapters, 
they have long played an integral role in creating the 'untouched' rainforest. In 
Burlington's 'environmentally-friendly' re-visioning of the Oriente, Shuar claims to 
land, forest, chakra, and sacred sites are simply obliterated. And yet, my fieldwork 
emphasised again and again to me the worked-over 'nature' of this tropical setting. 
On our way to one chakra, for example, about one days walk from Shinkiatam (in 
March 2004), Carmela Kuja pointed out the plants and fruit trees she had planted along 
11 As discussed on page 84 above, national and regional population estimates vary widely depending on 
the source consulted. However, and as suggested there, the most plausible figure is 50,000. 
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way. The first night we camped in a small platano plantation that she and her husband, 
Pedro Kuja, had planted a few years earlier. On the second day, we collected 
papachina, kamote, and juca in the chakra. I then understood that what the Shuar call 
the forest is very much a humanised environment where local communities actively 
shape the places, the species content, the distribution, and diversity of the forest 
through planting and selectively managing different vegetation. The local Shuar 
communities manage, live and use resources in the directly surrounding area and 
transform that area irrevocably in the process. 
Shuar residents are keen to stress their role in 'managing' the rainforest well. For 
example, Pedro Kuja (2004) argued: "We defend and care for the forest, by birth and by 
inheritance, in a sustainable way. We are caretakers of the forest". Carmela Kuja (2004) 
added, "We maintain our lands where we have been bom, where we have lived and 
where we will be buried. With our traditional ways of managing and using natural 
resources, we have shaped the forest and cared for it". Such representations serve to 
legitimise access claims to natural resources and land and explicitly create a linkage 
between cultural identity, place and the local environment. They also flatly contradict 
the images put around by Burlington Resources. 
Shuar representations also stress a low-impact form of economic activity that boosts 
self-reliance. This was drawn to my attention by another conversation whilst on 
fieldwork. I sat by the fire in front of Luis and Hilda (Luis's second wife) Mukucham's 
house in Mukucham (in February 2004). Insect life buzzed in the forest, and a score of 
children were gathered around. Luis had just returned from a few days of hunting in the 
forest to bring home food for the family. He showed me the animals he had killed and 
said, "I do not need anything. I have everything here. I kill a guanta and I have enough 
to subsist on, to sell, and I have money. A few days ago I made a stool out of chonta, 
sold it, and now I have money to buy what I need. I don't need the oil company to 
subsist and to survive" (L. Mukucham 2004). Hilda likewise conveyed her 
fear of the 
changes oil would bring: "It is possible that our community will not exist 
here in the 
future" (H. Mukucham 2004). Hilda was born near Mukucham and had lived there her 
whole life. She was one of the founders of the community, one of its eldest members, 
and had spent very little time away from it. 
Her words, along with many of the other 
community members, conveyed their 
fear that oil development would lead, in the long 
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term, to the disappearance of their way of life as well as the forest upon which that life 
depend. 
"The government should listen to the interests of the indigenous people. It is 
trying to destroy the forest and the sustenance of our people. It knows very well 
that we sustain ourselves by hunting, and we are not like those people that eat 
what is stored, that have a market. Our market is the forest. The government 
knows this very well, and wants to send the oil company, only thinking about 
money, and it wants to destroy the lives of our people" (H. Mukucham 2004). 
This observation is of interest to our discussion of oil-related environmental access 
struggles because it exemplifies how oil exploitation has especially posed a threat to the 
Shuar women because of their disproportionate dependence on communal resources. 12 
As the women are the ones responsible for cultivating and preparing food, it follows 
that they would be very concerned about potential threats oil could have on these 
activities. Shuar women, such as I-Elda Mukucham, were worried that oil development 
would degrade subsistence resources, and advocated maintaining a more traditional 
lifestyle. They did not need therefore the kind of development that the oil companies 
offered. Likewise, Carmela Kuja (2004) said, "We do not see any protection for nature 
in the oil development plans and above all, we are not interested in anything from the 
companies... because we can survive without them". As with other women, she seemed 
acutely concerned that oil development would destroy their people, both culturally and 
physically, through disease, depletion of the resource base and violence and conflict 
among the Shuar thereafter. 13 
Faced with these sorts of powerful arguments, it is hardly surprising therefore that 
Burlington has devoted considerable resources to its pro-oil campaign. Indeed, 
Burlington's focus on the environment went hand-in-hand with the attempt to control 
the resistance of Shuar residents, notably through the presence of the Ecuadorian 
military in the region as a mean to secure oil operations. 14 Thus, while the fin-n 
12 This observation has been a key theme in 'feminist political ecology'; see Rocheleau et al. (1996) and 
Sundberg (2004). 
13 It is interesting to note here that the Shuar women I interviewed generally used more resonant language 
than the rhetorical language often used by Shuar men. 
14 For example, the Ecuadorian government has used military threat to start oil activities in the Kichwa 
community of Sarayaku, Pastaza province, despite the community's long-standing opposition. In 
response, Sarayaku has declared a state of emergency (in March 2004) and mobilized their communities 
to prevent the incursion of Argentinean company CGC, Burlington Resources, and Perenco (Sarayaku 
2005). 
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emphasised its environmental 'compassion' as this section has illustrated, it 
simultaneously concealed its part in setting local communities against each other, 
thereby also weakening the political and organisational capacity of the Shuar 
federations. However, as of late 2005, the firm's oil operation is officially halted while 
it negotiates with FIPSE and FICSH over plans for oil development. 
Burlington Resources has thus mounted a sophisticated if controversial material and 
discursive campaign to transform the landscape of access in Shuar lands. In response, 
Shuar communities have promoted, with the assistance of the federations, community 
resource management schemes designed to (re)assert control over and management of 
their natural resources and lands, as discussed next. 
7.3 Alternative Community Resource Management 
The recent global resurgence of the local community scale as a key organising principle 
of natural resource management notably linked to 'alternative' community development 
projects has been reflected in Shuar action over territorial definition as well as access to 
and management of natural resources (see also Peluso 1995; Hodgson and Schroeder 
2003). The issue of territorial defence was discussed in Chapter 6. There, it was 
suggested that Shuar residents had pursued various community mapping projects based 
upon an alternative territorial vision from the hegemonic state vision. This alternative 
was reflected in how the Shuar relate to land, how place was defined, and how relations 
on the ground were understood in terms of rights and control of resources. Here, I will 
examine two projects (that were not discussed in Chapter 6), which have been 
developed in Shuar territory since the end of the 1990s, in order to better appreciate 
how Shuar groups have sought to safeguard their access to resources and land against 
the kind of threat posed by Burlington Resources as discussed above. 
Although quite different, the two projects are nonetheless interesting for their similar 
intent--that is, they are becoming central to Shuar communities in their efforts to 
counter dominant representations of property regimes and land use practices that 
marginalise them. In the process, these projects have opened a terrain on which 
struggles over access to resources and land are linked to questions of cultural identity, 
land rights, economic choice, and power relations. These projects do not represent all of 
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the projects that Shuar villagers are pursuing but illustrate some key issues in the Shuar 
'fightback' against Burlington Resources. 15 
Let us begin by examining the first project I observed which is related to the 
development of Shuar controlled and managed ecological reserves. Over the last 
decade, some Shuar have been active through the federations in lobbying for the 
protection of land rights, cultural preservation and locally ('sustainable') defined 
development. In the process, they have linked up with other indigenous activists as well 
as allied external actors in calling for the creation of a new category of reserve land that 
would be preserved for the exclusive use of indigenous groups. The central principle 
adopted here was that local indigenous groups would manage natural resources 
effectively if they have a direct stake in the work and other benefits such projects 
generate. 
The formal recommendation adopted by participants in the annual assembly meeting of 
FICSH in December 2003 nicely exemplifies the assumptions involved here: 
"FICSH support the declaration of certain communities as ecological areas. 
Demarcation, titling and allocation of lands for these reserves will be promoted as 
a way to protect Shuar lands and resources from grabbing by the State and the oil 
companies. Consideration should be given to frameworks based on traditional 
systems, to facilitate negotiations between the federation and our base 
communities for sharing and co-management of a range of resources. " 16 
In particular, Shuar leaders demanded that protected status be granted for critical 
resources including areas to be set aside for biodiversity protection which were now 
under threat from oil development. However, the implementation of these proposals has 
been quite limited so far in practice and when it occurs, has been carried out on an 
incremental community-by-community basis. 
One such initiative came in February 2004 when the Shuar community of Mukucham 
and the state-linked institute Ecodesarrollo de la Region Amazohia Ecuatoriana 
15 Out of all the projects the Shuar federations have developed, only those which showed significant 
difference were compared and contrasted to examine the validity of general patterns in local claims to 
resource access through 'alternative' resource management projects produced 
during the time of 
fieldwork. 
16 The following discussion is based on my observations of this meeting. 
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(ECORAE)" organised participatory exerci ses- -meetings and resource management 
schemes to create an ecological reserve in the area. As the official partner, ECORAE 
had signed up to an agreement with this local community including precise conditions 
of access to specific areas on the part of both external and local actors, adopting the 
premise that community residents hold the rights to their lands and practiced 
4 sustainable' resource management (ECORAE 2004). That project was notably about 
safeguarding local environmental access in order to promote sustainable agriculture and 
natural resource use for local residents. 
This project thus addressed a growing problem in Mukucham. As a result of increasing 
oil exploitation in the nearby region of Napo, local food supplies had declined since the 
rivers had become polluted and the animals had fled further into the rainforest. For 
example, one villager typically remarked, "life is harder now, there is less fish to catch 
and less animals to hunt, we must stop the others destroying fish and animal habitats" 
(Angel Mukucham 2004). This quote expresses a common experience of fishing and 
hunting as depleted resources. Even as late as the end of the 1990s, fish and animal 
species were abundant locally and were providing a stable livelihood. Yet with 
increased oil exploitation in nearby areas, villagers in recent years rarely found animals 
to hunt or an adequate volume of fish to catch. Therefore, the ecological reserve was 
seen to offer protection to an 'endangered way of life', as one community resident 
responded positively: 
"'The forest here is special ... as it contains 
lots of plant and animal species that we 
need for food, shelter and health. We must conserve and maintain the balance of 
our [biodiversity], however not totally prohibiting fishing or hunting in this area 
because this is our source of survival" (G. Tseremp 2004). 
This quote is interesting because this was the only instance during my research that a 
local community resident used the term biodiversity. Undoubtedly, this was due to the 
fact that he had been exposed to the term during training sessions and activities with 
ECORAE. Here, the biodiversity discourse was critical to the process since it helped to 
validate scientifically local claims that emphasised socio-econornic stability, resource 
access and habitat protection as the way in which local livelihood interests and 
biodiversity could be secured. 
17 ECORAE is a state-linked institute that works to develop ecological ly-oriented projects in the Oriente. 
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Thus, the community needed secure access to local resources --something that 
4ecological' project pledged to do. Gonzalo Tseremp, a community resident as well as 
co-ordinator of the project, strongly believed that the project would generate new 
opportunities for community empowerment and sustainable livelihoods. He argued that 
46 although the project has taken some time to get use to, we feel more comfortable now 
with the idea of creating an ecological reserve and we are highly motivated with the 
project"(G. Tseremp 2004). Similarly, Francisco Canellos (2004) said "it seemed 
strange to ring-fence our land and resources at first, but now we have realised that the 
project is a way to protect our traditional livelihoods and local resources. " Thus, 
resources and livelihoods were the principal element that allowed people to discuss and 
negotiate local claims in the context of an 'ecological' reserve. 
Yet, how did ECORAE leading the resource management scheme incorporate local 
claims into the proposal for the 'ecological' reserve? Exploring this question 
illuminates how this type of state institution reacted to the assertion of local access 
claims. The initial stance toward local people was established through a complex series 
of negotiations held in Mukucham itself between ECORAE and community 
representatives in March 2004 (see Figure 7.6). The meetings were the only time when 
local communities were given the 'legal' right to negotiate changes to the proposed 
resource management zones. ECORAE thus asked for various meetings to be held in 
communities such as Mukucham as it considered them a key opportunity for 
community input. This resulted in the assertion of a local claim based on hybrid 
knowledge gathered from several sources to form best practice. This claim was a 
starting point for the negotiations. 
This preliminary consultation was a highly important move. Gonzalo Tseremp (2004) 
observed, "ECORAE is here to help us to create an ecological reserve to enable us to 
defend our traditional culture and livelihoods". The way in which the project was 
devised was therefore as novel as the contents of the project agreement itself. Thus, 
these meetings were a general forum for local people, and yet, as we will see, their 
process and context could affect whether some claims prevailed over others. 
The initial 
assertion of local claims through the proposed ecological reserve was shown to reflect 
local influences, albeit keeping with uneven micro-powers between ECORAE and local 
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people. How though, did this process of local input change in the course of subsequent 
meetings held to elaborate the project? 
Figure 7.4 Community Meeting in Mukucham 
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Crucial here was how local access claims were related to both the format and content of 
the meetings. In terms of the format, the meetings involved the presentation of legal 
and scientific knowledge claims albeit using local cultural examples to justify claims 
for the protection of the area. One ECORAE representative thus evoked strong cultural 
metaphors--for example, using the metaphor of house construction to emphasise the 
need for careful planning through zone identification: "If you build a house you need to 
plan it: where to build it and where to get the material from. This is our approach, we 
researched where to put things, this is the point of managing a protected area" (Jose, a 
pseudonym 2004). 1 8 He closed by evoking a sense of natural retribution for bad 
management with a 'mother earth knows best' example, linking local people to 
sustainable resource practices. This talk set the scene for ECORAE to explain 
permissible activities in local management zones based on official scientific experience. 
Local people were finally invited to comment during the open question forum. Here, 
community residents sought to assert further their own knowledge claims, notably 
though careful questioning of the reasons for the placement of specific zones and their 
boundaries. 
18 This ECORAE representative wished to remain anonymous. This anonymity is most likely related to 
the fact that ECORAE had a negative reputation in the region since it had assisted the oil companies in 
the development of the 'community relations' strategies. 
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Various social dynamics affected the meetings. Thus, officials on the panel were 
relatively young and their infon-nal friendly style encouraged questions. Even with this 
informal style, though, uneven power relations between ECORAE representatives on 
the one hand and local people on the other created a communication gap. It fell to some 
local leaders to address this gap by drawing out local concerns. Hence, what was 
locally asserted within these meetings was already filtered through existing power 
relations associated with power and position within the community. 
During the meeting, many residents focused on the context of the project and were 
concerned with the location and size of the core zone. In many cases, they also did not 
accept the concept of the protected area itself. For example, one resident said during 
one meeting, "if this area is closed to all types of fishing then where will we fish, we 
cannot go to other areas since we do not have canoes" (Alfonso Mukucham 2004). 
Instead, where there were habitats that needed protection, residents defined practices 
that would not damage them. Indeed, in this local discourse of protection there was 
clear provision for the practices of local people. This was done either by suggesting that 
the core zone be reduced in size or that it be altered to allow livelihood activities to 
continue. 
At the meeting, some residents were so angry with the plan that they got up and left the 
room so as to give a clear meaning to their critique of the proposal for the ecological 
reserve. Jorge Taki (2004) the brother of Luis Mukucham, for example pointed out that 
"we thought the project was developed in order to help us defend our livelihoods 
against the oil company [Burlington Resources] but it has become a tool for ECORAE 
to gain control of community land and to restrict access to our traditional agricultural 
and hunting grounds". Here is revealed scepticism of the motives of outsiders whenever 
it comes to discussing new access and livelihood arrangements. Indeed, there was even 
the suggestion that ECORAE was using this project to further its own 'devious' plans 
to access local resources. Underlying all of this was the fear that this project might 
restrict Shuar access to game within traditional hunting areas. 
The idea that entire communities should be ring-fenced inside an ecological reserve, 
thereby prohibiting residents from accessing the land particularly alarmed some 
residents. Milton Jambis (2004) thus said: 
"The project was developed to safeguard our 
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traditional cultural practices and livelihoods, however, now it seems like it [the project] 
will limit our access to some areas where we used to go to the chakra and do our 
fishing". Similarly, Pedro Mukucham (2004) stated, "it feels like we were selling our 
livelihoods and source of survival". Indeed, this aspect of the project did not generate 
much enthusiasm among community members. 
The response from one of the proponents of the new ecological reserve was that the 
project had little choice if it was to ever hope to succeed: "It is necessary to establish an 
ecological reserve in order to safeguard access to our land and resources now when the 
oil companies are coming. This is the only way! " (G. Tseremp 2004). Indeed, when 
another proponent was challenged about drawing hard boundaries around key Shuar 
water and land resources, he gave a telling response: "The oil companies are drawing 
boundaries all around us. If we do not make clear where to and how to draw boundaries 
around our natural resources and land, those people will draw them for us" (F. Canellos 
2004). This statement is also of interest because it is a reminder of what the Shuar 
federations FIPSE and FICSH felt was an ongoing difficulty of oil-related development 
as Burlington sought to tempt villagers away from seemingly less lucrative alternative 
livelihood options. Thus alternative projects such as this one must always address not 
only the usual divisions within communities confronted with complex new access and 
livelihood arrangements, but also the glittering 'gifts' of the pro-oil lobby that seek to 
capitalize on such divisions. 
Diverse points thus emerge from the first 'alternative' resource management project 
discussed in this section. First, the ecological reserve contains detailed prescriptions of 
local activities allowed and not allowed in the management zones. Thus, it has a 
strategic role in setting the frame for policies that affect how local people ought to act 
and how their claims to resource access are received. It is also a means to prevent 
access to their lands by others such as the oil companies. Thus, the ecological reserves 
"will be promoted as a way to protect Shuar lands and resources from grabbing by the 
state and the oil companies" (F. Canellos 2004). As such, and in principle, the project 
ought to have dovetailed with community worries about why oil exploitation posed a 
threat to local resource access and livelihoods (L. Mukucham 2004). 
19 
19 During the meetings, however, the ECORAE representatives did not explore this 
further thereby 
avoiding any direct confrontations 
between the groups over oil development. 
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Second, the sheer array of meetings between local people and ECORAE provided 
several opportunities to assert local claims to resource access and land- However, it 
required time for villagers to discursively form meanings and positions at the local level 
because the project required a new way of thinking in which local people were little 
practiced. Where they were able to assert claims, it was the institution that integrated 
them with other scientific claims in the planning process thereby reducing any local 
challenge while increasing the likelihood of project acceptance within a broader set of 
power relations. Thus, the local government was pleased with the plan "because you 
can see it comes from the people" (L. Shakay 2002) . 
20 The plan legitimised local claims 
in a way that was acceptable to local government. However, this was not considered to 
be an equally good plan by all community residents. 
Thus, the experience of the alternative project captured in Figure 7.4 demonstrated at a 
minimum that there was a great debate both within the community and with ECORAE 
over different aspects of the project. These divisions, in turn, posed complex problems 
for those seeking to implement it. On the one hand, the success of projects based on 
sustainable use and management of land and resources depends heavily on the initiative 
and involvement of local people. Without such support, community-based natural 
resources management schemes are usually doomed (Lawrence 2002). On the other 
hand, the various elements of the project raised concerns about the loss of cherished 
local practices insofar as fixed borders sought to 'rationalise' highly complex resource- 
use patterns. The drawing of boundaries- whether around ecological reserves or 
communal forests- is thus as much a cultural exercise as a political and economic one. 
Let us now turn to a second case of the federation-led 'alternative' resource 
management project. This one has been designed to safeguard local environmental 
access in order to promote 'sustainable' agriculture and natural resource use for local 
residents. Although different from the first project, this scheme has also sought 
nonetheless to safeguard local access to natural resources even as it looked 
for ways in 
which to boost Shuar livelihoods. It too, though, promoted 
divisions between 
communities, federations and state institutions as well as within communities about the 
meaning and direction of 'alternative' schemes. 
20 This quote is extracted from Plan de Accion 
Plantitario (FIPSE 2002b). 
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Project Plan de Accion Communitario was developed in 2002 by the Shuar federation 
FIPSE in conjunction with FIPSE-affiliated Shuar communities. This project was 
supported by Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas y Negros del Ecuador 
(PROPEDINE), which is a nation-wide program (funded by the World Bank and IFAD, 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development) that offers to support indigenous 
organisations, and has the specific purpose of offering 'ethnodevelopment' or 
'development with identity' (CONDEMPE 2004; Radcliffe 2001b; PROPEDINE 
2002) . 
21 FIPSE organised community mapping exercises, public hearings and resource 
management schemes to elaborate proposals for the project (for example, as seen in 
Figure 7.5 and 7.6). The federation-led project was designed to "improve infrastructure, 
social and productive development and to strengthen community development, and 
incorporate residents' own vision of development" (FIPSE 2002c). Further, it entailed a 
substantial restructuring of local Shuar social and economic relationships by 
'modernising' and commercialising traditional agricultural production in order to 
increase household incomes. This would, for example, be achieved by boosting market- 
oriented activities centred on cattle ranching and/or the sale of products from the 
chakra, such as coffee and cacao, in outdoor markets in Puyo or in Macas. Federation 
leaders maintain that "the active transformation from subsistence to a market economy 
has resulted in socio-economic advantages for the Shuar ... At the same time this 
has 
given us [the Shuar] a sense of economic security and pride in our own achievements. 
Through cattle ranching and cash crop production, we [the Shuar] have found a way to 
prevent the Government from expropriating the land and the oil companies from 
accessing our resources" (D. Nayap 2004). Thus, and if seen from this perspective, 
these strategies have indeed been successful in securing access to land and resources. 
In addition, the aspiration here is that the hoped-for benefits of modernisation will 
strengthen the federation itself as socio-political vehicle for demanding change, access 
to resources and a more prominent role for Shuar [leaders] in rural development and 
governance. In one of the proposals produced by FIPSE (2002c), it is stated that the 
project aimed to "improve the life of indigenous communities ... and to access 
land and 
to finance subprojects of their own intervention ... with regard to existing cultural values, 
21 With a $50 Million budget, PROPEDINE gives indigenous organisations control over resources that 
are used for capacity building in indigenous organisations, regularisation of 
land and water tenure, rural 
investment in private and collective assets and institutional strengthening of the (governmental) Council 
for the Development of Nationalities and People of Ecuador (CONDEMPE) 
(CONDEMPE 2002). 
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development vision and governance". Such demands are given cogency by the fact that 
the federation's management of modernisation reflects an attempt to demonstrate a 
Shuar ability to manage modem administrative methods in a style similar to state 
programs. If they are able to administer rural modernisation through their own 
organisations, state-led development is no longer justifiable. The decision to foster 
commercialisation of agricultural production thus has clear rationalities. Modernisation 
seems a necessary response to the realities of land subdivision, state agricultural 
development projects, colonisation and oil-based development. 
Thus, it is important to recognise how the federation's proposals, encapsulated in the 
second project, are influenced by wider cultural and political logics as well as socio- 
economic pressures. The Shuar federation-led project can be seen as simply the latest 
instalment in a much larger process of frontier development. Indeed, as far back as the 
mid-1980s, the situation began changing rapidly due to privatisation of land and 
increased colonisation. Deepening commercialisation of the rural economy has 
heightened the Shuar's need for land (and thus land titles) as security for loans. As the 
Ecuadorian state belatedly began to make specific policies regarding indigenous 
ownership of lands, it also became a central strategy of Shuar federations to maintain 
control over land and natural resources (see Chapter 6). In particular, this has become a 
common strategy since oil-based development has heightened tensions over land and 
resources in the area, and since the Ecuadorian state has increased its bureaucratic and 
military capacity to dispossess those without appropriate legal documents. 
Hence, there is the perceived need for new market linkages and Shuar administration as 
part of a strategy of cultural survival that nevertheless challenges the viability of 
traditional indigenous agriculture. At the heart of the matter here was the issue of 
reliable access to markets and hence monetary income. However, when villagers have 
attempted to sell their goods in these markets over the years, they have been seriously 
disadvantaged--at the mercy of highly variable markets on the one hand, while being 
squeezed financially by powerful networks of merchants who purchase their goods on 
the other hand. 22 Given the distance and difficulty involved, the lack of reliable 
information on current commodity prices, and the difficulty of acquiring the money to 
22 Prices are controlled by traders so that a lack of competition between them means that villagers never 
reap the economic benefits from normal competitive 
demand and supply relations. 
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purchase vehicles to transport the goods themselves, Shuar villagers have hitherto had 
little choice but to simply accept prices offered to them. Miguel Anguash (2003) from 
the village of Ijinti, asserted, "We often lack the money necessary to get the products to 
the town [Puyo]. Still, if we would be able to sell our products there, we would not 
make enough profit to even pay for the bus fare". 
Indeed, these problems were quite visible when I accompanied community residents 
from Naparuk to the markets in Macas and Santiago. Since the villagers lacked the 
financial means to rent or buy a vehicle even though it was far to the nearest town, it 
was already difficult for them to sell the goods they had produced at the market. 
Oswaldo Anguisha (2003) of Naparuk put it: "We want to sell our products in the 
markets but we have neither the money nor the transportation to take them [the 
products] to the nearest road and then into the towns". Due to the lack of basic 
communication and infrastructure in their village, they also had difficulties in receiving 
information about current market conditions and commodity prices. Meanwhile, as a 
result of 'doll ari zation', unemployment in the towns climbed thereby changing local 
consumption patterns since many people could no longer afford to buy the products 
sold in the markets. There is also the broader political economy of Ecuadorian debt and 
structural adjustment, characterised by declining commodity prices and economic crises 
(see Chapter 4) that clearly undercut economic experiments such as the one associated 
with the second alternative project being considered here. 
To appreciate the nature of the challenge in project Plan de AcclOn Communitario it is 
important that we briefly revisit an earlier discussion on how many Shuar have long 
related to their land in terms of differentiated places. The project considered here is a 
visible contrast to traditional production systems used locally and based upon a Mix of 
horticulture and fishing. That these activities are carefully gendered and intricately 
linked to place has inevitably meant that the new project has disrupted existing 
perceptions held by some residents. Rosa Himpikit (2004) of Shinkiatam thus noted: 
"The federation and some institutions have developed this project that is supposed to 
develop new means to safeguard our natural resources and land, but it [the project] 
counteracts our traditional practices and what it means for us to be Shuar". Thus, as was 
noted in relation to the village of Shinkiatam, household production and consumption 
practices often still play an important role in deciding how to manage and use local 
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natural and material resources as well as in forming ideas about overall Shuar cultural 
identity. Based on many conversations held with Shuar villagers, it became clear to me 
that this was a relationship based on a perception of the Shuar as 'traditional' 
indigenous farmers and 'sustainable 1) resource managers. 
How, then, are these practices represented in the FEPSE-led project and which ones 
predominate? The community mapping exercises instigated by the federation (and 
supported by PROPEDINE) in FEPSE-affiliated communities revealed certain patterns. 
For example, Figure 7.5 demonstrates how resources with a market value were 
associated with livelihood knowledge. They tended to be a discrete resource, such as 
cacao or corn, with an identifiable market. These resources tended to be seasonally 
available in large volumes and were usually dependable. They also provided a cash 
income and associated activities were relatively easy to undertake. As one villager 
(2003) stated, "Everyone is involved in corn production, children and my wives 
included. We all go to the fields with our machetes and enough chicha to last for the 
whole day". Here, strong interest in the economic benefits to be derived from a 
substantial restructuring of local Shuar social and economic relationships by 
'modemising' and commercialising traditional agricultural production was widespread 
and reflective of a prior linkage to the market. This modernisation would be achieved 
by boosting market-oriented activities centred on the sale of products from the chakra, 
such as cacao or com, or from logging for hard wood and the clearing of forest for 
pastures. 
Meanwhile, important knowledge featured on the map--here illustrated with reference 
to Figure 7.6--related to subsistence and life-enriching activities, such as resources that 
provided food and shelter. 23 These included resources such as juca and plantains, and 
palmito and balsa trees. Asserting the claims to these resources through mapping 
ensures that local people have basic security. It thus shows how the community 
residents' experiences were reflected in the role certain resources were said to play 
locally. For example, knowledge claims and practices about hunting and general forest 
types were the presence of a male elder. Indeed, he knew thirty different species of 
trees in the area and could identify them through botanical characteristics: "The trees 
23 This map was initIally analysed in Chapter 6--notably, illustrated as Fiz-ure 6.5. Once again, reference 
to Mukucham community map is important in order to distil local people's claims to resources. 
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have different characteristics and are of great important for the survival of our people. 
They provide building materials, shelter and food. For example, we use the chonta for 
building canoes, we can eat some parts of it, and we use it for building our houses. " (L. 
Mukucham 2004). The depth of knowledge reflected in this quote also seems to 
indicate the importance of this resource (especially to the men who collect it). Further, 
the assertion of resource access in map form also featured diverse sorts of 'cultural 
knowledge', such as how to use spiritual practices. These may include those resources 
used in 'traditional' celebration, such as chicha made out of juca. Asserting these 
cultural claims in general through mapping exercises was seen to ensure that local 
people have the flexibility to adapt to any changes in access to resources by providing 
for a safeguarding an array of specific resources. 
Gendered knowledge was also visible when local women drew and discussed their map. 
Thus, for example, the female elders had knowledge and practice of chakra agriculture 
and collection of herbs and plants. This knowledge indicated that women were more 
responsible for resource activities in the fields and near the houses than were the men. 
The women also showed greater knowledge about the status of the land and the health 
of people. What emerged from these discussions was that gendered knowledge claims 
were spatially differentiated and represented different zones of land and resource use 
and knowledge. Thus, where men's knowledge extended deep into the adjoining forest 
where they hunted the animals, women's knowledge extended only as far as the 
regenerating forest area where agriculture was based and herbs grew. 
Thus, community maps developed in the context of the second project indicate that, 
while diverse activities are shown, the emphasis is on livelihood knowledge and 
'traditional' resource management systems. Yet, even this initial introduction to the 
question of local knowledge suggests unevenness in the portrayal of residents' claims. 
In many cases, knowledge claims reflect the heterogeneous character of village life and 
livelihoods. Thus, community mapping is a discursive tool that may not represent the 
full set of community experiences. Indeed, it may even reflect uneven power relations 
between groups as certain claims tend to be the most conspicuous. 
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Figure 7.5 Chuwitayu Community Map 
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For example, community leaders tended to be the most influential in the community 
mapping exercises since they already had some connections with outsiders (L. KuJa 
2004). This may be to the advantage of the community as a whole but depends on 
whether this stronger local voice incorporates or marginalises diverse other local 
interests. Subtle micro-power relations are at play here. They are reflected in how local 
communities assert themselves through the extemally-supported resource management 
projects. As part of this process, community mapping clearly represents a key means by 
which local knowledge claims are defined, albeit selectively. 
Yet, how did FIPSE leaders leading the second 'alternative' resource management 
initiative incorporate those claims into the project? The discussion here has assessed 
local community claims. However, these only make up a small part of the federation- 
led resource management projects which encompass a wider array of actors and 
interests. Community maps were an initial step because they enabled the communities 
to show how they used resources and how they would like circumstances to change. 
However, this was only the first step in developing the management plan, which 
requires communities to think about resources in a new way. Here, our concern is to 
assess where and how local claims were incorporated in the final version of the second 
resource management project. 
The second project developed by FEPSE certainly asserts local claims more successfully 
than the first resource management project discussed above. The relative success here 
reflects a greater opportunity to reflect, negotiate and propose local claims to resource 
access and land in sustained manner. For example, participating Shuar communities 
have finally been able to make themselves visible to local government, national 
institutions and NGOs with the prospect of protecting local resources and land. 
Villagers have finally received management plans based in part on their claims to local 
resources and land and even approved by local government. The generation of 'hybrid' 
knowledge claims combining resources and land concerns has been a pioneering effort. 
This process has changed how many in the official sector approach community 
resource management. 
That said, there were still ambiguities in the second project. Thus, in some cases, 
communities held different views from the federation over resource use leading to 
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controversy. This was the case in Mukucham (M. Peas 2004). FIPSE seemed to be 
inconsistent in how it deals with local claims to resource access. Indeed, the federation 
seemed to treat all claims as being equally reflective of all Shuar. Yet, this is not always 
the case as discussion of the community mapping exercises above showed due to 
existing unequal power relations between communities. In particular, they did not fully 
appreciate and respond to the claims made by some in the local communities seeking 
opportunities to secure access to resources and land based on 'traditional' resource 
management systems. FIPSE has rather reinforced a longstanding process of Shuar 
'modernisation' and market integration that casts some doubt on the 'alternative' label 
of this project. Although 'alternative' in the sense of privileging Shuar resource access 
and control over that of outsiders, there have nonetheless been adverse social and 
environmental impacts associated with this second project and the wider development 
dynamics it subscribes to. 
For example, cattle ranching and the clearing of land for pastures have led to extensive 
deforestation, degraded soil and the loss of hunting grounds. As argued by Luis Kuash 
(2004), a Shuar leader from Ijinti, "One of the greatest external pressures upon the 
social and economic systems of the Shuar communities has been the loss of forests and 
hunting grounds". These changes have moreover increased inequality between Shuar 
men and women. Since men have a virtual monopoly over animal husbandry, profits 
from cattle have transformed gender relations within Shuar society. And, as the men 
have been usually most widely exposed to urban markets, they have been the keenest to 
participate in 'modem' way of life (S. Tibi 2002). Thus, the sorts of changes that the 
second project proposes (and which, in turn, build on decades of land clearance for 
tenure security) have also led to an increasing economic inequality that has changed the 
nature of socio-political relations within Shuar communities. 
Further, the ways in which the federation has been supported by powerful outside 
actors, such as the state agency CONDEMPE, casts further doubt about the 'alternative' 
label of this project. For example, FIPSE itself negotiated and ultimately decided to 
participate actively in PROPEDINE, the project which the World Bank, MAD and the 
Government of Ecuador supported, which is specifically intended to promote 
indigenous development. The resources that this program has made available to the 
federation were without precedent, as was the notion that the federation would play a 
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direct role in the management of government programs. But also without precedent 
were the contradictions to be negotiated: an indigenous federation that opposes 
neoliberalism managing World Bank loans, market-oriented and infrastructure 
investments as a primary instrument for 'indigenous' development, the jockeying for 
power and resources among different indigenous groups, nationally and locally, and so 
on. These ch an ges- -unprecedented, complex and contradictory--challenge the 
assumption of our categories of 'alternative' resource management projects in the 
contemporary era. 
Thus, alternative projects that provide for Shuar-led management are seemingly not a 
complete solution for regional resource access and management problems. In particular, 
where long-term conflicts exist between the state and local resources users, as in Shuar 
lands, sustained multi-actor negotiation is required before more equitable solutions to 
land management conflicts are to be found. Specifically, alternative community 
resource management must be accompanied with well-defined legal and political 
strategies if they are to succeed. Our two 'alternative' community projects thus 
illustrate the point that mobilising a community to support a local conservation effort 
designed to deny access to outsiders is not the same as mobilising it around claims for 
greater economic security or broader territorial control. Although Shuar-led initiatives 
often involve extensive community participation, it is not clear furthermore that such 
participation attains a wider impact, through for example the revision of state or 
corporate practices. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has examined Shuar struggles over access to natural and material 
resources. One source of conflict lies in state and transnational understandings of how 
to control and manage natural resources in contemporary times. This has manifested 
itself in neoliberal policy that supports the privileges of oil companies such as 
Burlington Resources. Thus, there is a continuing emphasis on a top-down approach 
featuring production and technical aspects of environmental management, rather than a 
social or ethical sense of appropriate local practices. Productivity indicators are used as 
proxy for socio-economic development and as a proxy for economic, social and 
political empowerment. Yet, such measures do not square with community-based 
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resource management such that they have tended ultimately to deny local people access 
to local resources. Indeed, historical, institutional, economic and political 
considerations create barriers for the implementation of policies involving the transfer 
of power over natural resources from the state and the oil companies into the hands of 
local communities. 
However, growing awareness among the Shuar communities has encouraged the 
adaptation of community-based initiatives to manage local resources. As Peluso and 
Watts (2001) note, the challenge created by community-mapping projects is to push 
towards new paradigms that emphasise people and socio-economic development of 
rural communities living in forestlands, rather than emphasising conventional models of 
production. The historical legacy of state control over natural resources and enclosure 
of common lands, in combination with the increasing orientation towards privatisation 
of resources and lands, are nonetheless evident in Ecuadorian policies. However, the 
assumption that the state remains the ultimate environmental manager has changed, 
even though the belief that community-based management practices are 'backward' 
still shapes policy design albeit now often implicitly. Resource management remains 
inherently political since it revolves around the control of resources contested by actors 
at various scales. 
This thesis has thus broadly highlighted indigenous movements and political organising 
in the Amazonian region in Ecuador. Specifically, it considered how a Shuar 
indigenous movement was created over the last decades to challenge land reforms, 
colonisation programs, neoliberal policies and oil development through both formal and 
informal political processes. The theoretical framework of the thesis combined the 
concerns of political ecology and new social movement analysis in order to investigate 
the ways in which notions of cultural identity, territory and place, and control over 
resource access are central to Shuar politics and struggles. 
Thus, Chapter 5 examined the way in which the Shuar struggle has been partly about 
the articulation of Shuar cultural identity and its contested deployment in political 
battles with both the Ecuadorian state and transnational oil companies. In contrast, 
Chapter 6 considered how that struggle came to be defined in terms of particular 
geographical notions of Shuar territoriality and local sense of place. Here, the multi- 
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faceted effort by the Shuar federations to advance indigenous interests through the 
interweaving of ancestral and ecological claims was explored. Finally, Chapter 7 
assessed the ways in which the Shuar struggle involved a complex politics of land and 
resource access. In aggregate, the three key empirical chapters have thus presented a 
complex picture of indigenous struggles using a Shuar case study. It remains in Chapter 
8, then, to summarise the findings of the thesis and distil wider insights and a possible 
future research agenda from those findings. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis has considered the diverse ways in which indigenous people have responded 
to neoliberal policies and oil-based development using the Shuar people Ecuador's 
Oriente as a case study. Chapter 2 presented the three-fold theoretical framework of 
cultural identity politics, indigenous territoriality and place, and resource access and 
these research elements were then assessed in Chapters 5,6 and 7. The Shuar case 
study proved a challenging but rewarding one in which to assess this framework. The 
thesis showed how the Shuar federations have been successful in forging political 
articulations of a cultural identity and even a powerful social movement based on the 
assertion of Shuar culture in an age of proposed oil development. As the thesis showed, 
issues of territory and place were also quite crucial in that quest. The work of territorial 
defence by the Shuar federations has been successful insofar that as the rights of the 
Shuar communities to defend their land collectively have been officially acknowledged 
which has enabled the Shuar federations, in turn, to use new legally-based means to try 
to stop the imposition of oil-based territoriality. Then, finally, the ways in which the 
Shuar strategies involved complex struggles over land and resource access was 
investigated. It was considered how the Shuar federations have influenced livelihoods 
and resource access for their members, as well as the manner in which territory and 
cultural identity play out in the context of location-specific resources issues. 
Throughout, attention was paid to the possible tensions and contradictions of the Shuar 
struggle, and notably differences between the Shuar federations and the communities 
they purport to represent. 
In this, the final chapter of the thesis, the key findings are summarised in relation to the 
three main research themes, permitting assessment of the strength and weaknesses of 
the Shuar movement. The broader impact of these findings is then considered in light of 
a possible future research agenda for the study of indigenous politics. 
8.1 Cultural Identity Politics 
The first research theme guiding this thesis considered how the Shuar federations have 
articulated and politicised a Shuar cultural identity. The most important issue here was 
what it meant for the Shuar to be 'indigenous' and/or 'Shuar' in the context of new 
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relationships with the state, transnational corporations, non-governmental 
organisations, conditioned by shifting political and economic processes under 
neoliberal rule. Given this volatile and complex setting, how could the Shuar mobilise a 
cultural identity? What sort of articulation of indigenous identity and political 
positionality was at play here? It soon became clear that cultural identity and territory 
were key building blocks upon which a politics of cultural difference and indigenous 
rights were being constructed. And yet, this was an unstable and contradictory process. 
As Chapter 5 demonstrated, the Shuar federations built upon more than three decades 
of Shuar organising and resentment against land reforms, 'development', neoliberal 
policies and oil-based development to create an indigenous movement with national 
and international visibility capable even of challenging state and transnational powers. 
This was by any standard a remarkable achievement. Yet, as this thesis also showed, 
this federation-led struggle was both contentious and problematic. 
What the Shuar case study does clearly demonstrate, though, is how cultural identity 
can be constructed politically. Shuar self-identification as indigenous with a specific 
cultural identity was articulated politically by a leadership keen to marshal all available 
resources to stymie oil-based development. This process of identity articulation drew 
selectively upon cultural ly-based local practices, landscapes, and meanings, and was 
forged through particular patterns of engagement among Shuar communities as well as 
with an array of other actors. As I explained in Chapter 4, this construction emerged 
from nation-wide struggle insofar as invaluable political and territorial rights were 
added to the National Constitution in 1998 as well as being reinforced when Ecuador 
signed ILO Convention 169 also in 1998--both as part of the embrace of a new 
discourse of multiculturalism and plurinationalism. As we further saw, the rise of 
cultural identity as a political category (with international support) became a resource 
that local indigenous struggles, in turn, could latch onto--for example, as with 
FederaciOn Indenpendiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador (FEPSE) in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. The emergence of a national debate in Ecuador at that time was thus 
precisely both product of and spur for further indigenous claim-making on the state, a 
process by which cultural identity assumes an ethnic idiom through discursive and 
political activism. 
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Thus, the Shuar case study shows that the elaboration of indigenous identity reflects a 
complex and hybrid genealogy of identification that emerged over decades. That 
identity has been made around a strong inter-connected sense of territory, culture and 
tradition, but in the context of cultural, economic and political change. This elaboration 
was achieved through complex negotiations over cultural identity, even as the rise of 
indigenous politics nationally and internationally unleashed considerable political 
energy among indigenous people resentful of their marginalised status. A Shuar identity 
thus became a key tool used by the Shuar federations to build the political strategies 
based on collective Shuar political, economic, and cultural views critical of neoliberal 
policies and state-defined development, nationhood and democracy. For Shuar leaders, 
in particular, therefore local indigenous identity has been an essential element in their 
ability to engage in a contested political environment. 
Moreover, Chapter 5 suggested that there was no simple sense of what it meant to be 
'Shuar', no unproblematic unity, and no singular form of political subject (even though 
this has not stopped the Shuar federations from claiming that they represented all Shuar 
communities). Indeed, the analysis underscored the vulnerability of that struggle-- 
notably, a fractious and divided 'we' as splits between Shuar federations and Shuar 
communities emerged, for example. As we saw, federation leaders articulated a highly 
politicised cultural identity and drew explicit and close connections between identity, 
territory and political organisation. In contrast, in the Shuar communities themselves, 
cultural identity was found to be embedded within complex everyday practices, 
including notably long-standing agricultural production and consumption systerns--in 
other words, a world of micro-practices commonly identified as 'Shuar' locally. These 
place-based and gendered relations were notably different from the grand rhetorical and 
political articulations used by federation leaders to describe Shuar cultural identity. 
Conceptualisations of identity even differed quite markedly between Shuar 
communities. As we saw in the context of severe land subdivision and cultural change, 
indigenous residents followed diverse strategies to sustain livelihoods, including the 
adoption of cattle ranching activities as well as cash-crop production and marketing. 
Such non-traditional activities inevitably raised questions about the Shuar adopting a 
mestizo identity. Interestingly enough, however, and despite the intensive 
commercialisation of livelihoods and agricultural production, even Shuar thus 
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integrated into the 'modem' economy still maintained that they were a distinctive 
cultural entity. Thus, a whole range of complex and hybrid identities became visible 
through the research complicating any notion of a homogeneous 'indigenous' identity. 
Finally, the discussion in Chapter 5 of cultural identity politics revealed that, while the 
federations constantly invoked Shuar culture and tradition in their discourses, they also 
focused on participation in national politics using Western-style organisational 
strategies. This choice has re-shaped the approach of the federations providing new 
opportunities but also new sources of division. The political prominence and success of 
the Shuar federations have been linked to the provision of political, financial and 
technical support from various external actors. Yet the reliance (and dependence) on 
outside support has meant that the designs and implementation of projects was often 
based on the ideas and concerns of the outside agencies, rather than from the 
federations themselves liaising with Shuar communities. In particular, funding was seen 
as the 'Achilles heel' of their work since the need for money led to trade-offs at odds 
with their original objectives as autonomous Shuar bodies. 
This set of ambiguous findings alerts us to the ways in which indigenous movements 
tend to reflect the institutional and intellectual environment in which they emerge and 
operate. Neither movements nor their strategies are entirely self-generated. Not only are 
they situated in the political and economic context that greatly influences what they do, 
but they are also situated in a web of ideas and historical precedents that influence what 
they choose to do. At the same time, however, indigenous movements such as those 
described herein do become heavily involved in strategies of resistance and ethnic 
assertiveness, in which the role and social control of traditional powerful actors (states 
and businesses) are challenged and reworked--as some of the social movements 
literature canvassed in Chapter 2 suggests. 
8.2 Territory and Place 
The second research theme guiding this thesis considered indigenous territonality--how 
such territoriality was articulated in relation to state-sanctioned oil-based territoriality, 
and how the existence of rival terri tori ali ties has produced differing sorts of governance 
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possibilities. Thus, the focus of Chapter 6 was on the geographical building blocks of 
Shuar struggles --territory and place--and examined the processes surrounding Shuar 
land-based mobilisation as well as how territory became incorporated into political 
actions. Control over territory is the key political motivating force of Shuar 
mobilisation. Processes of territorial control and associated land-based conflicts are 
central to Shuar strategies of resistance as a reaction to oil development projects. As 
became clear in this thesis, moreover, territory has even come to play an important role 
in the formation of Shuar cultural identity itself. 
The importance of defending a clearly defined Shuar territory has been linked by Shuar 
leaders to the enhanced threat posed by outside actors, above all the Ecuadorian state 
and oil transnational corporations (for example, Burlington Resources) via oil-based 
territorialization. Challenging that territorial understanding, the federations elaborated 
another territoriality premised on indigenous community, citizenship and identity. They 
have thus attempted to 'redraw' the map of state power by generating a new spatial 
order predicated on distinctive local affiliations to territory. Shuar map-making and 
land titling projects thus generate metaphorical and material means to contest state- 
designed oil development projects that deny Shuar geographies and resource rights. By 
providing alternatives to land colonisation by settler farmers as well as oil-based 
development predicated on the Oriente as an 'empty space', these maps and projects 
were seen to provide a distinct alternative to that organised by the state. 
Chapter 6 also examined the extent to which residents were able to assert a local sense 
of place through these territorial initiatives. The study thus needed to unpack (however 
selectively) how a local sense of place is understood by various actors in a context of 
place-based relations and struggles. Here, the role of community maps in distilling 
place-based relations and perceptions was vital. In general, what emerged from the 
analysis was a strong sense of interdependence between people and specific places. 
While there were diverse place-based relations and perceptions, local senses of place 
nonetheless had one crucial aspect in common--namely, land as a common resource 
under threat from outsider-led 'development'. At the same time, though, difference was 
found in the specific relations linking local people with resources as well as with to 
outsiders. Ambiguities here had implications for how local people reacted to federation- 
led territorial initiatives and associated place-based opportunities. Indeed, by exploring 
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some of the conflicts that developed between local communities and the federations, it 
became clear that these struggles were indeed derived from micro-power dynamics 
associated with rival senses of place, notably reflecting the differing interests and 
networks of the various Shuar participants. 
Chapter 6, moreover, discussed sense of place in terms of a process of 'placing 
culture'--or what I have also described as place-based cultural identity. Much of the 
discussion here was concerned with assessing different federation-led initiatives 
designed to 'place culture' (i. e. cultural identity) as a strategy to make land claims. Pre- 
existing political and economic factors undoubtedly shaped this process in as much as 
the federations articulated claims through a carefully selected set of wider national and 
international discourses designed to maximise political effect. 
Take the example of ancestral domain claims. These are negotiated between the Shuar 
federations and state agencies and are of considerable potential importance. Federation 
leaders now commonly use ancestral domain claims as a strategy to 'place culture' and 
thereby secure 'officially' recognised rights to protected areas. A key indicator of 
whether local sense of place was asserted here was whether the protected area process 
challenged social and political power relations favouring elite access rights. To some 
extent, it was found that the initiatives that were considered allowed protected areas to 
function as 'other places' (Foucault 1986) nested within the context of official 
biodiversity management plans. Thus, some big economic interests (for example, the 
oil companies) were curtailed from these areas because the initiatives would close the 
protected area to exclusive private use (such as oil development) whilst maintaining it 
open for the controlled common use of local resources by local residents. The result 
here thus can be seen, to some extent at least, as an assertion of a local place-based 
opportunity. Yet given delays in winning formal approval for ancestral domain claims, 
these possible local opportunities may still be threatened in the future by the possibility 
that political and economic pressure for oil exploitation proves successful. In any event, 
in 'placing culture the federations had already compromised the local senses of place 
communicated to them at the community level by fitting into a fairly rigid context 
acceptable to powerful outsiders, such as state development agencies. Indeed, some 
place-based community-level understandings of Shuar identity were simply ignored-- 
prompting tension between the federations and selected Shuar communities. Here too, 
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therefore, the findings point to crucial ambiguities in how the Shuar struggle is 
articulated in relation to specific issues of the thesis. 
8.3 Resource Conflicts 
The third and final research theme guiding this thesis addressed resource conflicts and 
access rights. Formal and informal governance was examined in particular in order to 
assess possible shifts in environmental governance and associated micro-power 
relations. As the Shuar case study suggests, with the expansionary powers of neoliberal 
policies and transnational corporations, state power itself is rapidly changing. Some 
state functions are being created or strengthened, while others are being weakened or 
eliminated altogether. It became clear generally in the course of this study how central 
wider political and economic processes have been to trends in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
(as elsewhere). The emphasis in Chapter 7 was not only on these changes, but also on 
the regimes of environmental governance, power relations and access rights affected by 
such changes. 
Thus, Chapter 7 examined how the biophysical environment and associated human- 
environmental relations are being transformed through scientific and political processes 
of neoliberal thinking. Indeed, oil companies were seen to emerge with a strengthened 
mandate to oversee oil-based territorialization and associated 'sustainable' management 
of natural resources and land, resulting thereby in a radical alteration in the ways in 
which indigenous people would be able to interact with the local environment. Such 
'green neoliberalism' is clearly a political discourse designed to foster 
govemmentalisation and capitalisation of hotly contested ecological zones, such as oil 
block 24 in the Oriente (see also Goldman 2004). 
The discussion in Chapter 7 highlighted moreover the central role of Burlington 
Resources in conflict over access to natural resources through tactics based on the idea 
of 'corporate social responsibility'. The firm's objectives here were scarcely hidden. 
Thus, it orchestrated 'negotiations' with those communities it needed to control in order 
to advance the oil agenda even as it played a key role in creating and exacerbating 
divisions among local people in order to counteract the work of the Shuar federations. 
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Here this was a classic divide-and-rule strategy. Following the practices of every 
transnational oil company working in the Oriente, Burlington claimed it would assist 
local communities in the elaboration of development projects and new work 
opportunities (Sawyer 2004; Wray 2000). This strategy of 'buying consciousness' 
played on the distrust of some Shuar for the actions of the federations that purportedly 
acted on their behalf. The firm thus dismissed the accusations of the Shuar federations 
by casting aspirations in turn on their own local legitimacy, thereby hoping to 
undermine opposition to oil-based development. Here, then, we saw an apparent 
transition in how environmental governance is conducted in the Oriente as corporate- 
led 'sustainable development' and 'corporate social responsibility' moved centre-stage. 
Above all, the discussion in Chapter 7 clarified the complexity surrounding local Shuar 
claims derived from a long history of denied access to local resources even as it 
examined various obstacles to their assertion. As a response to new governance 
arrangements led by the oil companies, the Shuar federations have thus attempted to 
develop various resource management projects based largely on current community 
resource use patterns. There were seen to be two broad aspects to the assertion of 
calternative' resource management projects at the current historical juncture. The first 
involved the development of ecological reserves, which presented an opportunity to 
talk about and act upon biodiversity differently by, for example, incorporating local 
people's claims to local resources and land. While ultimately proposing limited 
governance benefits to local people, the first project that was analysed did nonetheless 
provide a new and somewhat positive experience of governance with one associated 
benefit that local people were beginning to become accustomed to questioning the 
nature of local political control. Yet, as we also saw, the groups that were involved in 
this project have different claims and clearly differed in their ability to assert their 
claims during project meetings. In fact, the villagers that were already marginalised 
within existing local power relations, continued to be so in the process of creating the 
proposed ecological reserve. As such, and although, local participation in the project 
was achieved, the result seemed to underscore the need to tackle access inequalities 
between powerful actors (states and businesses) and the project communities 
themselves. 
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The second aspect to the assertion of 'alternative' resource management related to a 
project supported by a federation (FIPSE) that took the decision to 'modernise' and 
'develop' traditional agricultural practices. The commercialisation of livelihoods and 
agricultural production involved, however, more than simple adaptive, technological 
changes. Rather, the goal was to change the regional political economy itself in 
significant ways so as to increase the accumulation and retention of capital at the 
community level. Here again, the aim was to gain additional control of and access to 
resources for both Shuar communities and the federations. The assumption behind the 
second project is thus also that the hoped-for benefits of modernisation and 
development will strengthen indigenous organisations as socio-political vehicles fully 
capable of demanding political change, access to material and natural resources and a 
more prominent role for the Shuar generally in rural development and governance. 
These sorts of 'alternative' federation-led experiences remain more the exception than 
the rule even today. As suggested in Chapter 7, rural development patterns in Ecuador 
are highly uneven and many localities remain largely excluded from economic growth 
options and are unable to exercise significant control over the markets in which they are 
often embedded. If this was so when I began this research study, it seems even more the 
case today as the combined effect of dollarization and trade liberalisation leave many 
local economies 'uncompetitive'. Major changes such as these are indicative that both 
community and federation struggles to achieve more control over local resources for 
indigenous people face enormous obstacles. The ways in which some Shuar have 
integrated their livelihoods and outlooks with processes of 'modernisation' and 
'development' casts doubt about even the long-term, future of schemes that go under an 
'alternative' label. 
In short, Chapter 7 showed that the political significance and effectiveness of the Shuar 
movement is remains ambiguous. It may represent an effective means to secure access 
to land and resources as well as to develop 'alternative' resource management projects. 
Then again, it may be a largely ineffectual enterprise whose activities are mainly 
defined by outside interests and perceptions. 
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8.4 Indigenous Movements and Beyond 
This study has thus assessed indigenous political organising through an analysis of how 
the Shuar negotiated the acquisition of new cultural identities, defined an Indigenous 
territoriality, articulated diverse local senses of place, proposed protected areas, and 
challenged existing governance relations and access rights. This analysis was found 
theoretically in the context of work in political ecology and new social movement 
literature. A thesis concerned with the possibility of indigenous struggles, it was 
nonetheless ever mindful of the wider political and economic context--of how land 
reforms, neoliberal policies, oil-based development, micro-power relations and 
governance agreements have shifted over time with decidedly ambiguous consequences 
for the Shuar. As such, this thesis has sought to unpack the complex nature of 
indigenous political organising, and in doing so has sought to contribute to recent work 
that seeks to challenge generalised or even 'romanticised' understandings of indigenous 
movements (Bebbington 2004). 
The decision to examine the case of the Shuar movement was motivated chiefly by a 
concern to 'put politics first' in my associated belief that an understanding of the 
political interests and actions of indigenous actors is the very stuff of much 
contemporary resource politics. This thesis has not been, however, about exemplifying 
how to 'do' political organising, but rather has sought to develop critical insights into 
the complex effects of such indigenous resistance against the practices of traditional 
powerful actors, such as states and transnational corporations. Certainly, the Shuar case 
study has revealed much ambiguity and tension in this process. Analysing this topic has 
therefore helped us to better understand what indigenous politics means for various 
groups and how these meanings relate to diverse political, economic and cultural 
motivations. This study thus adds to debate over the possible impact and meaning of 
indigenous struggles and has sought to understand such struggles as being, above all, 
complex and multi-faceted in nature. 
Such understanding is clearly needed in the wider literature on political ecology and 
social movement which, sometimes, has seemed to be trapped in simplistic 
appreciations of indigenous struggles. Undoubtedly, there were 'noble' ethical 
based 
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resources here. And yet, analytical complexity and normative engagement can go hand- 
in-hand. 
First, this study showed certainly how the political influence and achievements of 
indigenous organisations can be quite remarkable. Our case study discussed this in 
detail with reference to the Shuar federations, FIPSE and FICSH, but similar processes 
have occurred elsewhere (for example, Sawyer 2004). Shifts in the exercise of 
organised power and greater local control over the development process is perhaps the 
key achievement of Shuar struggles--but this shift was even more ambiguous and 
complex than I had anticipated when I began this research. On the one hand, the 
federations wished to strengthen a conception of Shuar identity largely grounded in the 
past, more 'traditional' forms of production and social organisation. Thus, their 
emphasis was notably on ethnic self-determination and cultural 'revalorisation'. On the 
other hand, the federations also demanded fairer access for Shuar people to markets, 
credit, research, and participation in the national political system--all processes that 
could be seen to jeopardise Shuar cultural identity. 
This insight illustrates how analysis of indigenous movements can benefit from a more 
critical look at the motives and assumptions behind indigenous strategies. Thus, 
indigenous movements need to be understood as a dynamic response to changing 
contexts--a response that is constructed in other words through strategies of indigenous 
actors 'situated' within economic, socio-political and ecological contexts that are 
products of complex and contingent local, national and transnational processes. And 
yet, these strategies are not simply passive 'adaptations to environment'. Thus, for 
example, indigenous movements may even pursue practices that, on the surface at least, 
seem to be counter-productive--the incorporation of modem organisational and 
development strategies (for example cattle ranching) as a part of a strategy for cultural 
and economic survival. While these practices may challenge perceived notions about 
4indigenous' livelihoods, at the same time they may also provide resources and ideas 
that are taken in and reworked by indigenous people to their advantage. Indigenous 
movements are both selective and eclectic in their strategy choices --choices that do not 
necessarily mesh with the concepts analysts have of them, but which are nonetheless 
possibly more coherent and helpful to the Shuar themselves. 
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Whether or not these are adequate responses is a separate question. If research does not 
understand the factors underlying them, however, it will never make a useful 
contribution to the specification or support of 'alternative' development strategies. 
Instead, there is the risk of imposing 'our' own perceptions of what is 'alternative' and 
'indigenous'. The sort of empirical phenomena considered in this thesis demand further 
analysis and explanation, and complicate greatly any notion of indigenous movements 
as being simply civil society agents, or as only being involved in acts of resistance, or 
as only being about the defence of culture. A whole range of complex and hybrid 
identities are clearly at stake here, and this ought to occupy more attention in research 
that examines indigenous struggles. 
Second, this thesis has highlighted the essential complexity of the interests of 
indigenous actors as they interact with each other, with other actors, and with the 
biophysical environment. We saw how indigenous movements are not always unified in 
their aims and interests. Here, internal divisions indeed weakened the political 
effectiveness of the Shuar movement. These internal differences have become notably 
manifested in struggles between indigenous organisations and indigenous communities, 
and encompass how local people organise politically, define cultural identity and 
mediate access to land and other resources. Thus, indigenous movements can be 
understood as complex 'fields of power' insofar as they are accordingly differentiated 
socially, politically and economically and express different sorts of social relations. 
Thus, they have to be understood as internally complex even as their strategies are 
ambiguous and multi-faceted in nature. These complexities within indigenous 
movements represent a less studied aspect that also ought to occupy far more attention 
in scholarly work. 
Finally, indigenous federations strategies, indeed the very existence of federations, are 
influenced by religious, non-governmental, state and transnational corporate entities. 
We saw how the success of the Shuar federations was linked to the provision of 
political, financial and technical support from associated benefactors, such as religious 
groups as well as national and international NGOs. Yet, reliance on outside support 
meant that sometimes the decisions made regarding the design and implementation of 
projects came from outside support agencies rather than from the Shuar themselves. 
In 
these cases, what was intended originally to be a process of grassroots organising 
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turned out in practice to be merely participation by grassroots actors in a programme 
that was planned by outsiders. This raises troubling questions about the long-term 
viability of indigenous political organising. This thesis has suggested that there is often 
logic to the alliances that develop between different actors based on their organisational 
traits and interests. Thus, for example, a recurrent theme within political ecology is the 
6 natural' alliance between grassroots actors and NGOs. While my study has questioned 
this 'naturalness' of these alliances by highlighting the tensions and conflicts between 
actors, I nonetheless would emphasise that there is a further need for political ecologists 
and other researchers to engage in theoretical and empirical work that readdresses the 
political and ethical issues surrounding the multi-scalar networks and organisational 
strategies through which local people increasingly seek to secure natural resources and 
livelihoods. In the case presented here, these strategies not only involve material 
concerns but also the symbolic representational practices of identity construction itself. 
It is worth concluding this thesis with a few final comments about the question of the 
practical role and purpose of political ecology research on indigenous movements. Who 
is the intended audience for this research and what it is hoped to achieve? It is my belief 
that political ecology is a research field that seeks to explain the topography of a 
politicised environment, and the role that diverse actors play in constructing that 
environment, so to better assist those actors disadvantaged in society who are fighting 
for social justice and environmental conservation (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Neumann 
2005; Peet and Watts 2004; Robbins 2004). Yet, in doing so, I would argue, it is vital to 
acknowledge the essential complexity of the interests of actors as they interact with 
each other and with the environment as well as the possibilities for 'liberatory' 
unintended consequences to emerge. Indeed, this thesis has done so inasmuch as it 
highlighted the diverse political, economic, cultural and strategic considerations that 
have influenced indigenous movements. As we have also seen, however, the path of 
creating an alternative vision and polity is littered with severe obstacles. 
Hitherto, political ecologists have tended for the most part to describe problems rather 
than prescribe solutions. It may be that this role is the most important contribution that 
scholars can make given that, in order to resolve the Third World's environmental 
crises, one must first clearly understand the nature and dynamic of those crises. The 
case for a more politically engaged political ecology is nonetheless compelling 
(Bryant 
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and Jarosz 2004; Neumann 2005). The suggestion here is not that political ecologists Cý 
and other critical scholars are unaware of this literature and its practical implications, 
but rather that now is the time for research to reflect increasingly the practicalities and 
ethics of sustained political engagement given the constraints and opportunities of the 
current historical juncture. 
The elaboration of such political engagement is a valid and important task, as part of a 
sustained questioning of dominant ideas and policies (Peet and Watts 2004). However, 
this political engagement must also be constructed from actual practice as well as being 
grounded in the aspirations of indigenous actors. This thesis has shown, however, that 
indigenous political organising is likely to always remain a contested and contradictory 
process, where different actors express a variety of interests, ideas and meanings. The 
paradox here is that some of these practices may incorporate precisely the features of 
'modernity' and 'development' that scholars have long rallied against. Those who are 
in the business of investigating or working with indigenous movements must therefore 
be aware of and sensitive to popular aspirations here. There is finally a sense of 
urgency insofar as, often with indigenous people, there is the immediate problem of 
survival. Most Shuar residents, for example, have not the time to wait for possible new 
opportunities to be devised by scholars and/or social movement activists. If a material 
basis for the survival of Amazonian communities is not assured soon, a key element of 
indigenous identity will be eroded. Should this happen, then cultural struggles will have 
little apparent significance in the longer term, as indigenous people will be unable to 
sustain the material basis on which their very cultural identity rests. In the current 
policy context, this material basis is threatened. The challenge here, then, is to build 
pragmatic and realistic responses that work from contemporary contexts-- and which do 
so in a way that promotes longer-term opportunities reflective of the basic visions and 
strategies of the indigenous movements themselves. In its own way, this thesis has 
sought to contribute to this broader task through a nuanced appreciation of the complex 
dynamics surrounding specific indigenous struggles in Ecuador, and it is hoped thereby, 
a better understanding of the constraints and opportunities that are likely to shape these 
struggles in the years ahead. 
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Appendix 
Guide Questions for Qualitative Interviews 
The following questions guided the qualitative interviews with various actors including 
notably Shuar community residents, Shuar federation leaders, national and International 
NGO workers, and state officials. These questions were for general guidance only and 
tended to vary depending on the interview context and interviewee responses. 
How do the Shuar people perceive social, cultural, economic and political 
changes? 
How are cultural and social practices relating to the biophysical environment 
constructed among the Shuar? 
How and why did the Shuar mobilise and organise politically in the past and how 
has such struggle changed over time? 
To what extent and in what ways are the Shuar seeking to resist state 
'development' programmes and oil company interventions? How far is community 
resistance an outcome of the actions of the Shuar federations? 
How do the Shuar attempt to construct a political strategy based on the connection 
between identity, culture and politics? What role have the Shuar federations 
played in this process? 
0 Who are the recognised leaders in the Shuar federations and/or communities? 
How are community concerns about the social and environmental impacts of 
'development' first raised? How are they discussed? How are they resolved, if at 
all? 
How are decisions made in the communities and in the federations? Who is 
involved in decision-making? 
How is information from outside of Shuar territory accessed (and what sorts of 
information are thus acquired)? Who brings information from the outside to the 
community? How is such information spread in the community and with what 
effect? 
How are community decisions and information shared with outsiders? Who is 
responsible for disseminating village perspectives to outsiders? Which outsiders 
are involved in such information exchange and why? 
What relationships exist between the Shuar federations and the Shuar 
communities? How do these relationships affect life in the communities? 
What kinds of place-based relations exist within the communities and how do 
these connections relate to the development of local sense of place? Are there 
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variations in such a local sense of place among the Shuar, and how do 
'development' programmes and/or oil development affect the local construction of 
a sense of place? 
How is the concept of territory understood among the Shuar and how important is 
it to them? 
How and to what extent are community residents able to articulate identity claims, 
local cultural practices, and sense of place in and through Shuar federation-led 
territorial initiatives? 
What is the nature of Shuar community access to local biophysical and material 
resources? How are resources allocated among community residents? Who makes 
the decisions here? How does such community decision-making relate to the 
decisions of outside actors such as state agencies and/or private corporations 
concerning land and natural resources? 
In what ways is local resource access important to Shuar communities and how 
does this vary across and within these communities? How and why have the Shuar 
attempted to protect these resources? What role (if any) have the Shuar federations 
played in this process? 
How do Shuar communities relate to the federations over how to define 
'traditional' Shuar access to natural and material resources as intended for 
dissemination to outsiders (e. g. state officials, NGO workers)? Do any differences 
and tensions arise between communities and federations in this process of 
identification? Indeed, do divisions emerge within the Shuar communities 
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Anguash, Miguel (2003) Community resident in Ijinti, Interview held the I Oth 
December in Ijinti, Pastaza Province 
Anguash, Rosa (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 23 rd 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Anguisha, Estaban (2003) Community elder in Naparuk, Interview held the 16 th 
October, Naparuk, Morona Santiago Province 
Anguisha, Jesus (2003) Community resident in Naparuk, Interview held the 17 th 
October, Naparuk, Morona Santiago Province 
Anguisha, Milton (2003) Community resident in Naparuk, Interview held the 17 th 
October, Naparuk, Morona Santiago Province 
Anguisha, Oswaldo (2003) Community resident in Naparuk, Interview held the 17 th 
October, Naparuk, Morona Santiago Province 
Antuash, Patricio (2002) Secretary for the Comit' Interfederacional, Interview held e1 
the I Ith September Comite Interfederaclonal Second Annual Meeting, Shinkiatam, 
Morona Santiago Province 
Arboela, Carlos (2003) Senior Official Ministry of Energy and Mining, Conversation 
at the ComW Interfederacional Meeting in Makuma, 12-13 th December 
Belen Paez, Maria (2004) Representative for Pachamama, Con-ýite Interfederacilonal 
Meeting, 3 I't March, Puyo 
Beltran, Bolivar (2004) Representative for The Institute for Science and 
Interdisciplinary Studies (ISIS), Interview held the 31't March Comite 
Interfederaclional Meeting, Puyo 
Canellos, Francisco (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 15th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Chumbia, Armando (2003) Community resident in Ijinti, Interview held the 2 nd 
December in Ijinti, Pastaza Province 
Chumpi, Cesar (2003) Community resident in Ijinti, Interview held the 2 nd December 
in Ijinti, Pastaza Province 
Chumpi, Luis (2004) Community elder in Mukucham, Interview held the 15 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
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Elliot, David (2004) Representative of Pacharnarna, Interview held the I" May at the 
Pacharnarna office, Quito 
Himpikit, Patricio (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 15 th 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Himpikit, Rosa (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 15t" 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Jambis, Milton (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 28 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Koster, Harko (2004) Co-coordinator SNV, Interview held the 15 th May at the SNV 
office, Macas 
Kuash, Calixto (2003) Community resident in Chuwitayu, Interview held the 26 th 
December in Chuwitayu, Pastaza Province 
Kuash, Luis (2003) Founder of Ijinti Educational Project, Interview held the 28 th jUly 
in Ijinti, Pastaza Province 
Kuash, Luis (2004) Founder of Ijinti and fonner CONFENIAE leader, Interview held 
the 13 th January at the CONFENIAE office, Union Base, Puyo 
Kuash, Manuel (2003) Community Resident in Chuwitayu, Interview held the 26 th 
December in Chuwitayu, Pastaza Province 
Kuja, Amelia (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 5 th April 
in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Kuja, Armando (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 3 rd 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Kuja, Bartolome, (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 3d 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Kuja, Carmela (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 1st April 
in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Kuja, Lauro (2004) Teacher in Ijinti and community resident in Jurallpa, interview 
held in the 15 th March in Jurallpa, Pastaza Province 
Kuja, Pedro (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 3 rd April in 
Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Lopez, Victor (2002) CDES representative, Interview held at the CDES office, Quito 
Maiche, Manuel (2003) Shuar leader, Arutam, Interview held the 13 th December in 
Ijinti, Pastaza Province 
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Martinez, Maria (2003) Community elder in Naparuk, Interview held the 20 th October 
in Naparuk, Morona Santiago Province 
Melo, Mario (2002) CDES representative, Interview held the 17 th jUjY' CDES office, 
Quito 
Mukucham, Alfonso (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 
24 th February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Mukucham, Angel (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 24h 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Mukucham, Hilda (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 16 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Mukucham, Ilda (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 15 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Mukucham, Jorge (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 24 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Mukucham, Luis (2004) Community elder in Mukucham, Interview held the 15 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province. 
Mukucham, Pedro (2004) Community elder in Mukucham, Interview held the 25 th 
March, in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Mukucham, Tsamariant (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 
23 rd February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Nantip, Gonzalo (2002) Vice President FICSH, Interview held the 30 th July, Sucua 
Nantip, Gonzalo (2004) Vice-President FICSH, Interview held the 15 th April, FICSH 
office, Sucua 
Nayap, Daniel (2004), FIPSE leader, Finance, Interview held the 16 th May, FIPSE 
office, Macas 
Na andey, Bosco (2004) Ex-president FIPSE, Interview held the 15 
th May, FIPSE i 
office, Macas 
Najandey, Manuel (2002) FIPSE leader, Interview held the 15th June, FIPSE office, 
Macas 
Nunkias, Rosiendo (2004), FICSH leader, territory, Interview held the 15 th April, 
FICSH office, Sucua 
Pandam, Pedro (2004) FICSH leader, Interview held the 14 th April, FICSH office, 
Sucua 
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Pandam, Rafael (2002) Vice-President FIPSE, Interview held the 24 th July, FIPSE 
office, Macas 
Peas, Gonzalo (2003) Community Resident in Ijinti, Interview held the 17 th December 
in Ijinti, Pastaza Province 
Pitiur, Alfredo (2004) President of OSHE, Interview held the 23 rd March, OSHE 
office, Macas 
Puanchir, Tito (2002) Vice-president of CONAIE and Ex-president of FIPSE, 
Interview held the 14 th jUly, CONAEE office, Quito 
Puanchir, Tito (2004) Vice-president of CONAEE and Ex-president of FIPSE, 
Interview held the 3 I't January, Comite Interfederaclional meeting in Puyo 
Rodriguez, N, F, Dr. (2004) Senior Official, Ministry of Environment, Interview held 
the 20th January, Ministry and Environment office, Quito 
Sanduo, Francisco (2002) Ex-president of FIPSE, Interview held the 25 th July, FIPSE 
office, Macas 
Sandu, Kuamar (2002), Co-coordinator Comite Interfederaclional, Interview held at 
the Comite Interfederaclional Second Annual Meeting, I lth September, Shinkiatam, 
Morona. Santiago Province 
Serrano, Jose (2004) Lawyer working for CDES, Interview held the15 th April, CDES 
office, Quito 
Shakay, Adolfo (2004) Ex-President CONFENIAE, Interview held the 22 nd January, 
Union Base, Puyo 
Shakay, Rosa (2004) FICSH leader, Interview held 31s' January, Comite 
Interfecleraclional meeting in Puyo 
Taki, Jorge (2003) President of Ijinti, Interview held the 3d March in Ijinti, Pastaza 
Province 
Taki, Jorge (2004) President of Ijinti, Interview held the 28 th February in Mukucham, 
Pastaza Province 
Tivi, Elias Catani (2002), Former FIPSE leader, Interview held the 15 th July, FEPSE 
office, Macas 
Tibi, Manuel, (2004) Shuar shaman, Interview held the 15 th October in Naparuk, 
Morona Santiago Province 
Tibi, Manuel (2002) A young Shuar living outside Puyo, Interview held the 31 July in 
Puyo, Pastaza Province 
Tibi, Silvia (2002) Shuar leader, FENASH, Interview held the 30th August in Puyo 
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Tsamariant, Manuel (2002) Community resident in Chuwitayu, Interview held the 28 th 
July in Chuwitayu, Pastaza Province 
Tseremp, Gonzalo (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 16 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Tsere, Pablo (2002) Ex- President FISCH, Interview held the 3 I't June, FICSH office, 
Sucua 
Tsere, Pablo (2004) Ex-President FICSH, Interview held the 31st, ComW 
Interfederacional Meeting, Puyo 
Tsere, Pedro (2002) FICSH leader, Interview held the 3 Is' June 2002, FICSH office, 
Sucua 
Tupac, Cesar (2004) Shuar leader FIPSE, Interview held the 3 I't March 2004, ComW 
Interfederacional Meeting, Puyo 
Tukupi, Marco (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 15'h 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Uwi, R (2002) Shuar leader FICSH, Interview held the 23 d July, FICSH office, 
Sucua, Pastaza Province 
Vargas, Luis (2004) Achuar leaders FINAE, Interview held the 31st March, ComW 
Interfederad'onal Meeting, Puyo 
Vargas, Miguel (2004) Shuar leader CONFENIAE, Interview held the 22 nd January 
CONFENIAE office, Union Base, Puyo 
Vargas, Kuash, , Patricia 
(2003) Community Resident in Ijinti, Interview held the 22 nd 
December in Ijinti, Pastaza 
Government Registry 
Ley de Prevenclion y Control de la Contaminaclion Ambiental (Law for the Prevention 
and Control of Environmental pollution) No. 374; Registro Oficial 1997-98: 31.5.5.76, 
articles 8-11,16,20 
Ley Forestal y de Conservaclion de areas Naturales y Vida Silvestre y Reglamento 
(Law and regulation on Forests and Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife) 
No. 74; Registro Oficial 64: 28.8.81 and Decreto Ejecutivo 1529; Registro Oficial 
436: 22.2.83 
Ley que Protege la Biodiversidad (Law for the Protection of Biodiversity) No 3: 
Registro Oficial 35: 27.9.96 
Oficio No. 0095-DNH-EE 02 0171,10th January 2002, Director Nacional de 
Hidrocarburos, Ing. Juan Carlos Bermeo, Gerente de Desarollo de Negocios de 
Burlington, Sr Herb Vickers 
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Tsamariant, Manuel (2002) Community resident in Chuwitayu, Interview held the 28h 
July in Chuwitayu, Pastaza Province 
Tseremp, Gonzalo (2004) Community resident in Mukucham, Interview held the 16 th 
February in Mukucham, Pastaza Province 
Tsere, Pablo (2002) Ex- President FISCH, Interview held the 31 st June, FICSH office, 
Sucua 
Tsere, Pablo (2004) Ex-President FICSH, Interview held the 3 l't, Comite 
Interfederacional Meeting, Puyo 
Tsere, Pedro (2002) FICSH leader, Interview held the 31st June 2002, FICSH office, 
Sucua 
Tupac, Cesar (2004) Shuar leader FIPSE, Interview held the 31" March 2004, Comite 
Interfederacional Meeting, Puyo 
Tukupi, Marco (2004) Community resident in Shinkiatam, Interview held the 15 1h 
April in Shinkiatam, Morona Santiago Province 
Uwi, R (2002) Shuar leader FICSH, Interview held the 23 rd July, FICSH office, 
Sucua, Pastaza Province 
Vargas, Luis (2004) Achuar leaders FINAE, Interview held the 3 1't March, ComW 
Interfederacilonal Meeting, Puyo 
Vargas, Miguel (2004) Shuar leader CONFENIAE, Interview held the 22 d January 
CONFENIAE office, Union Base, Puyo 
Vargas, Kuash, , Patricia (2003) 
Community Resident in Ijinti, Interview held the 22 nd 
December in Ijinti, Pastaza 
Government Registry 
Ley de Prevenclion y Control de la Contaminaclion Ambiental (Law for the Prevention 
and Control of Environmental pollution) No. 374; Registro Oficial 1997-98: 31.5.5.76, 
articles 8-11,16,20 
Ley Forestal y de Conservacion de, areas Naturales y Vida Silvestre y Reglamento 
(Law and regulation on Forests and Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife) 
No. 74; Registro Oficial 64: 28.8.81 and Decreto Ejecutivo 1529; Registro Oficial 
436: 22.2.83 
Ley que Protege la Biodiversidad (Law for the Protection of Biodiversity) No 3; 
Registro Oficial 35: 27.9.96 
Oficio No. 0095-DNH-EE 02 0171,10th January 2002, Director Nacional de 
Hidrocarburos, Ing. Juan Carlos Bermeo, Gerente de Desarollo de Negocios de 
Burlington, Sr Herb Vickers 
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Reglamento para la Prevenclion y Control de la Contaminacion (Regulation for the Prevention and Control of Pollution, regarding water resources) No. 2144; Registro 
Oficial 204: 5.6.89, Articles 11,17,22-25,64 
ArtiCulo 5 de la Constituion 
ArtiCulo 83 de la Constituion 
ArtiCulo 84 de la Constftuion 
ArtiCulo 83 de la Constituion 
ArtiCulo 224 de la Constituion 
ArtiCulo 241 de la Constftuion 
ArtiCulo 247 de la Constituion 
ArtiCulo 248 de la Constftuion 
Ecuadorian State Laws 
1964 Ley de Desarrollo Agrario 
1964 Ley de Tierras Baltidas 
1993. Hydrocarbon Law 
1994. Ley de Ordenarniento del Sector Agrario 
IERAC Documents 
1992 Title Deeds 
1994 Indigenous Territories 
Web-based Materials 
Abya Yala (1992) "Ecuador/ Indian March", 
http: //abyayala. nativeweb. org/ecuador/quichua am/apr92 4. htm] 
Amazonwatch (2004a) Houston-based Burlington Resources Prepares to Use 
Ecuadorian Military to Forcibly Enter Amazon Indian Lands- Military Invasion 
Expected as Early as Tomorrow", Assessed the 28 th January 2004, 
www. amazonwatch. oriz 
(2004b) "Amazonian Indigenous Leaders Travel to Houston 
Call on Burlington Resources to Immediately Abandon Controversial Oil Drilling 
Projects on Their Territories", Assessed 14 th April 2004, www. amazon watch. orR 
(2004c) "Burlington's Oil Pro'ects vs. Indigenous Communities and 
Rainforest Protection", Assessed 15 
ltý 
April 2004, www. amazonwatch. org 
(2004d) "Amazonian Indigenous Chief Addresses Burlington Resources 
Shareholders on Controversial Oil Projects", Assessed 21s' April 2004, 
www. amazonwatch. or. g 
282 
(2004e) "New Problems for Burlington Resources' Rainforest Drilling Plans", 
Assessed 27 th April 2004, www. amazonwatch. org 
Burlington Resources (2003), Annual Report 2003, http: //", ww. br--inc. com 
(2004a) "Indigenous Communities Rights Policy" 
(2004b) "Ecuador: The Status of Blocks 23 and 24", Assessed 3 I't August 2004, 
http: //www. br-inc. com/rei)utation/ecuadorstatusfacts. qsýx 
(2004c) "Environment, Health and Management Systems", Assessed 0 
September 2004, http: //www. br-inc. com/rei)utation/environmentalhealthandsafety. asp 
ECORAE (2004) "Desaffos de la Amazonia", Assessed 21 January 2004, 
http: //www. ecorae. org, 
ELDIS (2004) "Tools for Participation", Assessed August 2003, www. eldis-com 
El Univesro (2004) "Indigenas piden salida Burlington", Assessed April 2004 
http: //www. eluniverso. com/core3/eluniverso. asp? 
page=notici a&i d=9 &tab= I &contid= 
FB542A255OBF4DA7BF3CC45DO08E7922&EUID=t 
Expreso de Guayaquil (1999) 25 th jUjy 1999 
The Houston Chronicle (2004) "Tribe delivers message at shareholder meeting", 
Assessed April 2004, 
http: //www. chron. com/cs/CDA/ssistory. mpl/business/enerp-y/2522708 
Instituto Geografico Militar (2004) Map of Ecuador, http: //www. igm. gov. ec/ 
New York Times (2004) "Burlington Resources Plans for Ecuador Run Into 
Opposition", Assessed April 2004, 
http: //www. nytimes. com/2004/04/22/business/22enerRy. html 
Pachamama (1999) "Court Decides in Favor of Indigenous Federations and Against 
Arco", Assessed June 2002, www. pachamama. org 
(2001a) "Achuar and Shuar Federations Stand in Solidarity Against Oil 
Development", Assessed June 2003, www. pachamama. Qrg 
(2001b) -FIPSE Completes Land-use Planning Proposal for New Regional 
Development Strategy", Assessed June 2002, www. pachamama. orR 
(2002a) "Shuar Federation and Team of International NGO's Collaborates with 
Pachamama to Implement Groundbreaking Plan for Territorial Management and 
Development", Assessed June 2002, www. pachamama. grg 
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(2002b) "Over 500 Achuar and Shuar marched in solidarity, as their federations 
present a lawsuit to defend their territories against illegal incursions by Texas-based 
oil company Burlington Resources", Assessed June 2002, www. pachamama. org 
(2002c) "AMAZONGISNET -A Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
Network for Indigenous Cartographers", Assessed June 2002, www. pachamama. org 
(2003) "Ecuadorian Ministry of Government Temporarily Suspends Exploratory 
Oil Operations in Achuar and Shuar Ancestral Territory", Assessed January, 
www. pachamama. oEg 
PROPEDINE (2002) "Ecuador: Project for the Development of Indigenous Peoples in 
Ecuador", Assessed August 2002, http: //www. PROPEDINE. oEg 
Sarayacu (2005) "The Government protects an oil company that has violated our 
constitution and our laws", Assessed April, www. sarayacu. com 
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